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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis analyses the impact of strategy on the 
financial performance and risk of industrial firms 
quoted on tl1e Johannesburg Stock Exchange over the 
period 1970 - 1976. Thi$ _;Ls_the first study inves-
tigating the impact of strategy on economic perfor-
mance in a developing economy and which utilizes a 
managerially orientated view of diversification to 
assess the association between strategy, performance 
and ~ystematic risk. 
The strategic categorization scheme employed is 
·based-on a-methodology which is common to explor-
atory studies carried out in more developed 
econorr.ies . 
Firms were placed into strategic categories based 
on the extent, manner and type of diversification 
that they exhibited. Four major and nine sub-
categories were identified. 
The results showed that South African industrial 
firms are not highly diversified and the compos~ 
ition of the firms suggest that they are at a 
stage of development that is comparable to that 
of the developed economies in 1950 when measured 
on the extent and manner of diversification. 
The growth and return performance of both major 
and sub-categories were analysed and a number of 
hypotheses were tested. The results showed that 
there are significant differences in performance 
between the categories and that utilizing the 
strategy classification system it was possible to 
distinguish between categories. In addition, the. 
ranking of strat8gies, based or. performance was -
found to differ significantly from the United 
s·tates research f indi.ngs. 
A_n important_a.spect of the study was the~ evaluation 
of risk based on strat~gy. A number of overseas 
studies been unable to explain the impact of strategy 
on diversification. By employing techniques developed 
in the finance area, this study has shown that the 
strategic categories d.i.f fer in both levered systematic 
/risk and in 
i 
risk and in unlevered systematic risk. 
It was concluded that strategy does ~ffect systematic 
risk and that when the risk· surrogate is adjusted fo:c 
-leverage, strategy has an important ef feet on the 
business risk component. 
The findings have important. implications for both 
managers, educationalists and academics. The 
research has provided insight into the effect of 
strategy on corporate value and p·erformance and 
forms a basis from which future research into 
economic performance in the developing economy may 
·flow. 
ii 
To Barbara, Felicity and Robert, 
my own attempts to move to a more 
diversified portfolio. 
\' 
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.1. 
I. INTRODUCTION, SCOPE AND Bl\CKGROUND 
:I.l Introduction 
The subject of this study is the manner in which 
complex organizations have decided to develop strategic-
ally and the performance of these organizations as 
measured by financial performance and risk. This is some-
times refered to as policy formulation and implementation • 
. 
The subject is of interest to both the managers of these 
complex organizations and to outsiders such as investors 
and researchers. The study can be described as an analysis 
of "top management~; "decision-making processes"; or even 
·· "an evaluation of strategic selection" •. 
Such a study which examines the evolution of the rela-
tionship between a particular environment and groups of 
firms which have selected similar patterns of development 
of considerable interest. It seems that as industrial 
firms grow, they become more complex and the more complex 
an organization becomes, the more difficult it is to assure 
that resources are obtained and used ef feciively and eff ic-
iently in the accomplishment of the organizations objec-
. 1 
tives. It seems logical to assume that if the environ-
ment in-which the firm operates, is different in some way, 
or is changing and developing, then studies should be 
carried out in these different environments to establish the 
unique relationships which may or may not arise. However use-
ful and interesting such a study may be, the scope is beyond that 
2 • 
which can be handled by a single researcher. What is 
required to achieve and generate this body of knowledge, is 
a series of studies each of which fbcusses on a particular 
environment. 'Ihe_ critical element selected for this study is the 
"developing economy". To facilitate understanding of the 
n~ture and implications of the study a brief discussion of I . 
' 
what can be termed the "philosophy of research in general 
I 
management" follows. 
Men have been making strategic policy decisions for 
the organizations which they have controlled for a few 
thousand years. Many of these individuals have proved to 
be extremely successful in this role. Yet others have 
shown themselves to be incompetent. The successful 
leaders appear to adopt strategies and actions which, 
although based on the same information as that available to 
the unsuccessful leaders, are shaped by a "knowledge" and 
"skill" which is not generally available. Although we are 
now in the realm of "education," it seems obvious that 
skills and knowledge can be learned. However, a prior 
requirement is that the information to be learned be 
explicitly identified, articulated and converted into a 
form which is then available for disemination. 
There are however, certain important problems. 
First, the knowledge that successful leaders and execu-
tives possess may be based on practical experience and 
intui ti.on. This type of knowledge is difficult to 
. -· 
3. 
identify and articulate. Secondly, it is likely to be 
difficult to translate this information and skill to 
individuals who do not have the benefit of experience. 
The relatively limited emphasis which many firms ap-
pearto place on training their exec·1tives for roles in 
general management leads one to assume that the role of 
the general manager is a relatively simple one. Andrews 
states that "little special effort is directed to the 
education of general managers, and that little opportunity 
is afforded either in education or in industry to special-
ize in generality 112 An aspiring general manager typically 
receives his training "o·n the job." He is expected to 
either "sink or swim." Others have also noted the impor-
tance of the generalist. For example, Sir Eric Ashby 
an experienced administrator and also Master of Clare College, 
Cambridge, has noted: 
" .•• the world needs generalists as 
as specialists. Indeed you have only 
to read your newspaper to know that the 
big decisions on which the fate of 
nations depends are in the hands of 
generalists. I do not think that 
Universities, American or British, ar·e 
sati~f ied with the education they give 
the man who is to become a generalist ... 
~~ _can wi tl1. some conf_idence prescrib~----­
the minutiae of curriculum for doctors, 
Phiy~icists, and lawyers. The unpalatable 
fact is that we have no confidence in 
prescribing curricula for men who will 
become presidents of industries, news-
paper editors, senior civil servants, 
or congressman !'3 
To return to Andrews: 
,, 
l 
! 
4. 
"Both our failure to establish a tra-
dition of specific preparation for 
general management responsibilities and 
our casual selection of candidates for 
this post on the basis of effective past 
performance of a specialty(which may 
require few of the coordinating skills 
needed for overall leadership) bespeak 
an historic disrespect for the preten-
sions of general management to being a 
specialty of its own."4 
A major difficulty which has, and which continues to 
plague the field of general management, is the fact that 
the theoretical foundations are still to be firmly estab-
lished. This study seeks to examine and to establish the 
relevant relationships between strategy, performances, and 
risk and to make a small contribution towards the estab-
lishm~nt of a theoretical body of literature. 
In sunm1ary, a reason for conducting research is to 
establish a b6dy knowledge so that, knowledge may become 
generally available to assist managers to operate more 
efficiently. Bauer maintains: 
"Man has proceeded and succeeded in many 
enterprises by rule of thumb. The fact 
that he has done better than chance and 
often been quite successful has not 
diminished one general faith that a 
fuller understanding of the phenomena 
with which he deals will be of use. On 
the whole, it has been mankinds experience 
that we are able to guide our affairs more 
to our liking as we better understand what 
we are doing. 11 5 
Bauer makes a strong argument for basic research. He 
notes that "rocks were thrown ... and guns and canons 
constructed ... before the science of ballistics was 
developed." The study of general management is in a 
( 
5 • 
. similar position. We believe that there are those who 
throw rocks particularly well and that their methods 
need to be studied, evaluated and then communicated if 
one is interested in having better-thrown rocks. 
There are very real and obvious reasons for attempt-
ing to study, .analyze and develop a formal explanation of 
corporate performance. These explanations, although based 
on ex-post data and situations, can be useful in the 
directing and controlling resources towards concrete ends. 
This research attempts to identify variables and relations 
that can be measured and controlled in order to facilitate 
decisions which will affect future situations in a 
business context. 
To date, relatively few studies have been carried 
out which seek to explain the growth, risk and perfor-
mance of the firm. Although a large number of descrip-
tive attempts have been made and which have made signifi-
cant contributions, considerably more analytical work is 
required to provide an empirical base for future research 
and to provide relevant theory and academic rigour in the 
field of "Business Policy". · 
Kerlinger maintains that a "workable theory" is an 
attempt "to explain natural phenomena" and defines a 
theory as follows: 
"A theory is a set of interrelated constructs 
(concepts), definitions, and propositions 
that present a systematic view of phenomena 
by specificying relations among variables, 
with the purpose of explaining and predict-
ing the phenomena."? 
6 . 
In the field of business policy the identification 
and definition of the concepts that are most useful from 
a research point of view are very difficult to obtain. 
This is due primarily to the complexity of the problem 
to be studied which concerns all the disciplines in busi-
ness management. Research in the Business Policy area 
at the present stage of development, requires explanations 
which are not, nor can be, as definitive as those possible 
in say, the physical sciences. Rather the research attempts 
to provide the individual manager and strategist with 
some control over the complex situation which he faces. 
The complexity of the decision facing a manager should 
not be underestimated. Miller and Starr note that "a 
machine-shop problem, of no apparent complexity, could 
involve 2.5 quintillion strategies. 118 In the analysis of 
marketing decisions they maintain that "the discussions 
of marketing strategies are so varied that it is in-
conceivable to include all of them. in a formal analysis. 119 
To illustrate the complexity of a very simplified market-
ing problem they ask the reader to imagine: 
"that the decision-making strategy includes 
5 possible product designs, 5 prices, 5 
patterns of distribution, and 5 methods 
of communicating with the consumers. This 
-is a total of 625 strategies. If there 
are 4 competitors, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that each of the competitors has 
625 strategies available. Presuming that 
there are 5 states of nature, then the 
number of different conditions that can 
prevail is 476, 837, 158, 203, 125. Iron-
ically the only ludicrous thing about this 
number is that it is far too small to 
describe the actual situation. 11 10 
7 . 
Miller and Starr also recognise the complexity of 
the strategist's decision when they state that "the 
complex decision.of allocating an organisation's re-
sources may easily require an astronomical number of 
strategies to include all feasible alternatives. 1111 
This research will attempt to build on the frame-
works established by earlier studies in order to assist 
in the development of a more definitive and analytical 
approach to the formulation of corporate strategy and 
to develop a more powerful explanation of the relationship 
between managerial decision and corporate performance. 
Clearly then, from a practical point of view, given the 
complexity of the situation facing the manager, research 
in this field should attempt to seek and identify the 
most significant variables and to mea~ure, if possible, 
the extent and manner of these relationships. 
( 
8. 
I.2 Purpose and Scope 
This study is concerned with the development of and 
the strategies adopted by quoted industrial companies in 
the developing country of South Africa and the financial 
performance of those companies over a seven year period. 
The major research objective is to assess the effects of 
strategic posture on financial performance and the risk 
associated with posture and performance. The study is 
the first of its kind to be carried out in what may be 
termed a developing economy. Much of the research per~ 
formed in the field of business administration is based in 
mature economies such as the United Kingdom, the United 
States of America, France and Germany. Yet the major 
proportion of world economies can be classified as devel-
oping economies. It would seem that too often, important 
decisions are taken in the less developed business environ-
ment, that are based on research and experience in very 
much more mature business conditions. With their limited 
resources and often very rapidly expanding populations, 
these economies cannot afford to make mistakes. 
9. 
I.3 Comparison Between Developed and Developing Countries 
This research topic is believed to be of importance 
to managers in the developing economy because of ·important 
differences between the environmental conditions faced 
by firms operating in the two economic situations. A 
corporate strategy which proves very effective in the 
"developed" economic environment may prove to be a fail-
ure in a "cileveloping" or "less developed" economic environ-
ment. There are a number of factors which may cause the 
performance of firms operating in the two environments to 
differ substantially. 12 . For example: 
differences in the costs of the factors of production 
differences in the scale of operation and 
differences in the characteristics of certain imputs. 
There are a number of important differences between 
developed and less developed countries. Certain of these 
characteristics are outlined in Table 1-1 below. 
Certain important features are worthy of discussion. 
For example: 
1.3.1 less developed countries have an abundance of 
unskilled labor, and 
1 3 2 . h f . 1 13 . . • experience a s ortage o capita . · 
1.3.1 Abundance of Unskilled Labour 
By examining Table 1-1 it is clear that the developing 
·nations have "excess" labour. Whereas the population of 
developed countries is 1.1 billion people, the GNP_is 
$4991 billion compared with 2.8 billion people and $632 
l"' 
J 
...................... ~~ 
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TABLE 1-1 
Profile of the Developed & Devel<.?J?.ing Nations 
(Data for 1974;values in 1974 U.S. Dollars) 
Developed 
Nations 
Developing 
· Nations** 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
Population '(in billions) 
Percentage of total world 
population 
Birth rate (per thousand) 
Death rate (per thousand) 
ECONOMIC 
GNP (gross national product -
$ billion) 
Percentage of total world GNP 
GNP growth rate (1970174) 
Per capita income (1974 $) 
Investment ($ billion) 
Per capita investment ($) 
Investment as a % of GNP 
Exports ($ billion) 
Percentage of total world 
exports 
SOCIAL 
Literate population (in millions) 
Malnourished.population (in 
millions) 
Poorest population in millions 
below $100 per capita 
Percentage of population 
1,1 
27,5 
17 
9 
4,991 
86,2 
3,6 
4,537 
1,098 
100 
22,0 
808 
77,5 
758 
10 
nil 
nil 
*~ includes countries of the Third World, but 
excludes OPEC members (except Indonesia and 
Nigeria) 
2,8 
70,0 
37 
14 
632 
10,9 
5,5 
226 
114 
4 
18,0 
134 
12,8 
746 
900 
942 
33,6 
World 
4,0 
100,0 
31 
13 
5,788 
100,0 
4,5 
1,447 
1,243 
31 
21,5 
1,043 
100,0 
1,522 
910 
942 
23,6 
Source: ~he Poverty Curtain, Mahbub ul Haq, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1977. I 
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billion respectively for the less developed nations. The 
less developed countiies have a massive unemployment prob-
lem. The degree of unemployment is difficult to gauge 
accurately due to the narrow definitions of unemployment 
used by these governments. The International Labour 
Organization unemployment statistics are therefore likely 
to be seriously understated. Certainly 'che South African 
figures are incorrect. 
Apart from measurement problems, the developing 
countries are believed to contain a large prop6rtion of 
what is termed "underemployment 11 or "disguised 11 employ-
ment. These terms refer to a situation where the re-
moval of units of labour (or other f actorl? of production) , 
would not, ceteris paribus, reduce the total amount of 
. d . . d . 14 h' pro uction - or may even increase. pro uction. T is 
condition would exist where the input of the factors of 
production are at a point Y or Z in Figure 1-1 and if 
reduced to X, production may increase, or not diminish. 
Figure 1-1 
Illustration of the Disguised Employment 
OUTPUT 
----.;...---L----1 
& I 
--------T----r----
1 I I 
: I : 
I ! I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
z x y 
INPU'J.' FACTOR I 
12. 
The agricultural and public service sectors are gener-
ally believed to contain a large proportion of disguised 
unemployment. Certainly the South African situation is 
in agreement with this reasoning and large amounts of un-
skilled labour exist. 
Whilst unskilled labour is abundant in the develop-
ing economy, it is also generally true that a scarcity of 
skilled labour and managerial expertise exists. South 
African data is difficult to obtain, but newspaper comment 
in this regard and the tendency of local firms to recruit 
managerial and technical staff from foreign countries is 
evidence of the local shortage of these skills. 
1.3.2. Capital Scarcity 
Availability of capital in developing economies is 
difficult to assess but a brief synopsis of the data in 
Table 1-1 above, will serve to illustrate the relative 
scarcity of capital. Investment as a percentage of Gross 
National Product is 22 percent for developed countries 
while the value for the developing nations is 18 percent. 
This is not a serious descrepancy as the values are 
roughly the same. When the investment value of $1098 
billion for developed nations is compared to that of the 
developing nation's investment of $114 billion the differ-
. ence is significant. As a percentage, the investment in 
developing nations is only 10.3 percent of that of the 
developing nat'ions. The disparity is even more evident 
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when the population factor is introduced as investment per 
capita of developing nations is only 4 percent of that of 
he developed nations. 
The developing nations also experience a faster popu-
lation growth and require considerable amounts of capital 
to generate employment for their growing populations, 
apart from the capital requirements necessary to reduce 
existing unemployment. 
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1.4 Strategic Choice in the Developing Countries 
Given the brief description of two of th~ major problems 
facing developing nations discussed above, it becomes im-
perative for firms in the developing countries to avoid 
wasting capital through inappropriate corporate decision 
making. It is at the corporate level that a large propor-
tion of capital is invested. These resource allocation 
decisions form part of, shape and flow from the corporate 
strategies of each of the firms. 
Discussions with executives and colleagues has re-
vealed that an extremely simplistic view of the situation 
facing d~veloping countries is taken by certain individuals. 
This view is that firms in developed countries have the 
benefit of hindsight in that they can simply examine the 
experiences of firms in developed economies and apply the 
same successful strategies in their local situation. Their 
answer assumes that the developing economy will follow 
the patterns experienced by the developed economy in arriv-
ing at that stage of development. Yet the corporate grave-
yards are full of firms that have attempted to transplant 
what was foun·d to be say, a successful marketing strategy 
in the United States, into the supposedly identical South 
.African marketing environment. A number of factors, some 
of which are discussed below, contribute towards producing 
a business environment in the present developing economy, 
which is very different to the conditions experienced by 
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firms in the present developed economy when those economies 
were in the "developing stage". 
1.4.1 Sources of Technology and Capital Goods 
During the period when the developed economies were 
"developing'', technological change was in response to an 
evolving market and was limited by the state of the art 
from a technological point of view. The changes that were 
necessary and that were made were "internally generated". 
The developing economies in today's world must import 
their capital goods. Thus the source to the developing 
economy is "externally generated" and is dependent to a 
large measure on the design requirements of the exporting, 
developed country. 
The imports of machinery and equipment by developing 
countries is significant. In 1974, imports of these items 
bj developing countries represented 36 percent of total 
imports. The export of these items in the same year was a 
15 
mere 1.9 percent. 
The design requirements of this equipment, as stated 
above, are determined in the·mature economy since many of 
the.larger firms in the developing economies are subsidiaries 
of firms already established in the developed economies. The 
equipment thus imported will, in most cases, be particularly 
suited to the production of products demanded by a relatively 
sophisticated markets in which the parent firm resides. A 
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further problem from a developing economy's point of view, 
is that equipment is likely to be designed for large scale 
production and will be less labour intensive, thereby 
aggravating an already chronic unemployment problem. 
From a strategic point of view, overcapacity, due to 
the large scale production for which a plant may be designed, 
and the product which is produced, when added to a technical 
and managerial manpower shortage in a market with limited 
purchasing power, may prove to be fatal. These problems 
were less critical to the firm which was located in an 
evolving market where the technology and scale of production 
was more suited to the needs of its developing market. 
An obvious question thus arises - Why do the de-
veloping countries not adopt and employ technologies and 
designs that were utilized by the present developed 
countries when they were at a comparable stage of develop-
ment? The answer is threefold. 
Firstly, the developing countries are in direct 
competition with the developed countries in almost all 
product areas. The developed countries are employing 
modern technologies which require less labour to produce 
and are often more efficient, thereby requiring less 
capital per unit of output. 
Secondly, the markets in which the presently developed 
and developing countries compete, are likely to be more 
quality conscious than these markets were during their 
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development stage. Steel made in modern furnaces has less 
imperfections than steel made in furnaces designed a · 
century ago. Woodpulp bleached usins-1 the r~1odern multi-step 
process produces a superior paper than that bleached using 
the older chlorine process. Certainly, this is true for 
~any products. The developing country 1 when producing p 
products for export to the ~eveloped countiies, must conform 
I 
1' 
to design and quality standards to which these markets are 
accustomed .. Indeed, this problem also exists for products 
produced for the local market. Prior to local manufacture, 
·most products are imported from the developed economies. 
Ganitsky has studied the crit~cal success factors for firms 
as the business system develops and hi"s re.search em- - ----- -
------····------ -· .. . -
~ ph_asises the importance of imported products and the 
problems associated with production during what he has 
termed Stage I of the development process of business 
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systems. Ganitsky studied the development of a number -of 
industries and classified them into two broad .groups, 
nondurable and durable goods. His study was performed in a 
de-veloping economy and his estimates of the transition st~ges 
for various products under each classification are between- the 
... . .. . ··-··-··- . .. . ... - -··· 17 
years ;J..9}9 _-:- J,949. ~ The stage when local manufacture 
seemed ~o occur is Stage II and his estimate of the trans-
ition for both durable and non-durable products from Stage I 
:to_"Stage II is between 1930 and 1949 - that is, the 1930's 
and the 1940's. For 75 percent of the product groups 
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studied, this period is stated to be the transition from 
import to local manufacture. It seems obvious that for most 
products, any firm producing these products with technology 
developed between 1930 and 1949, would be at a serious dis-
advantage. 
The decision as to whether or not a developing economy 
should concentrate on capital-intensive or labour-intensive 
technologies is also subject to debate. The studies con-
flict with one another and can be divided in two broad 
groups - the one group favouring labour-intensive investment 
strategies and the other capital-intensive strategy. 
The first group maintain that the choice should be 
based on the real prices to the economy (or social prices) 
of the various factors of production which, when taking the 
demand and supply situation of these factors into account, 
differs considerably from the demand and supply situation 
faced by the developed economy. The low capital invest-
ment necessary would free capital for other low capital 
projects and thereby serve to employ additional labour. 
W . t . th' . 1 d s. 18 19 . . 20 ri ers in is group inc u e inger, Mason, Higgins, 
P 1 k 21 d . 22 · o a , an Lewis. 
The "capital-intensive" group advocates this stra-
tegic approach as they believe it will generate the largest 
reinvestable source of capital and ease the problem of 
scarcity of capital availability. This theory is based on 
the assumption that the owners of capital have a higher 
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propensity to save than do wage earners. This approach 
also maintains that skilled labour and managerial skills 
are likely to be scarce and that a capital-intensive 
industtial structure will ease the effects of the shortage 
of these factors of production by reducing the size of the 
managerial and .labor .forces. Proponents of this strategy 
. 1 d bb 2 5 . 2 4 . f 2 5 d 2 6 inc u e Do , Hirschman, Leontie- an Sen. 
The research into the performance of developing 
countries suggests that these countries are experiencing 
lower and lower returns for each additional unit of invest-
ment. 
Bruton's research into Latin-American countries has 
shown that, while the rate of investment ·was high, the 
ability of this investment to absorb labour was not im-
proved over time but remained constant or declined. 27 
Sakong analyzea developed and developing economies for the 
period 1950-1953 and 1961-1963. 28 He found that the amount 
of cap1tal to produce an additional unit of output has 
grown at a rate of 20 percent per year in developing 
countries. The comparable figure for developed countries 
was -0.29 percent per year •. In addition he finds that the 
growth rate of value added in manufacturing was 10.9 per-
cent and 6.4 percent for developed and developing countries 
respectively. 
Mason, in his study of the Philippines, also a de-
veloping country, found that while the total book value of 
fixed assets gr~w at a rate of 15.7 percent per year £or 
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period 1960-1965, employment increased at a rate of 5.6 
t h . d 29 percen per year over t e same perio . 
These studies suggest that capital intensity is in-
creasing rapidly in the developing economies and fewer and 
fewer jobs are being produced for each additional unit of 
capital invested. 
1.4.2 Summary 
The preceeding section has attempted to sketch the 
major differences between the developed and developing 
countries in terms of the problems faced by these countries. 
The fact that the developing countries are at a major dis-
advantage when competing with the developed countries is 
clear and the solutions to the problems are not as simple 
as many would believe. The developing countries must 
support 70 percent of the world's population and if 
world population growth estimates are realized, this 
figure will have doubled from the present 2.8 billion 
people to around 5.6 billion by the turn of the century. 
The research has indicated that capital investment in de-
veloping countries is facing declining returns if measured 
in terms of labour employment. Business firms are very 
important channels of investment and given the scarcity of 
capital in South Africa in particular, the available cap-
ital should be invested optimally to avoid any misalloca-
tion of this critical resource. As will be discussed 
21. 
belo~ the manner and direction in which a firm allocates its 
"discretionary capital" can be described as that firm's 
strategy. 
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I.5 South Africa - A Developing Economy 
There seems to be little argument that South Africa 
is not a "developed economy. 11 The International Monetary 
Fund categorises South Africa as a 11 rnore developed, 
primary producing country. 1130 Thus South Africa is 
grouped with ~uch countries as Australia, New Zealand, 
Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, 
Rumania, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia. All these 
countries are "dependent on crude or semi-processed 
. 1 f d ff f h . . u 31 materia s or oo stu s or t eir export earnings. 
Knight also views South Africa as less developed when 
he states that: 
"Although the industrial structure of South 
Africa approaches that of industrialized 
countries - manufacturing is the largest 
sector and its output now exceeds agriculture 
and mining combined - there are many great 
differences in labour productivity between 
sectors, and the most important sources of 
African employment are low productivity 
services, wage employment on white farms ci.nd 
self-employment in peasant agriculture. 11 32 
Business firms in South A£rica can least afford to 
make costly errors which result in poor financial per-
formance or failure. South.Africa's population of twenty 
five million is the fourth largest in Africa, is nearly 
half that of Britain and France and nearly double that 
of Australia. 33 The population comprises four main 
groups, all with differing growth rates. Table I-6 
contains figures for the 1970 census and estimates of 
population compos_ition by population group for 1980 and 
34 2000 while Table I-7 contains growth rates by group. 
Population 
Blacks 
Whites 
Coloureds 
Asians 
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'l'able I- 2 
So~th African Population by GrouE 
(Figures in Millions) 
Census 
Grou:e. 1970 1980 
15,34 20,64 
3,77 4,76 
2,05 2,82 
0,63 0,83 
Total: . .21,79 29,05 
2000 
37,29 
6,89 
4,89 
1,22 
50,29 
Source: J. L. Sadie, Projections of the South African Popu-
lation 1970-2020, Industrial Development Corporation. 
1973, quoted by:M. Dagut, South Africa:An Appraisal, 
Nedbank Economic Unit. Johannesburg, 1977, Page 27. 
Table I-6 suggests that Blacks will increase as a 
proportion of the total South African population from 70 per-
cent in 1970 to 74 percent in 2000, while the comparable 
figures for whites are 17 percent and 14 percent respectively. 
This disparity is due to the differing growth rates in the 
different population groups. Estimates of the growth rates 
of the different population groups are presented in Table I-7 
below •. 
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Table I- -13 
Pr~jected Growth Rates of South African 
Population Groups, 1975 - 2000 
(percentage increases per annum) 
Population Group 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Blacks 2.87 2.97 3.04 3.06 
Whites (including 2.26 2.19 2.06 1. 91 immigration) 
Coloureds 2.99 2.99 2.97 2.85 
Asians 2.43 2.36 2.22 2.01 
2000 
2.90 
1.69 
2.61 
1.73 
Source: J.L. Sadie, Projections of the South African 
Population 1970 - 2020 Industrial Development 
Corporation. 1973, quoted by M. Dagut, South 
Africa: An Appraisal, Nedbank Economic Unit. 
Johannesburg, 1977, page 27. 
This large rapidly growing population will have to 
be employed if major social problems are to be avoided. 
With the relatively limited resources available in South 
Africa it is imperative to avoid a misallocation of re-
sources. 
If such wastage is to be avoided, a wider body of 
research which is directly related to the developing 
economy is required. This study is thus concerned with 
the selection of the optimal strategy for corporate de-
velopment within such an environment. The study focusses 
.on two major areas of strategic choice. 
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I.5.1 Financial Strategy 
Business firms in South Africa face particular prob-
lems at this critical stage of development. Almost all 
firms require access to capital markets to fund their 
growth. The capital markets in their turn require adequate 
performance in. order to attract capital. Dickman has 
expressed the view that South African industrial firms 
may not be "sufficiently profitable" to attract equity 
. 1 f. . 35 capita to inance expansion. The Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange has been a poor source of capital since the boom 
period of the late sixties and the high rates of inflation 
have served to reduce the attractiveness of stock market 
as an investment. 
Another major source of capital for expansion are 
internally generated funds, namely depreciation and re-
tained earnings. However these sources are unlikely to 
provide sufficient funds as inflation tends to make de-
preciation allowances inadequate and thus effectively 
raises taxation rates. Inflation also reduces the funds· 
available for real expansion by causing investment in 
assets to increase. Inflationary conditions also tend to 
raise costs and profit margins are squeezed further reduc-
ing retained earnings. 36 The other major source of capital 
is that of debt financing. However, increased debt 
raises financial risk and thus shareholders typically 
require an increase in return to compensate for the in-
creased risk. 
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It would thus seem to be important to assess the 
effects of financial strategy to determine whether firms 
which have adopted similar corporate strategies in terms 
of product-market diversity (which are discussed in detail 
below), differ in respect of their debt usage profita-
bility and perhaps more importantly, in terms of their 
growth rates. 
I.5.2 Product-Market and Diversification Strategy 
The data provided by the Balance Sheet and Profit 
and Loss Statements are a measure of the results of de-
cisions taken in the product - market interface. Foster 
--
maintains that product strategy is defined for the in-
dividual firm by answering the question: 
"What range of products should we off er 
to our customers to achieve the target 
levels of profit, growth and market 
position we have set for ourselves, in 
relation to the total market? 11 37 
The ability of the firm to satisfy market needs 
through the provision of products will determine the 
growth and financial performance of the firm. In certain 
cases, the firm may decide that other field provides more 
attractive opportunities and will diversify its activities. 
The interesting question from an academic point is-·why 
have companies adopted different patterns of diversifica-
tion and development? Rumelt states that: 
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"When an industrial corporation de-
cides to diversify its product line, 
it is making a strategic decision whose 
consequences may alter the fundamental 
nature of the firm and may involve as 
well, a substantial redeployment of re-
sources and a redirection of human 
energy. Diversification, however, is 
neither a goal nor a plan; each firm 
that diversifies must choose the types 
of business it will enter, the degree 
to which it will build on past strengths 
and competences or require the develop-
ment of new ones, and the total amount of 
diversity that is appropriate. There . 38 is no single strategy of diversification. 
Indeed, many firms chose not to diversify their operations 
and this too is a strategic decision. This research is 
thus an attempt to assess the efficiency of these strate-
gies of diversification in terms of financial performance 
and risk in the context of a developing economy. 
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I.6 Background to the Research Problem 
During the' two decades, 1950 to 1970, business firms 
were faced with problems and conditions which could not be 
overcome with existing management techniques. The prime 
cause of these difficulties was that these firms were find-
ing it increasingly difficult to adapt to a rapidly changing 
environment. 
The firm can be seen a system of parts, all of which 
must be integrated if the firm is to achieve its objective. 
Some writer's believe that this objective is primarily 
. 1 39 surv1va . The firm receives from the environment and 
provides a product or service in return and strives to 
achieve its objectives by the most efficient deployment 
and allocation of the resources at its disposal. 
Chamberlain describes this process as follows: 
... Just as the firm explores its environment 
to discover what opportunities are offered 
and how it can best exploit them, so does the 
environment - the social environment - react 
to the firm in turn. The firm offers 
society a resource to be exploited for the 
achievement of the latter's own objectives. 
To that end it may prod the firm to move 
along certain lines rather than others, 
offering inducements. It may close off 
certain opportunities on which the firm had 
seized if the exploitation of these seems to 
disadvantage society rather than reward it. 
It may impose certain restraints on the 
ways in which a firm is free to act in the 
pursuit of its objectives.40 
Clearly then, the firm is monitored very closely by 
what Chamberlain calls "society" - but this society is made 
up of many different components. These components are the 
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legal, political, social and cultural sub-environments. 
The most important element is probably that of competition. 
Competitors, either existing or potential, are continually 
assessing a firm's performance, and if that performance is 
seen to be inadequate in any way - new and aggressive 
entrants will appear and only the most effective and eff i-
cient firms will survive. The problems at present experi-
enced by firms, has resulted from a failure to provide the 
products required by the market or gross inefficiency. The 
failure to provide the products needed may be a result of 
product life cycle effects when demand cannot be restim-
ulated by promotion and where the product is being replaced 
by superior substitutes provided by new entrants. A 
number of important factors have enabled firms to enter new 
markets and to compete with entrenched competitors. Two 
important contributory factors have been technological 
development and consumers market development. 
1.6.1 The Impact of Technological Advance 
Expenditure on research and development has increased 
tremendously since the Second World War. Table 1-8 lists 
total expenditures on research and development and scientists 
and engineers employed in the United States between 1941 and 
1963 and provides an indication of the rapid increase in 
research effort. Total research and development expendi-
ture rose 1828 percent during the period. These statistics 
reveal an annual compounded growth rate of 14. 4 percent pe:i..." 
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annum for scientists and engineers. The figures suggest 
a doubling of research expenditure every five years. These 
statistics are for total research ~nd deve~opment expendi-
ture but industrial research and development expenditure 
has increased at an even faster pace. Ansoff maintains 
\ 
that industrial research dollar expenditures grew from 
.I 
! 
$1.2 billion to $10 billion over the period 1946 to 1961. 41 
! 
Ansoff compares the relative growth of research and develop-
ment expenditure with the investment in plant and equipment 
which rose by 833 percent and 135 percent respectively • 
. Table 1- 4 
Research and Development Expenditures in Total and Number 
of Research Scientists and Engineers, U.S.A., 1941 - 1963 
Total R&D No. of Research 
Expenditure Scientists and 
Year ($ millions) Engineers (OOO's) 
1941 900 87 
1943 1210 97 
1945 1520 119 
1947 2260 l25 
1949 2610 144 
1951 3360 158 
1953 5160 223Cb) 
'1955 6200 n.a. 
1957 9810 327(c) 
1959 12430 n.a. 
1961 14380 387 
1963 17350(a) n.a. 
(a) Preliminary, (b) 1954 figure, (c) 1958 figure n.a.; _not available 
Source: .The Growth of Scientific R&D, Department of Defense, 1953 
Pages 10 and 12; National Science Review of Data on R&D, No. 33, April, 
1962; National Science Review of Da.ta on Science F<esources, Vol. 1, Ne. 4, 
.May 1965, quoted by E. Mansfield, Industrial Research arid 'I'echnological 
Innovation, I.ongmans, Green and Co., Ltd. London, 1968, page 7. 
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Ansoff states that by 1962 the total United States 
expenditure for research and development was roughly 40 
percent of that for plant and equipment. 42 
Many of the giant companies of the World have attrib-
uted their success and growth to their emphasis on research 
and development. Luck states that: 
"Eli Lilly (the pharmaceutical firm) , during 
the past decade has spent around 10 percent 
of its revenue on research and development. 
During that period its sales have risen 
threefold, while profits have risen fivefold. 
Observers attribute these gains largely to 43 
the flow of new products from its laboratories. 
Proctor and Gamble, another extremely successful pack-
aged goods company "spends well over $100 million a year 
on research" and "has been growing at an average rate of 
8 percent a year, compounded - one of t!1e most splendid 
long run performances in the annals of Business 11 • 44 
Vanderwicken continues: 
"Proctor and Gamble took 119 years to reach 
its first billion dollars in sales, nine 
years for its second, five years for its 
third, three years for its fourth, and a 
little more than a year for its fifth. At 
the recent rate of growth, sales could more 
than double by 1980. If history is a guide, 
profits would keep pace~ 11 45 
South African businessmen often fail to appreciate the 
scale of these levels of expenditure. An example will 
serve to place these levels of research expenditure in 
context. In 1975, South African Breweries Limited, the 
·largest industrial company in South Africa, announced that 
its sales turnover for 1975 was R888 million. 46 During 
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1975, International Business Machines Corporation, spent 
47 $946 million on research and development alone! 
The emphasis that many companies place on research and 
development suggests that a company can expect to obtain 
a "pay off" from investment in research and development. 
It is however,. extremely difficult to measure such a re-
turn. Research by Keezer et al. suggests that expected 
returns from research and development were "significantly 
better than the typical returns or payoff, on investment 
in new plant and equipment ... (this explains) why many 
companies with a given amount of capital to reinvest found 
it profitable to increase the proportion going to research 
48 
and development." 
1.6.2 Consumer Market Development 
A second major influence on economic development since 
the 1940's has been the apparent willingness of consumers 
to adopt new products. This willingness has resulted in 
a flow of new products and vast new markets have been 
opened up. Robertson maintains that the consumer appears 
to have undergone a social and psychological shift in 
that he or she seems to expect and require change and is 
49 
"receptive to progress and 'newness'." This receptivity 
has resulted in a shortening of the product life cycle for 
50 
many products. A.C. Neilson, the market research firm, 
has carried out a study investigating trends in the length 
of product life cycles. The study concludes that 85 percent 
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of' all new brands can expect less than three years of success 
before their market shares start declining rapidly. 51 
Ansof f supports this view and maintains that there 
"has been a continuous shortening of the 
profitable life-span of products. While 
DuPont's nylon, invented in the 1930's 
had no competition for many years, the head 
start of equally dramatic Delrin was over-
come by competition in a matter of two or 
three years."5~ 
The environmental factors of rarid technological and 
market/need changes poses both a threat and a problem to 
management. Ansoff states that: 
"Triggered by accumulated technology and pent-
up consumer demand, product innovation has 
become an increasingly important tool of 
competition and growth. To the business 
manager it has brought both opportunities 
and problems. On the one hand, application 
of new technologies to new uses has opened 
up many new markets; on the other invasion 
of established product lines by new and 
improved products has produced technological 
obsolescence and forced companies to devote 
major attention to defensive research and 
development. 11 53 
Schon has also pointed to the threat of a firm in a 
• 
different ·industry "invading" a market and rendering the 
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existing product obsolete. The invasions of the wrist-
watch market by the electronics industry and the textile 
market by the chemical industry through the development 
of nylori are good examples of this threat. 
The increased competition in the market place will 
mean that many firms will be forced into other areas or 
will have to defend their existing markets more vigorously. 
These critical strategic decisions will become the vital 
ingredients of success or survival. 
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1.7 The Trend Towards Diversity 
There would appear to be a trend towards increased 
specialization in the business world. Modern life appears 
to be so complicated that the individual can only master 
a small portion of a task. Galbraith believes that tech-
nology and the increasing specialisation of technological 
effort "forces specialisation and yet results from special-
isation.1155 He believes that the firm, due to the special-
isation in technology, will grow to take advantage of 
economies of scale. The firm in an effort to reduce un-
certainty resorts to planning in order to control and 
manipulate the market. He states; 
"So the firm controls the prices at which 
it buys materials, components and talent and 
takes steps to ensure the necessary supply 
at these prices. And it controls the prices 
at which it sells and takes steps to insure 
that the public, other producers or the 
state take the planned quantities at these 
prices. So far from being controlled by the 
market, the firm, to the best of its ability, 
has made the market subordinate to the goals 
of its planning. 11 56 
Certain writers in the field of corporate development 
have disagreed with Galbraith's theory of increased 
specialization. Scott maintains that Galbraith "has not 
burdene~ his readers with supporting evidence. 1157 In 
particular, Scott believes that Galbraith offers no sys-
tematic evidence on the evolution of the large company. 
Instead he offers an economic argument buttressed by 
"anecdotes". Scott maintains that Galbraith's "new in-
dustrial state" is actually the "old industrial state. 1158 
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The behaviour of firms seems to support Scott's thesis. 
Firms appear to be diversifying rather than specializing. 
As Lynch has noted: 
"The multifirm horizontal consolidation 
dominated the industrial scene at the turn 
of the century; large-scale vertical integra-
tion, particularly in the basic metals in-
dustries occurred during the same period and 
again in the 1920's; ... The phenomenon of the 
1950's and 1960's has been the 'acquisitive 
conglomerate', the corporation growing 
through a continuing program of aggressive, 
diversified acquisition. In 1969 it was 
still a growing phenomenon, comprising a 
substantial group of firms 11 .59 
There are a number of reasons or explanations as to why 
this trend from specialization should exist and include such 
factors as: 
1.7.l. The desire for increased stability by corporate 
management by investing in counter-cyclical busi-
ness areas; 
1.7.2. The drive to satisfy and improve on growth and 
profit objectives requires management to enter 
growth industries. 60 
Whatever the reasons for this tendency toward corporate 
diversification there appears to be little doubt as to its 
existence. The trend to increased diversity has led 
certain writers to question the "survival capacity" of 
·these firms. Attiyeh maintains that the corporate environ-
ment will slow conglomerate growth rates due to external 
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constraints such as anti-monopoly legislation and industry 
resistance on the one hand and their increasing size on 
the other. 61 Judelson believes that the conglomerate is 
the corporate form of tomorrow. 62 Carroll identifies the 
challenges facing conglomerates but believes that their 
unique problems can be overcome. 63 
The study of corporate growth and success suggests 
·that these large, diversified firms have solved the problems 
of managing an enterprise with operations in diverse and 
often unrelated fields. The intriguing aspect that is 
revealed by such a study is the fact that many of these 
successful firms have used different strategies and degrees 
of diversity to achieve their apparent success. Some firms 
have adopted strategies to become the largest firm in a 
particular industry, others have attempted to spread their 
"risks" by diversifying, whil~ others have remained small 
but have been able to produce records of exceptional per-
formance. 
This difference in approach to a common problem which 
can be defined as a difference in the strategy employed to 
achieve objectives and has given rise to a number of 
1 d h . . . . d. ff t t . 64 re ate. researc investigations in i eren coun ries. 
These investigatiohs have all sought to examine the manner 
in which firms solve the problems posed by a rapidly chang-
ing environment, shareholder, employee and societal pressures. 
Not only are these pressures increasing but the rate of 
change appears to be accelerating. 
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The management of these problems place management into 
a situation of paradox. They must strive for.growth on 
the one hand, while,,on the other, the operations of the 
firm must be stabilized to control and measure performance. 
The drive for growth requires that the existing order be 
broken down and rebuilt in order to generate increased 
efficiency or to enable expansion to take place - but the 
need for stability demands that the system be maintained 
and not be changed in order to facilitate the measurement 
of performance. Chamberlain states: 
"There must always be a tendency toward sys-
tematic, coherent organisation if the firm's 
existing goals are to be achieved and if 
the complex of relationships is to be held 
together at the present point in time. There 
must always be a tendency toward a state of 
equilibrium. At the same time there must 
also be a tendency toward a breakup of exist-
ing relationships and the formation of new 
ones, because of the intrusion of unavoidable 
environmental changes and the firm's pur-
posiveness toward them. There must be a 
tendency toward disturbing present relations, 
toward introducing an element of disequilib-
rium 11.65 
The continual movement towards change is not confined 
to size, markets and operations but also to organisational 
structure. The first study ·Of note which analysed the 
patterns and manner in which firms developed was performed 
by Chandler. 66 The development of firms was studied over 
the period 1909 to 1959 and the findings showed that the 
widening of product-market-scope and diversification had 
resulted in the need for a new management and administra-
tion system that would be able to manage diverse market 
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operations. The administrative system known today as the 
multi-divisional structure was developed as a result of 
these more demanding organisational requirements. 
Rumelt has noted that this new organisational struc-
ture: 
" ... has served to institutionalize diversi-
fication. It has permitted the insulation of 
a set of business managers from.the vicissi-
tudes of the capital markets, and has created 
a type of managerial environment that en-
courages rapid deployment of resources and 
places a premium on economic performance and 
the skills of the generalist. 11 67 
The trend toward divisionalization also resulted in a 
need for a new "breed" of manager - the generalist. The 
generalist must be able to integrate the functional and 
operational skills below him. The increasing complexity 
of modern business operations serves to make the task of 
the general manager an extremely difficult one. Bower 
states that "so many basic technologies are in use in the 
company, that no one manager is likely to have the compe-
tence to evaluate critically and in .depth the technological 
f h b . . .. 68 component o more t an one or two us1ness groupings. 
As a result of these complexities, strategic decisions 
are of ten forced lower down the management hierarchy and 
must be made by divisional management who are expected to 
have a better knowledge of environmental conditions that 
could be expected and how best to exploit opportunities 
·that may arise. The problems are not overcome by forcing 
decisions on divisional management who are not easily 
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integrated into a single unit and a conflict of interests 
between the corporate head office and divisional management 
can develop. As Berg states: 
"For the purpose of corporate long range 
planning, a large multi-unit company cannot 
be usefully regarded as a single economic 
unit with a single set of interests. The 
principal difference is that ... each of .the 
subunits of a large multi-unit company will 
have some interests which are either inci-
dental to or in conflict with the interests 
of the corporate as a whole. 11 69 
Thus the diversified and/or divisionalized firm differ~ 
not only in organisational structure and product/market 
operations from what Rumelt calls the "more primitive type 
of enterprise" but in the kinds of problems that it faces. 1170 
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1. 8. Summary 
It can thus be seen that the modern firm faces prob-
lems that are related to: 
1. 8. 1. The environment in which it must operate; 
1.8.2. The tendency towards increasing size and diversity; 
and 
1.8.3. The problems of controlling these operations while 
trying to provide a structure which facilitates 
change and growth. 
The manager in the developing economy, when setting strategy 
for his firm, seeks answers to such questions as: 
Are single product/non-diversified firms better 
"performers"than multi-product/diversified firms? 
Are diversified firms, due to their ability to 
spread their risk over different markets, more or 
less "risky'' than single product firms who are 
committed to only one market? 
The major thrust of this research is to attempt to 
provide answers to these and other questions, and to assess 
the effect of corporate strategy, as defined by financial 
policy and diversification, on £inancial performance and 
risk. The research is based in the context of a developing 
economy with not yet fully developed capital markets, rapid 
population growth, a large and unskilled labour force and 
a shortage of managerial skills. The growth and development 
.of firms in this environment is seen to be an area of 
considerable interest to academics and businessmen who deal 
4 J.. 
with developing e~onomies. 
Answers to these questions are seen to be important, 
especially i.n the South Jl.frican context as the economy j_s 
'in a developmental stage and more a.nd more f irrns appear to 
be facing the problems of selecting strategic direction as 
I 
the economy matures. 
Chapter Outlin~ 
The conceptual framework of the theory of Business Policy 
is prescribed in Chapter 2. Tbis Ch.apter review~ the basic 
approach to formulation of corporate strategy and.attempts 
to sketch the basic objectives of business firms which 
highlights the growth emphasis evident in corporate behaviour. 
In addition, the theory of the growth of the business firm 
is presented. 
Chapter 3 provides greater depth of discussion in the area 
of corporate diversification and a brief history of diver~ 
sification in the major economies, the reasons for diversific-
ation and entry behaviour are reviewed. The existing lite~ature 
concerning internal and ext~rnal routes to diversification are 
discussed in depth. 
The important fields of Portfolios and Capital Asset Pricing 
Model Theory are introduced in Chapter 4. The models and the 
underlying assumptions are examined since these models provide 
import.ant risk measurement techniques which are utilized 
later in the study. 
/The methodology used .... 
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'l'he methodology employed, tha.t variables analysed and 
the research hypotheses are described in Chapted 5 while 
Chapter 6 presents the findings. Chapter 7 integrates 
the major concepts and synthesizes the findings. The 
implications ·for management and educatj_onalists and possible 
future research .directions are also discussed. 
the major findings are reviewed and surr~arised. 
Finally1 
43. 
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2. THE THEORY OF CORPORATE S'l'RATEGY AND DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
The past fifty years have produced tremendous changes 
in the life of the average man. The industrial revolution 
has continued to influence the quality of life. This 
economic dev.elopment has affected the social, cultural, 
political and legal structures in almost every country and 
continent. The effects seem to have been most radical 
~ 
amongst the developed countries when the pace of develop-
ment and change has been the most rapid. The key to this 
development has been the establishment of the business 
organization or firm. 
Since the industrial revolution, society has been the 
growth of a new form of social institution - that of the 
·~ 
large-scale business enterprise. This industrial corpora-
tion has itself evolved further and new forms of industrial 
combination and organization have been developed. These 
developments have seen their most rapid growth since the 
late 1800's, starting with the consolidation period and 
.ending with the sprawling conglomerate/multinational firm. 1 
Dyas believes that the development of the business 
organization is a major cause or agent of the development 
achieved during the twentieth century. 
He states that: 
"While appearing less dramatic than the avent 
of the motor car, the airplane, the radio or 
the computer, the growth of the lar~e scale 
50. 
economic organisations nonetheless rep-
resents one of the radical new departures 
of recent human history. Indeed it could 
even be argued that the changing nature of 
economic institutions over the last century 
renders most of the concurrent changes in 
governmental, military, legal and religious 
institutions almost insignificant by com-
parison. The modern industrial enterprise 
is a very new phenomenon when looked at 
with historical perspective. Employing 
thousands of people in co-operative effort, 
requiring complex administrative structures 
for their management, the large scale in-
dustrial enterprise, both private and govern-
ment-owned, play a key role in economic life 
today. The development of this new insti-
tution could be described as the second 
major aspect of the economic revolution of 
the last century and a half."2 
The firm enabled resources to be concentrated under some 
form of central control, production was rationalised into 
technological systems called "factories" and diverse skills 
were integrated. In the early part of this century these 
firms were very small by today's standards. Drucker quotes 
the following example: 
"The octopus which so frightened the grand-
parents of today's Americans, Rockefeller's 
giant Standard Oil Trust, was split into 
fourteen parts by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1911. Thirty years later, ... every single 
one of these fourteen Standard Oil daughters 
had become at least four times as large as 
the octopus when the Supreme Court divided 
it. II 3 
Society has also become increasingly dependant on the 
modern institution - of which the firm is the leading ex-
ample. This is not difficult to understand when the con-
centrations of wealth and power vested in the modern day 
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business firm is taken into account. For example accord-
ing to the ''Fortune '500'" of 1974, 4 three companies, 
namely Exxon with sales of $44.8 billion, General Motors, 
with sales of 35.7 billion, and Royal Dutch/Shell with 
sales of $32.1 billion in 1975, are larger than South 
Africa if compared with the South African gross national 
product of R24.6 billion in 1975. 5 When the size of many 
multinational companies is taken into account, the de-
cisions of these companies may have more impact on trade 
6 then the decisions of governments. 
The power that large firms appear to control has re-
sulted in many commentators paying considerable attention 
to the power and size of these firms. Many of· these 
writers have expressed fears as to the concentration of such 
power in the hands of relatively few companies. The ap-
parent trend towards concentration of corporate power has 
led certain writers to forecast that large firms would 
continue to increase in size and power. 
Berle and Means in a 1932 study, estimated that two 
hundred firms would control 70 percent of all corporate 
. 7 
activity in the U.S.A. by 1950. Chairman of the United 
States of America Anti-Trust and Monopoly Sub-Committee of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Philip A. Hart, 
has estimated that. less than 200 corporations will control 
75 percent of the U.S. nation's manufacturing assets by 
1976. 8 Nicholas Salgo, the colourful entrepreneur who 
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started Bangor Punta has stated that by 1979 there would 
be only 200 major industrial firms in the United States. 
He predicted that all of these companies would be conglom-
erates. 9 
Markham cites the attitude of the Federal Trade 
Commission in the United States when he quotes the com-
missions' 1960 report on the Conglomerate Movement as 
follows: 
"In. unprecedented fashion the merger move-
ment is centralizing and consolidating 
corporate control and decision-makbng among 
a relatively few vast companies. 111 
Markham also states that: 
"In the late 1960's, at the peak of the 
conglomerate boom, it did not appear in-
conceivable that the whole of American 
industry might someday become a single 11 
all-encomparsing conglomerate, USA Inc." 
It seems clear that the largest proportion of modern 
industrial activity is produced by larger firms. Stacey, 
in a study of 2027 companies, examined by the British 
Board of Trade in 1963, found that as much as 57 percent 
of the total net assets of the companies examined, were 
12 
accounted for by the 100 largest firms in the sample. 
This means that 4.9 percent of firms accounted for 57 
percent of total net assets in this sample. Galbraith 
has also commented on this phenomenon: 
"Nothing so characterizes the industrial 
system as the scale of the modern corporate 
enterprise. In 1962 the five largest in-
dustrial corporations in the United States, 
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with combined assets in excess of $36 
billion, possessed over 12 percent of all 
assets used in manufacturing. The fifty 
largest corporations with assets in excess 
of $10 million, some 2000 ~n all, accounted 
for about 80 percent of all the resources ~ 3 
used in manufacturing in the United States~ 
In another study, Wrigley shows that in 1968, although 
the 500 largest United States firms account for only 0.25 
of the total number of rirms, these.500 firms accounted for 
I 
some 66 percent of industrial output and employees, and 
75 percent of industrial products in the United States 
14 
economy. The actual figures are provided in Table 1-1 
below. 
Table 2-1 
Relative Importance of 500 Largest 
United States Corporations in 1968 
All firms Top 500 All firms 'l'Op 50 0 
Output 
Profits 
Employees 
(millions) 
633 000 
32 000 
19.8 
(millions) 
405 000 
24 000 
14.0 
(percent) (percent) 
100 64 
100 74.4 
100 69 
Source: Wrigley, Leonard, ''Divisional Autonomy and Diversifi-
cation," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Graduate 
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 
Boston, 1970~ Chapter 2, Page 19. 
Galbraith has been so impressed by what he believes 
to be the importance of large business organisations that 
he appears to regard the smaller business as a relic of the 
past. 
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"In the past, leadership in business 
or~anization was identified with the 
entrepeneurs - the individual who 
united ownership or contrql of capital 
with capacity for organising the other 
factors of production and, in most contexts, 
with a further capacity for innovation. 
With the rise of the modern corporation, 
the emergences of the organisation re-
quired by modern technology and planning 
and the divorce of the owner of the 
capital from control of the enterprise, 
the entrepreneur no longer exists as an 
individual person in the mature industrial 
enterprise. 11 15 
Sheehan has however, provided some evidence to show 
that the situation is not as nearly as serious, from a 
corporate control point'of view, as Galbraith has suggested. 
In an examination of the "Fortune 500," the largest indus-
trial corporations in the United States, he concluded 
that family control and ownership was still significant. 
"In approximately 150 companies on the 
current Fortune 500 list, controlling 
ownership rests in the hands of an in-
dividual or the members of a single 
family. Significantly, these owners 
are not just the remants of the Nine-
teenth Century dynasties that once ruled 
American business. Many of them are 
relatively fresh faces. In any event, 
the evidence that 30 percent of the 500 
largest industrials are clearly con-
trolled by identifiable individuals or 
by family groups, is something to ponder. 
It suggests that the demise of the 
traditional American proprietor has 
.. been slightly exaggerated and that the 
much advertised triumph of the organi-
zation is far from total. 11 16 
In the South African context, although no research 
·into this issue could be identified, the prima facie 
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evidence would appear to support the Sheehan findings. 
The importance of men such as Barlow, Rupert, Luyt, 
Ackerman, Oppenheimer, McCarthy, Gordon, Frame, Shill 
and Hersov in their firms cannot be denied. 
Burch has also challenged the concept of divorced 
control and management of United St~tes firms. In an 
.exhaustive study he has found a close relationship be-
! 
tween control. and ownership. He states that~ 
" ... Contrary to what many might think, the 
rather pervasive family control exercised 
over a substantial number of the tot.al 450 
industrial, merchandising, transportation, 
and commercial banking concerns included 
in this analysis is, for the most part, 
of a very direct and enduring nature. That 
is to say, not only is this control exer-
cised through significant stock ownership 
and outside representation on the Board of 
Directors, but also, in a great many cases, 
through a considerable amount of family 
managerial direction of these major corporate 
enterprises. As a rule, moreover, a very 
sizeable percentage of these families have 
wielded this formidable economic power over 
a fairly long period of time."17 
The belief that large firms will continue their 
march toward total control and dominance of the economy 
has not materialized. Prais has shown that the share 
of manufacturing output of the 100 largest corporations 
in the United States remained constant at 33 percent over 
the seven year period, 1963 to 1970 while the comparable 
figures in the United Kingdom show an increase of 4 per-
18 
·cent to reach 40 percent. Steiner maintains that: 
I 
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"There is today in the United States 
the greatest concentration of economic 
power that the world has ever seen. 
About 150 of the largest manufacturing 
corporations control around 50 percent 
of all assets of manufacturing companies, 
and the largest 500 companies own about 
66 percent of the economically productive 
assets in the country, excluding agri-
culture. In a very large number of in-
dustries the three or four largest 
companies sell a preponderant propor-
tion of the products of those industries. 
Both these types of concentration have 
increased only slightly in the past 30 19 years but, even so, are very impressive." 
It would seem as though the large firms are no longer 
growing as rapidly in the developed economies, as they did 
in the past but interest lies in the analysis and determina-
tion of the manner in which these firms were able to 
achieve their positions of dominance. These firms are 
dynamic and as has been noted above, very profitable. 
These firms have been able to arrive at an extremely 
efficient solution to the problems of growth and compe-
tition. 
The manner in which firms relate to their environment 
and the methods they adopt in the allocation of their 
resources in a competitive situation has been described 
as .strategy. The next section seeks to discuss definitions 
of management in general, objectives and strategy. 
,r 
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2.2 Concepts of Corporate Strategy 
The concept of corporate strategy is the cornerstone 
of the field of general management. Yet the term is sub-
ject to many different definitions and is used in many 
different ways. Analysis of the literature suggests 
i . 
:that there are two broad approaches to the ccincept of 
porporate strategy. 
The first approach is that of Andrew-s whose view can 
20 be described as "planned purpose" or "conscious strategy". 
The other approach is that exemplified by the work of Cyert 
and March and which can be described as a "coalition out-
come" approach. 21 
2.2.1 The "Planned Purpose" or "Conscious Strategy" 
Approach 
In developing this concept of strategy, Andrews 
writes: 
"Strategy is the pattern of objectives, 
purposes or goals and major policies 
and plans for achieving these goals, 
stated in such a way as to define what 
business the company is in or to be in 
and the kind of company it is or is to 
be."22 
He sees strategy consisting of: 
·"Two equally important aspects, inter-
related in life but separated to the 
extent practicable here in our study 
of the concept. The first of these is 
formulation~ the second is implementa-
tion. Deciding what strategy should be 
is, at least ideally, a rational under-
taking.1123 
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Other writ~rs have adopted a similar approach to 
that suggested by Andrews. Chandler defines the' con-
cept as follows: 
11 Strategy can be dt=:~fined as the de-
termination of the long term goals and 
objectives of an enterprise, and the 
adoption of courses of action and the 
allocation of resources necessary for 
carrying out these goals. Decisions to 
expand the volume of activities, to set 
up distant plants or offices, to move 
into new economic functions, or become 
diversified along many lines of business 
involve the defining of new basic goals. 
New courses of action must be devised 
and resources allocated and reallocated 
in order to achieve these goals and to 
maintain and expand the firm's activi-
ties in the new areas in response to 
shifting demands, changing sources of 
supply, fluctuating economic conditions, 
new technological developments and the 
actions of competitors. 11 24 
Ansoff's definition of the concept of strategy also 
has a "purposive'' flavour. He sees strategy as identify-
ing the "common thread" in the firm and specifies four 
components of strategy. These are product-market scope, 
growth vector, competitive advantage and synergy. ·He 
maintains that: 
"They specify the amount of growth, the 
area of growth, the direction of growth, 
the leading stren~ths, and theprofit-
ability target. 11 2 
Interestingly, Ansoff does not include implementation 
of the actions necessary to achieve the objectives as part 
of the strategy as do Andrews and Chandler. Ansoff in-
eludes the action area in his definition of administrative 
decisions. 
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Bower on the other hand sees strategy as a "problem 
solving" framework when he defines the concept of 
strategy: 
"The concept of strategy helps the manager 
by converting his planning difficulty into 
a problem. As with any good problem-
solving theory, it provides a metaphor 
for understanding the problem, provides 
a structure for the information at his 
disposal, defines the relationships among 
the parts of his structure, and provides 
an orderly sequence of questions for the 
definition, analysis, and choice of al-
ternatives.1126 
Bower's emphasis is on the executive's interpretation 
and the strategy is seen as assisting in the identifica-
tion of priorities and relationships in the data avail-
able and in the situation as he perceives it. Bower's 
concept of the strategy formulation and implementation 
stages are shown in Figures 2-1 and 2-2. 
McArthur and Scott define corporate strategy as: 
"A concept of how to compete in an industry 
or industries. Such a concept must be 
formulated in terms that are specific 
enough to be operational, that is, to 
serve as guides to managerial action. 
That is to say, the concept of how to 
compete should spell out the market or 
market segments which the company intends 
to serve, the kinds of products needed 
to serve these markets effectively, and 
skills and resources the company must 
.have to develop these special kinds of 
products. This concept of how to compete 
thus includes a statement of where as 
well as how; as such it provides a much 
more specific guide to action than some 
vague expression of a "company philosophy" 
or hoped for "public image," often em-
bodied in a company credo. Besides this 
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Figure 2-1 
Bower's Conceptual Model of Strategy Formulation 
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Source: Bower, Joseph L., "Strategy as a Problem-Solving 
Theory on Business Planning", Unpublished Paper, 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard 
University, Boston, 1967, page 12. 
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Figure 2-2 
Bower's Conceptual Model of Strategy Implementat.;Lon __ 
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page 12. 
plan. 
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concept of how to compete, corporate 
strategy calls for a statement of 
specific goals against which progress 
can be measured (for example, a target 
market share to be attained, a target 
growth rate in sales, a target return on 
investment) ."27 
This definition also implies a conscious, purposive 
2.2.2 The Coalition Outcome Approach 
This view, developed by Cyert and March is based on 
a behavioral theory of corporate behavior. This theory 
is based on the premises that "people have goals, but 
collectivities of people do not~, 28 and that the organi-
zation can be viewed as a "coalition 11 • 29 The coalition 
members are seen to include managers, workers, stock-
holders, suppliers, customers, lawyers, tax collectors, 
regulatory agencies." Cyert and March disagree with the 
classic economic view that the entrepeneur/owner defines 
the goals and that these then become the goals of the 
organization. They also disagree with the notion that 
goals are set through conflicts being resolved by con-
sensus. Their view is that. these theories are invalid 
because the theories "both attempt to define a joint 
prefer~nce ordering for the coalition." They maintain 
that: 
"Actual organizational goals cannot 
normally be described in terms of 
joint preference ordering. Studies 
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of organisational objectives suggest 
that agreement on objectives is usually 
agreement of highly ambiguous goals. 
Such agreement is undoubtedly important 
to choice within the organisation, but 
it is far from the clear preference 
ordering usually assumed. The studies 
suggest further that behind this agree-
ment or rather vague objectives, there 
is considerable disagreement and un-
certainty about subgoals, that organisa-
tions appear to be pursuing different 
goals in the same time."30 
A diagrammatic model of the organisational decision 
process has been_developed by Cyert and.March. 
Cyert and March do not assume tha. t all coalition groups 
participate iri all decisions and suggest that sub-coalitions 
are formed in certain instances. The complexity of the 
process can be reduced according to Cyert and March due to 
the fact that only certain coalitions may be involved while 
others are seen to be "passive" 31 
Their theory sees organisational objectives flowing 
from a bargaining process: 
"It is primarily through bargaining 
within this active group.that what we 
call organisational objectives arise. 
Side payments, far from being the 
incidental distribution of a fixed, 
transferable booty, represen~ the 
central process of goal specification. 
That is, a significant number of these 
payments are in the form of policy 
commitments . "3 2 · 
Clearly this view of an organisation does not seem 
to fit with the concept of the goals of the organisation 
being consciously selected and consistent but rather 
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being the result of a process both based on changes in 
the power and structure of the coalitions. As Cyert and 
March maintain: 
11 We have argued that the goals of a firm 
are a series of more or less independent 
constraints imposed on the organisation 
through a process of bargaining among 
potential coalition members and elaborated 
over time in response to short-run 
pressures. Goals arise in such a form 
because the firm is, in fact, a coalition 
of participants with disparate demands, 
changing foci of attention, and limited 
ability to attend to all organisational 
problems simultaneously. In the long 
run, studies of the goals of a business 
firm must reflect the adaptation of goals 
to changes in the coalition structure. 
Finally, we have argued that, because of 
the form of the goals and the way in which 
they are established, conflict is never 
fully resolved within an organisation. 
Rather, the decentralization of decision-
making (and goal attention) , the sequential 
attention to goals, and the adjustment in 
organisational slack permit the business 
firm to make decisions within inconsistent 
goals under many (and perhaps most) condi-
tions. 1133 
2.2.3 ~econciling the Opposing Theories 
It is important to note that the theories are not 
.completely opposed to one another .. Andrews recognizes 
that not all firms will have an explicitly stated strategy 
statement when he maintains that: 
11 In the absence of explicit statements, 
the student may deduce from operations 
what the goals and policies are, on the 
assumption that all normal human be-
havior is purposeful. . At the same 
time, it is desirable not to infer a 
degree of conscious planning which does 
in fact, not exist. 11 34 
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Bower also notes the influence of groups other than 
top management in the process when he states that: 
"The notion that the decisions of 
subordinates are critical to the choices 
presented to superiors, that indeed these 
subordinate decisions may of ten consti-
tute the true shapers· and indicators of 
corporate commitment, once stated, is 
obvious •... The objectives of management 
of a large organisation - in the serise 
that a handful of men who can be charac-
terized as "top management" - are not in 
any way a sufficient description of the 
objectives which direct and motivate 
action at the critical, resource allocat-
ing levels of the organisation. Hence, 
a model which prescribes proceedure for 
resource allocation based on the maximi-
zation or satisfaction of "management 35 
objectives" is not a complete picture." 
Further research into the long range planning of large 
diversified firms by Berg supports this view. Berg has 
stated that "Each of the sub-units of a large, multiunit 
company will have some interests which are either inci-
dental to or in conflict with the interests of the corpora-
36 tion as a whole." 
McArthur and Scott also recognise the outcome effect 
when they state that: 
"Sometimes almost the only way to dis-
cover a strategy is to study the sequence 
of moves which a company has made in 
the past, and thus to piece together an 
·idea of what the str~tegy must have been 
or might have been. 11 37 
They accept that as they "define strategy, not all 
companies have it, yet every company does, nevertheless, 
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have a strategy but that this strategy is not inexplicit." 
Thus Andrews, Bower, Berg, and McArthl!r and Scott accept 
that much of strategy can be "implicit" and can therefore 
be seen to be in agreement with the Cyert and March view 
based on "outcome." 
Salter has also attempted to reconcile the different 
approaches. Recognising the normative approach suggested 
by the "planned purpose and conscious strategy" model 
which stresses the matching of internal capabilities with 
external opportunities during the strategy formulation 
stage, he highlights the distinguishing features of the 
approach which he calls the "Strategy Model" as follows; 
There is a attempt to establish and define objec-
tives before the final analysis of policy alterna-
tives. 
The criteria established during the objective setting 
process assist in structuring the analytic process, 
but also ensures that the policy alternatives 
evaluated and considered are comprehensive and 
wide ranging. This involves the assessment of the 
different policy alternatives under various environ-
mental conditions under which circumstances strengths 
and weaknesses may well change considerably. 
A further feature of this approach is that major 
changes to policies can be, and will be made if 
detailed analysis required by this approach indi- 38 
cates that such a change is logical and necessary. 
The major decision making stages of Salter's strategy 
model are given in Figure 2-4. Salter recognises that in 
the large organisation, major strategic change is infrequent. 
The information system to obtain data pertaining to oppor-
tunities and threats facing lower levels of the organisa-
tion,or diversified divisions, of whose problems and risks 
I 
Strategic 
Intelligence* 
Organisa-
tional 
Profile 
-Environ-
mental 
Analysis 
-Strategic 
Forecasts 
Figure 2-4 
Decision-Making Process Implied by the Strategy Model 
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Source: Christense.ri, C.R., Berg, N.A., Salter, M.S., 
Policy Fom.ilation and Administration, Richard 
D. Irwin Inc., Homewood, Illirpis, 7th Ed., 
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top management may have had little experience, may be 
39 
extremely complex. This complexity "tends to result in 
discontinuous policy...;..making" rather than continued modi-
fications of policy." 40 
Salter contrasts the "strategy model" with what he 
41 terms the "incremental mode." The "incrementalists" 
see complex structures being unable to avoid or survive 
major changes only if these changes meet certain pre-
conditions. Such ·a precondition may be for example, that 
the change may only be accepted if that change occurs 
42 
slowly. The major distinguishing feature of this ap-
preach is that changes are analysed and made within a 
framework of continuously changing objectives, and states 
of internal and external environments. Figure 2-5 is an 
attempt to illustrate the incremental planning mode. 
The dichotomy between the two modes and their sim-
ilarity to the Andrews and Cyert and March approaches is 
clear. The danger of the incremental approach is that due 
to its "satisficing" properties it may misallocate re-
sources due to short term result emphasis and the accep-
tance of the first ''acceptable" alternative. Figure 2-6 
illustrates this problem. 
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The Incremental Planning Mode 
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Figure 2-6 
Effects of Satisficing and Optimizing 
Approaches on Performance 
·-71 
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~f a firm adopted the incremental mode it may adopt 
strategy 1 during the first stage of the planning process, 
test the policy and achieve A, the revise to strategy 2, 
test and achieve B, revise again by selecting strategy 3, 
and obtain the result c. Under these circumstances the 
firm is likely to accept strategy 3 and set it's objective 
at a level of C. However, this "satisficing" procedure 
may cause the decision-makers to overlook the possibility 
of strategy 4 which would produce result D - far in excess 
of C. If the planning process forced the consideration 
of all possible strategies, as suggested by the "conscious 
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approach" or "strategic mode", this situation would not 
occur. 
A spectrum which contrasts the basic philosophies of 
the strategic and incremental modes is provided by Salter. 
See Figure 2-7. 
2.2.4 Summary 
Thus it can be seen that despite the importance of 
the concept of corporate strategy there exists consider-· 
able confusion in the literature. The conceptions of and 
the terminology used appear to be inpercise and can of ten 
have multiple meanings. In addition, the literature 
suggests that there is relatively little information to 
hand or agreement on the ways in which decisions, often 
of considerable importance, are made. 
The preceding discussion has attempted to clarify 
and define the different meanings and interpretations of 
the concept of strategy in order to place the research 
into a context which will facilitate the study and hope~ 
fully, make it a worthwhile project. The following 
section of this chapter examines the firm over its "stages 
of development" or "life cycle" and seeks to identify the 
major strategic issues that it faces during this period. 
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Figure 2-7 
A Spectrum of Planning Models 
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Source: Christensen, C.R., Berg, N.A., and Salter, M.S., 
Policy Formulation and Administration, Richard D. 
Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 7th Ed., page 12. 
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2.3 The Theory of Corporate Development 
Corporate development is ~nextricably tied to the 
ability and objectives of management. It is thus necessary 
to define both management and objectives of management< 
Definitions of management and of objectives are many and 
varied and it .is difficult to find agreement ~n the lit-
erature. Bower defines managing as: 
"The activity or task of determining 
the objectives of an organisation and 
then guiding the people and other re-
sources of the organisation in success-
ful achievement of these objectives. 11 43 
_ Barnard, sees management as "the essential executive 
functions" which are, "first, to provide the system of 
communication; second, to promote the securing of 
essential efforts; and third, to formulate and define 
44 purpose." 
Christenson, Andrews and Bower define management as; 
"Leadership in the informed, planned, purposeful conduct 
of complex organised activity," and define general manage-
45 
ment as the management of "a total enterprise." 
The objectives of the business are clearly related 
to the organisations central purpose. Ansoff maintains 
tha·t the purpose of .the business is to; "Optimise the 
efficiency of its resource - conversion 46 process." 
Andrews believes that "objectives can be all-encom-
passing or specific" and that because "action, policy and 
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purpose change roles so readily "that it seems wise" to 
sidestep the problem of drawing distinctions between 
objectives, policy and programmes of action, and to 
avoid speaking of single or functional strategies except 
47 
as aspects of total corporate strategy." 
Drucker's statement on this topic suggests that he 
agrees with Andrews as he states that a purpose of a busi-
ness is to "create a customer'', and that a central objective 
of a firm is "survival" and he believes that t.he main task 
48 
of management is "economic performance". 
Other writers emphasis profit and/or return. Hayek 
maintains that objectives which do not seek to maximise 
return can be dangerous when he states: 
"It is preci~ely the tendency to allow, 
and even to impel, corporations to use 
their resources for specific ends other 
than those of a long range maxi~isation 
of the return of the capital placed under 
their control. which tends to confer upon 
them undesirable and socially dangerous 
powers and that the fashionable doctrine 
that their policy should be guided by 
"social consideration" is likely to 
produce most undesirable results .... 
The only specific purpose which corpora-
tions ought to serve is to secure the 49 highest long term return on their capital." 
Hayek stresses that this objective should only be 
sought in general, and be draped by legal and moral rules. 
Friedman agrees with this view when he states that: 
"There is one and only one social responsi-
bility of business - to use its resources 
and to engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays 
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within the rules of the game, which 
is to say, engages in open and free 
competition without deception or 
fraud. 11 50 
If these definitions are combined it seems that the 
objectives of a business relate to the efficient and 
economic use of the resources under its control, to pro-
vide the goods and services required to satisfy the demand 
in the market and thereby to ensure its survival. 
If this definition of the objectives of the firm is 
adopted, then profit and return can be regarded as a 
measure of the efficiency of performance in achieving 
I 
central purpose of the organisation, - which can be 
described as survival. As stated above, Cyert and March 
believe that organisations per se, do not have objectives -
only people have objectives. Clearly, the basic assets 
of a business such as land, buildings, equipment, plant, 
machinery do not have "objectives" and thus the people 
who form the management team of the company can only have 
b . . 57 o Jectives. 
The Cyert and March theory however, tends to overlook 
the fact that there are different kinds of organisations. 
Certain organisations, for example, exhibit features 
which suggest that they do have purpose and objectives of 
their own. That is to say that they have objectives 
which are separate from the groups of people who con-
stitute the management of the organisation. In these 
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organisations, the corporate culture seems to dominate and 
managerial behavior is shaped by the organisational climate. 
The economic definition of the objective of the firm, 
namely, profit maximisation, is one of the most frequently 
attacked corporate objectives. The number of critics of 
prof it maximisation as a corporate goal have increased 
considerably over the last twenty years and these critics 
have in turn produced competing hypotheses of business 
motivation. The most powerful of these alternative hypo-
theses, is that managers do not seek to maximise profit 
but rather seek to maximise growth. 
Baumol believes that corporate growth , as measured 
largely by growth in assets and turnover and thus "size" 
is the primary goal of management when he states: 
"The businessman's concern with his 
market share, the large firm's ability 
to spread its risk, and the fact that 
the stockholder gains primarily through 52 business. growth, all makes for expansion." 
Galbraith also emphasizes growth as a key managerial 
objective but believes that growth in sales, rather than 
growth in assets, is the measure which concerns manage-
ment most when he states: 
"Nothing is so compelling as the need 
to survive. However, there is little 
doubt as to how, overwhelmingly, this 
choice is exercised; it is to achieve 
the greatest possible rate of corporate 
growth as measured in sales .... No 
other social goal is more strongly 
avowed as economic growth .... Given a 
secure level of earnings, the esteemed 
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firms are those that are large - that 
have a record of achieved growth - or 
which are growing at a particular speed. 
Increasingly, the esteem is associated 
with the latter. 11 53 
This theory compares favourably to profit maximisa-
tion as a corporate goal because it is simple and rela-
tively easy to measure. Marris maintains that the chief 
obstacle to its gaining a more general acceptance has been 
a fact that it has been difficult to produce empirical 
evidence which enables a distinction to be made between 
a growth and profit motives of managers. 
Marris has argued that: 
"We have repeatedly indicated that 
othodox econometics measurements may 
not easily discriminate between our 
models and potential rivals, or be-
tween alternative interpretations of 
our models as such; in truth, despite 
appearances, the theory of the in-
dividual firm presents the statistic-
ian with a surprisingly acute identi-
fication problem. 11 54 
The financial literature on the other hand indicates 
that this discipline believes that the objective of the 
firm is to maximise the value of the firm to its share-
holders. The value of the firm is measured by the market 
price of the firms ordinary shares which are a measure or 
an assessment of the firm's overall posture in the environ-
ment. This assessment is based on the firm's investment, 
f . . d. . d d d k d . . 55 inancing, ivi en an mar et ec1s1ons. 
It would seem obvious that total profits are not a 
good indicator of corporate performance. For example, a 
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firm could issue new equity capital and merely invest the 
proceeds in government stock. This would improve the 
profits. Yet most investors would hardly see this as a 
satisfactory method of conducting business operations 
simply because they could invest in government stocks 
personally and obtain a greater return as they would and 
not have to pay·a management "fee". Certain businessmen, 
on the other hand, focus on the maximisation of earnings 
per share as their major criterion of corporate perfor-
mance. Earnings per share are not a satisfactory method 
of corporate evaluation due to the fact that this value 
can be easily manipulated by the use of differing account-
ing policies. Earnings per share also do. not take into 
account the time horizon nor do they incorporate a measure 
of the risk that the firm faces. Obviously certain busi-
nesses are more risky than others. There are many examples 
cif firms with the same earnings per share but the market 
value of the total equity may differ considerably. This 
issue will be discussed in depth in Chapter 4 which 
explores the problems of financial evaluation of business 
firms. 
Clearly then the literature has revealed that the 
prime objectives of the firm are far from resolved, but 
three major objectives of the firm appear to be given 
priority in the literature. These are: 
Profitability 
Growth 
Survival. 
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In the ongoing company it appears to be very difficult 
to distinguish which of the three objectives listed above 
is paramount, and it would seem that each of these is 
given priority depending on the circumstances that face 
the particular firm. A competitive environment demands 
that a business must be profitable to survive. And in 
order to survive companies may, due to constraints on 
profitability, growth and competitive activity, be forced 
to seek new products to expand existing operations, or 
possibly even diversify into business areas unrelated to 
their present fields of operation. 
Management, in attempting to achieve the objectives 
of profitability, growth and survival must often make de-
cisions based on incomplete and inaccurate information, 
which may involve a trade-off between conflicting objec-
tives. For example: 
Short-term Profit versus Long-term Growth. 
It is relatively simple for management to maximise 
short-term profits. All this involves is a cut back on 
expenditure in the fields of advertising, research and 
development, management training, service and other 
similar expenditure items. However, by investing funds 
in research and development which may only pay off some 
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time in the future, management are effectively reducing 
the short term profit expenditure in the anticipation in 
improving the long term growth potential of the firm. A 
decision to enhance the current profit figure by reducing 
such expenditure (often considered an investment rather 
. 
than expense by certairi managers) , will in many cases 
dilute the firms ability to compete effectiv~ly in the 
future. 
Profit Margin versus Competitive Position. 
This trade-of£ is similar to the one above in that 
competitive position namely, market share, can be improved 
by reducing prices. This serv~s to reduce the profit 
margin and raises the breakeven point of the firm. In a 
price elastic market th~s will have the effect of in-
creasing market share and in certain cases, return on 
investment. The relationship between return on invest-
ment and market share has been shown to be very strong in 
the PIMS study carried out in the United States of America. 56 
The findings are given in Table 2-2 below. 
Table 2-2 
Relationship cf Return on 
Investment to Market Share 
Market Share % Return on Investment 
(before tax) 
'10 and less 
10 - 20% 
20 - 30% 
30 - 40% 
40% plus 
9% 
14% 
18% 
24% 
30% 
Sou.rce: Bussell, RObertD., Gale, Bradley T., and Sultan, Ralph.G.M., -'"Market 
II Share, a Key to Profitability, Harvard ~~siness Review, Jan.-Feb. 1975 pp 97-106 
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This relationship clearly shows why management are 
so concerned with market share. In a competitive market, 
management must obviously decide between maintaining profit 
margins in the face of competitors reducing their margins 
and thereby losing market share, or market aggressively 
1by increasing advertising, pricing aggressively, providing I . -
i 
better ~ervice, longer guarantees and higher product 
I 
~uality - all of which serve to reduce prof it margins but 
will increase market share and hopefully, return our in-
vestment. 
Direct Sales Effort versus Market Development Effort. 
Here management must decide between a strategy of 
market penetration and market development. Ansoff's 
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matrix illustrates this concept as shown in Figure 2-8. 
Figure 2-8 
Ansoff's Matrix of Strategic Choice 
Existing Market New Market 
Existing 
Pr:oducts 
Market Penetration Market Development 
New 
Products 
Product Development Diversification 
Source: Ansoff, H. Igor, 'torpor ate Strategy," McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
New York, 1965, page 109. 
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A firm which intends marketing an existing product 
in an existing market, can be said to be following a 
strategy of market penetration. In this case the firm 
will seek to optimize sales and profits and if possible, 
dominate the market. The firm which markets an existing 
product in a new market can be said to be developing new 
markets. Generally, a firm will tend to move to market 
I 
development when it believes its present products will 
soon experience the product-life cycle effects of satura-
tion and will seek a new growth market by exporting or 
marketing to new users or consumers. Obviously both 
these strategie~ have risks. The market penetration strat-
egy requires that market share be improved. However 
market share improvement as discussed above, implies 
profit reduction in order to increase the m~rket share. 
Market development, on the other hand, involves consid-
erable risk as the firm has little knowledge of the market 
or experience in reaching new market segments. The strat-
egy selected will obviously depend on management's view 
of the competitive situation in each of the markets. This 
is the equivalent of manage~ent believing that the risks 
of market development are less than the risks of market-
penetration or vice versa. 
Related versus Diversified Opportunities for Growth. 
Referring to Figure 2-8 above the firm has an addi-
tional choice. It can penetrate its existing market, 
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develop new markets, or develop new products. This involves 
the development of new products for the existing markets. 
On the other hand, a firm can choose a non-related area. 
For example, where it does not have any skills either from 
the product or market points of view and market a completely 
; new product in a completely new area. 
I 
Ansof f describes the marketing of a new product in a 
completely new market as strategy of diversification. 
Each of these strategies has its advantages and disad-
vantages. By staying in a related area the firm becomes 
tied to a particular industry and therefore its performance 
will be tied to the performance of the industry in the 
overall economic climate. A firm which is for example, 
heavily committed in the construction industry must expect 
its fortune to fluctuate with those of the general industry. 
On the other hand, if it seeks to diversify it could serve 
to reduce these fluctuations and therefore produce a more 
stable earnings pattern. Diversification strategy, has 
the major disadvantage or risk, that management does not 
possess, or may possess, relatively few skills in the new 
market area, and therefore may be unable to produce a 
satisfactory return and may in fact be at a serious dis-
advantage from a competitive point of view. Obviously a 
firm which chooses to adopt a strategy which will move 
-
either vertically or horizontally from its initial strategy 
of market penetration will still retain knowledge and 
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skill pertaining to either the produ8t or the market 
and such strategies will involve relatively lower risks 
than a diagonal move into diversification. Following 
Ansoff's terminology, this strategy entails both new 
markets and new products and would therefore be more 
'risky. 
I 
! 
Growth versus Stability 
Management must decide whether they wish to grow, 
and at what rate they wish to grow. Or management can 
decide to reduce growth and to strive for stability. Each 
of these two alternatives obviously requires different 
skills. The growth strategy will require that management 
be risk-acceptors and adopt innovative and aggressive 
business strategies. Innovation is generally regarded as 
being high risk due to the high probability of failure 
whilst an aggressive strategy may invoke competitive re-
sponse which also raises risk. The stability choice on 
the other hand, requires managers who are less innovative 
and entrepreneurial, and who believe that consolidation 
and stability are preferable to change and growth. Such 
a strategy also contains high risk elements. Competitors 
may innovate and make the firm's product obsolete or the 
firm may become attractive to outsiders who do perceive 
benefits in an aggressive managerial style and who will 
attempt a take over. This choice will determine whether 
management will seek risky environments where the returns 
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are correspondingly high, or whether they will seek risk-
less environments, where returns are relatively low. As 
stated above, the objectives will define or shape the 
manner and the rate of corporate development. 
A brief review on the major approaches to corporate 
development is discussed in the following section. 
2. 4 Theories of Corporate Developm_ent 
2.4.l Science Bas~d Theories 
A number of theories on corporate development have 
been drawn from the natural sciences. These theories, 
are drawn from such fields such as biology and maintain 
that all organisms grow rapidly at first but then as the 
organism becomes older, its rate of growth slows and 
eventually ceases. This theory has become known as 11 the 
life _cycle" theory. This approach has been used fairly 
extensively in the literature.to describe not only growth 
but also the cessation of growth. 59 McGuire maintains 
' that one of the first uses of this analogy was made by 
Alfred Marshall in 189o. 60 
.•.. here we may read a lesson from the 
young trees of the forest as they struggle 
upwards through the benumbing shade of 
their older rivals. Many succumb on the 
way, and only a few survive, those few 
become strongerwith every year, they 
get a large share of light and air 
with every increase in their hight, and 
at last in their turn they tower above 
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their neighbors, and seem as 
though they would grow on for 
ever, and forever become stronger 
as they grow. But they do not. 
One tree will last longer in full 
Vigor and attain a greater size 
than another, but sooner or later 
age tells on them all. Though the 
taller trees have better access to 
light and air then their rivals, 
they gradually lose vitality, and one 
after another they give place to 
others which, though of less mater-
ial strength, have on their side 
the vigor of youth. 11 61 
In a corporate sense, the firm will begin when an 
entreprerieur believes he possesses skills or knowledge 
that will allow him to penetrate a particular market. 
Of ten this takes the form of a development of a new 
product, a more skilful marketing technique such as a 
more creative advertising approach or more efficient 
methods of distribution which will enable the entrepreneur 
to reach the market more efficiently or more economically. 
The entrepreneur will then seek to raise capital and will 
begin operations. If the entrepreneur has correctly 
identified that the market opportunity and if the organi-
sation is capable of satisfying or exploiting the oppor-
tunity the firm will expand. The entrepreneur has been 
able to convert what was a market opportunity into a 
corporate opportunity. As the firm expands it will 
typically follow the traditiorial 11 8 11 curve as indicated 
in Figure 2-9. 
87 
Figure 2-9 
The Life Cycle "S" Curve 
Sales 
Assets 
Employees 
Profits 
Time 
If the firm is a success, the expected return on 
investment, discounted for uncertainty, will tend to rise 
during the stages of rapid growth as the uncertainties 
surrounding. the new firm will have been reduced as 
production will have coi:nmenced and sales achieved. 
During this rapid growth period the shareholders will re-· 
quire that all the profits be reinvested in the firm in 
order to maximize the value of the ordinary shares. This 
and other valuation and growth concepts will be discussed 
later in the study. 
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In summary then, for the purpose of this discussion, 
it is assumed that the firm will tend to retain earn-
ings and thereby reduce dividend payout ratios in order 
to fund the expansion of the business. It is also likely 
that the new firm will be forced to raise additional out-
side capital during this growth phase. During the growth 
phase competitive products are likely to be introduced 
into the market as competitive and other entrepreneurs 
become aware of the market opportunity. The new competi-
tion is likely to try and improve the product or service 
and profit opportunities are likely to decline. The life 
cycle theory then predicts that the market will tend to 
mature and ultimately to saturate and as growth oppor-
tunities decline dividends are likely to be increased 
and unless the firm diversifies or enters new markets, or 
develops new products all remaining funds will be paid 
out in the form of dividends and the firm will cease to 
. t 62 exis . 
This theODJ does however, process certain limitations. 
For example, the growth of a firm is not necessarily just 
the function of age. The rapid growth of firms like Pick 
'n Pay and Pep Stores in the recent past suggests that 
new firms can grow very rapidly but firms like Anglo 
American, and Barlows also provide evidence that older 
firms are also able to grow at a significant rate. This 
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is so because no matter what the age of the organisation 
its actual performance, is likely to be a fun~tion of 
its managements objectiv~s, due to what Ansoff has called 
the "purpo_sive" nature of .the organisation. 63 
McGuire puts it neatly when he states: 
"The fact is, of course, that the firm is 
not a·biological organism. As defined, 
it is composed of persons who determine 
its course, or at least to a degree, and 
who give it the will to change direc-
tion. The firm's growth pattern depends 
to a great extent, upon the decisions 
made by its executives and are not 
contingent solely upon its age. To be 
sure, a firm may be buffeted and tossed 
.about by external forces - by competi-
tion, changes in fashion and taste, and 
other factors - but basically its sur-
vival and even its growth is determined 
by the responses and actions taken by 
those who direct its course. Biological 
organisms can do little to alter the 
growth patterns from within. They 
cannot 'will' their growth, except in 
the most general manner and the method 
of birth, the nature of growth, and 
the fact of death are fairly well de-
termined by natural laws. There is no 
reason to suppose, however, that the 
firm necessarily be passive about its 
growth or death, for the persons who make 
decisions can alter the factors responsi-
ble for the path that ~4 can take and 
the end it can reach." · 
Clearly then, any theory which is solely dependent 
on-the age of the organisation of the criterion for growth 
and development has serious limitations. 
2.4.2 Evolutionary Growth Theor~ 
Another set of theories related to the natural 
sciences is known as the evolutionary theory of growth. 
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This theory, as the title suggests, is that the firm tends 
to evolve in response to its environment. Based as it is 
in the "Darwinian Theory" it implies the process of natural 
selection. 
This approach implies a change from one species to 
another and not nearly a transition. McGuire describes 
this theory as follows: 
"The concept of growth, therefore, is 
likened not to the transition from 
small to large, but to the evolutionary 
changes that occur when one species 
is altered to an allied, but unique 
species. The analogy is not one of 
growth from childhood to adulthood, 
but rather of change from fish to land 
mammal; from ape to man. 'l'he distinc-
tion exists: small firms and large 
firms, although of the same family, 
are just not identical, and the 
differences between them are so 
great that it is unrealistic to 
think of small firms as simply being 6 _ 
miniatures of our giant corporations." ~ 
Other writers have also noted the difficulty of the 
comparison between small and large firms. Whyte states 
that: 
" ••. the small business is praised as 
the acorn from which a great oak may 
grow, the shadow of one man that may 
lengthen into a large enterprise. 
Examine businesses with fifty or less 
employees, however, and it becomes 
apparent the sentimentality obscures 
some profound differences. You will 
find some entrepreneurs in the classic 
sense - men who develop new products~ 
new appetites, or new systems of dis-
tribution - and some of these enter-
prises may develop into self-perpetuating 
institutions. But very few. The great 
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majority of small business firms cannot 
be placed on agy continium with the 
corporation. 11 6 
McGuire argues that the evolutionary theory 11 gives 
little information on the reasons why some firms evolve 
and others do not, nor hint at the stage where metamor-
phasis of the 'firm takes place, i.e. that form where the 
form of the enterprise is altered. 1167 This theory also 
suffers from the major limitations mentioned above in 
that it ignores 11 the purposive 11 role of management. The 
whole concept of strategy is concerned with management's 
roles to attempt to influence the environment rather than 
merely react to changes in that environment. The evolu-
tionary theory implies that management is passive and 
reacts to the environment and has no influence over the 
destiny of the company. If it is true that the firm 
merely reacts to environment then success in corporate 
terms. is very dependent of "luck". The modern day busi-
ness manager almost certainly would not admit to luck 
being the major determinant to his company's success. 
2.4.3 Economic Based Theory 
The economist bases his theory on efficiency. 
Efficiency is "cost reduction" orientated. The firm 
is expected to grow to that point where average costs 
·are minimized. The theory is based on perfect markets 
which assume that the business man has perfect 
I 
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infonnation as to prices, costs, competitive activity and 
future returns. The the~ry also possesses the further 
limiting factor from a practitioner's point of view 
in that it assumes that all competitors in the market 
have the same information. The implication is that all 
firms in the same industry who all have perfect knowledge 
of the market can then be expected to all be of the same 
size. This is obviously not the case. 
It is possible to d~scribe the growth and develop-
ment of the firm in terms of Rostow's "stages of economic 
68 growth" theory. This theory is based on the economic 
growth pattern of an economy and covers five different 
stages. 
2.4.3.1 The Traditional Society 
Rostow defines this stage in economic terms as "a 
traditional.society is one whose structure is developed 
within limited production function. 1169 
Rostow continues, "the level of productivity was 
limited by the inaccessability.of modern science, and 
its frame of mi.nd. 1170 
This stage is similar to that of the small business, 
managed by the entrepreneur. Levels of productivity in 
the small firm do appear to be limited by the level of 
managerial and other skills such as production, technology 
and control. In addition, small businessman does appear 
r 
' 
I 
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to be bound by conventional, traditional ways of doing 
business in his industry. The apparent reluctance of the 
corner grocery store owner to adapt to the new concept 
of the supermarket is perhaps an example of the inflex-· 
ibility or unwillingness to cast off the traditional methods 
of grocery merchandising. 
2.4.3.2 The Pre-conditions for Takeoff and Takeoff 
--· ---
Rostow believes that the basic inf astructure of the 
economy was laid during this stage. More modern techniques 
begin to be employed in the economy and the basic infra-
structure of transport, communications, banking, financial 
institutions are developed. This stage is comparable in 
the corporate sense in that the firm will during this 
stage perceive that growth is possible and the management 
will begin to become more professional. Management will 
begin to organise and plan for the development of the 
firm, either through the development of new products or 
geographical expansion into new markets. 
The "take-off" stage for the business firms seems to 
parallel that of the economy reasonably well. As in the 
case of the economy, the "take-off" and rapid growth are 
dependent on similar factors in the case of the small 
firm. The opportunities are seen to exist and the capa-
bility of the firm to convert an environmental opportunity 
into corporate growth appears to depend very heavily on 
the availability of capital and capable management. 
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Rostow describes this stage as follows: 
"We come now to the great wateJ.:-shed 
in the life of modern societies, the 
third st~ge in this sequence, the take-
off. The take-off is the interval 
when the older blocks and resistances 
to steady growth are finally overcome. 
The forces making for economic progress, 
which yielded limited bursts and en-
claves of modern activity, expand and 
come to dominate the society. Growth 
becomes its normal condition. Compound 
interest becomes built, as it were, into71 the habits a.nd institutional structure." 
The.economy, during the take-off stage produces an 
increased rate of saving and capital formation and a 
formation of the manufacturing industry of the economy. 
In addition, unused resources are exploited and increased 
productivity and commercialisation produce rapid growth. 
The analogy from a corporate point of view is likely to 
be that management of the firm is almost totally in con-
trol of professional management and the firm would tend 
to be vertically integrated and will seek to control the 
. h h' . 'bl 72 complete ,production process w erever t is is possi e. 
The firm will thus expand both into both manufacturing 
and distribution on a wider scale. 
2.4.3.4 The Drive to Maturity 
This phrase sees sustained growth over a long period 
of time as the economy expands and increasingly employs 
modern technology in all spheres of activi t:y. Ros tow 
maintains: 
( 
\ 
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"The make-up of the economy changes 
increasingly as technique improves, new 
industries accelerate, old industries 
level off .... Some 60 years after 
take-off begins (say, 40 years after 
the end of take-off) what may be called 
maturity is generally attained. 
Formally we can define maturity as a 
stage in which the economy demonstrates 
the ca.pa.city to move beyond the ori--
ginal industries which powered its 
take-off and to absorb and to apply 
efficiently over a very wide range of 
its resources - if not the whole range -
the most advanced fruits of modern 
technology. 11 73 
From a corporate point of view, the business now 
becomes a multi-product company with the older products 
facing product life cycle decline whilst others are in the 
introduction and growth phases. The firm has moved beyond 
the original business or product and will probably have 
changed its personality or character completely. 
2~4.3.5 The Age of Mass Consumption 
During this, the last stage, the economy seeme_d to 
move towards a high standard of living for the total pop-
ulation. An economy is seen to move towards increasing 
social welfare benefits. The company, in a comparable 
stage of development, will be seen to have multiple 
objectives and will be regarded as being "socially 
responsible". 
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2 . 4 . 4 Su.:_mmary 
A major criticism of the science based and evolution-
ary theories discussed above has been that they are based 
on biological theories which see the f irrn as moving in-
exorably through a life cycle which ranges from birth, 
through a period of rapid growth through a period where 
.the growth rate slows, finally ceases, and the organism 
I 
'dies. The theories can also be seen to be based upon 
evolutionary thinking, which implies a mutation from one 
form to another, different form. These theories ignore 
the "purposive" nature of the business organisation and 
the ability of the decision makers to influence the destiny 
of the firm. These theories imply a form of development 
over which management has little, or even no control. 
In the Rostow model development of the firm appears 
to parallel the development of the economy reasonably well. 
Although the Rostow approach may explain "how" firms grow, 
it do~s not answer the questions relating to "why" firms 
grow. 
Certainly the analogies of the scientific, biological, 
evolutionary and economic models to the growth and develop-
ment of business firms should be retained and kept in 
mind. There does appear to be a "life cycle" pattern in 
the histories of certain firms. Furthermore, certain firms 
do seem to "evolve" rather than simply "grow" in size. All 
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these theories provide clues as to the underlying causes 
of and reasons for corporate growth and development. Each 
of the theories taken on its own may possess certain weak-
nesses but when combined they provide a useful starting 
point or background, from which studies, which are specif-
ically aimed at explaining and interpreting the growth 
and development of business firms, may be contrasted and 
compared. The following section presents a_ summary of 
the important studies and literature in this field which 
examines the development of the firm using many different 
variables and does not rely on a single variable such as 
"age!'. 
\ 
. ) 
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2.5 The Stages of Corporate Development 
This section will examine the literature in this 
field which aims to explain and predict the problems 
faced by a firm as it expands both in size and markets. 
Each of the major studies will be examined individually 
due to their importance in the field. 
2.5.1 The Chandler Study 
This study, considered to be classic in the field 
examined the development of some seventy large United States 
firms and in indepth study of four companies namely, Du Pont, 
General Motors, Sears Roebuck and Standard Oil, were ex-
amined in depth. ·Chandler found certain similarities in 
the ways in which these firms were able to adapt to a 
h . . 74 c anging environment. Chandler believes that structure 
follows strategy. This idea revolves around the concept 
of the firm first exploiting market opportunities and then 
developing the organisational and administrative sy~tems to 
support the market activities. Chandler states: 
"The thesis deduced from these several 
propositions is then, that structure 
follows strategy and that the most complex 
type of structure is the result of the 
concatenation of several basic strategies. 
Expansion of volume led to the creation 
of an administrative off ice to handle one 
function in one local.area. Growth through 
geographical dispersion brought the need 
for a departmental structure and head-
quarters to administer several local field 
units. The decision to expand into new 
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types of functions called for the build-
ing of a central office and a multi-
departmental structure, while the 
developing of new lines of products or 
continued growth on a national or inter-
national scale brought the formation of 
the multi-divisional structure with a 
general office to administer the differ""'. 
ent divisions."75 
Chandleris study was concerned with the develbpment 
and diversification patterns of the four.companies mentioned 
above and concerned largely with the administrative burdens 
that were placed on management as a result of their 
diversification and growth strategy. Chandler found 
these companies to be functional·ly organised during their 
early stages but he saw that this form of organisation 
possessed one major weakness. This was that very few 
executives at the top of the company were involved with 
the major, and important decisions. Chandler found: 
"As the enterprise reached the limits of 
the existing market set by available 
consumer income, the state of technology, 
and the location of population, and as 
it came to the limits of cost reduction 
through rational and systematic integra-
tion and use of its resources, its senior 
executives began to seek new markets or 
new lines of business were they might 
apply some resources only partially used, 
or where existing ones might be employed 
more profitably. A threatened decline of 
existing demand even more dramatically 
increased the pressure to find new markets. 
Not only did they seek these overseas but 
they also took their markets into new 
lines of business that were similar enough 
to its existing activities to permit a 
transfer of resources. The latter type 
100 
of expansion was practical, however, 
only if some skills of some of the 
personnel and the capacities could be 
transferred without too great a cost 
to new lines. Finally, those companies 
that did develop new markets or 
products then had to reshape the 
channels of communication within the 
enterprise. Otherwise, the officers 
managing in the several activities lost 
contact with the new and even the old 
markets, and the senior executives had 
increasing difficulty in allocating in-
telligently the expanded and more 76 
varied resources at their command." 
Chand~er's findings therefore show that if the large 
company wishes to continue its growth and to achieve this 
growth through diversification, it will soon lead to a 
breakdown of management communicationand integration and 
the organisation will ultimately be faced with a choice. 
This will mean that either the strategy of diversifica-
tion will have to be abandoned and thus its very survival 
may be threatened, especially in a rapid change environ-
ment,- or it could modify the organisation in some way so 
as to overcome the problems of communication and integra-
tion. Chandler's research shows that diversification and 
growth strategies were not abandoned and that it was the 
existing organisational structure that was changed in 
order to achieve corporate objectives. He states: 
"A preliminary survey of the 50 largest 
industrial corporations in the U.S. 
showed that in rec~nt years what may be 
called the multi-divisional type of 
organisation has become generally used 
by industrial firms carrying on the most 
diverse economic activities. 11 77 
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Chandler describes the multi-divisionalised organi-
sation as follows: 
"In this type of organisation, a general 
office plans, co-ordinates and appraises 
the work of a number of operating divisions 
and allocates to them the necessary 
personnel, facilities, funds and other 
resources. The executives in charge of 
these divisions in turn have under their 
command most of the functions necessary 
for handling one major line of product 
or set of services over a wide geographic 
area, and each of these executives is 
responsible for the financial results of 
their division and ~or its success in 
the market place. 11 7 
In other words, the functional responsibilities of 
the management team were no longer held at the top level, 
but were rather lower down in the organisational and were 
held at the divisional level. These divisions were 
organised on a geographical or product basis and were 
viewed as profit centres. 
Chandler continues: 
Expansion, primarily through diversification, 
enlarged the range, number, and the complex-
ity of the entrepreneurial activities 
required of the senior executives. The 
long term allocation of resources now 
involved deciding between the expansion, 
maintenance and contraction of personnel, 
plant, and equipment in several different 
large scale, wide spread businesses. The 
appraisal of existing performance as well 
as the planning of future uses of resources 
called for a general off ice in which the 
executives were given the time, the in-
formation, and the encouragement to develop 
broad view, all so necessary for the handl-
ing of the new and more complex problems."79 
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It seems the success of the divisionalised form of 
structure which as Chandler maintains, flow from the 
strategic decisions to diversify into various product 
lines was a major factor contributing to the trend of 
diversification. Chandle~ states that: 
"Once the new type of structure became 
known, as it did during the 1930's, its 
availability undoubtedly encouraged many 
enterprises to embark on a strategy of 
diversification, for the ability to main~ 
tain administrative control through such 
an organisational framework greatly 
reduced the risks of this type of ex-
pansion, in fact, the systematising of 
strategic decisions through building of 
a general office and the routineising 
of product development by the formation 
of a research department have, in a sense, 
institutionalised this strategy of 
diversification. 11 80 
In summary, Chandler's thesis is that firms that adopt 
a strategy of diversification will tend to experience. 
organisational problems, and in order to overcome these 
problems, the firm is likely to adopt the multi-divisional 
organisation form. Chandler believes that the trend to 
diversify, in response to technological demands and de-
vel6pment, is likely to continue: 
"As the population continues to grow, and 
become more and more suburban, as tech-
nology becomes more intricate and more 
fruitful, and as the demands for the 
industrial markets become more complex, 
the activities of many American enter-
prises should become still more diverse 
and still more complicated. 11 81 
Chandler further believes that multi-divisional form 
of organisation encourages the development of new products 
due to the fact that the divisional form of organisation 
I 
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tended to institutionalise diversification. 
2.5.2 The Scott Research 
This approach is essentially a marriage of Chandler's 
findings, which identified the uniformaties in the manner 
I 
in which companies adapted to their environments, and 
risks, and described as "structure following strategy," 
with ·the Ros tow model of economic growth •. 82 The Scott 
approach to the development of the firm is unique in that 
it is based on "managerial adaptations" and not on bio-
logical patterns, such as size, age or life cycle. 
The model is constructed around four hypotheses: 
Firstly, that there are significant regularities to the 
way in which companies are organised, 
Secondly, that these regularities stem from the managerial 
requirements of a similar set of activities more 
than from size or 11 age 11 per se, 
Thirdly, that there is a characteristic sequence to the 
sets of activities managed, and hence, 
Fourthly, a characteristic sequence (1, 2, 3 ••• ) to the 
organisational adaptations. 
This model has drawn on Salter's study in which Salter 
states his "partial theory of corporate development" as 
follows: 
Evolution of Product-Market Relationships: 
In dynamic economies such as that of the United 
states, the product-market relationships of 
manufacturing firms tends to become more complex 
over time. 
Organisational Structure of Manufacturing Firms: 
The form of organisation of manufacturing firms 
tends to vary directly with the complexity of 
their product-market relationships. 
104 
Evolution of Organisational Structure: 
Therefore the organisational structure of manu-
facturing firms tends to change as their product-
market relationships become more complex. 
Stages of Development: 
At any given time manufacturing firms can be 
arrayed along a spectrum in relation to the 
degree of complexity of their product-market 
relationships, and four clusters of firms can 
be identified along this spectrum which repre-
sents four characteristic stages of organisa-
tional or corporate development. 
Alternative Paths of Development: 
Therefore it can be said that a given manufac-
turing firm tends to evolve in the direction of 
stage 1 toward stage 4 as its product-market 
relationships become more complex if; 
The long term product-market strategy focusses 
primarily on expanding the existing product 
line, then the sequence of organisational de-
velopment will tend to be Stage 1, 2 and 3 in 
that order with Stage 4 only following a dramatic 
shifting in strategy toward multiple products. 
The long-term product-market strategy focuses 
primarily on developing new products or lines 
of products, then the sequence of organisational 
will tend to be Stage 1, 2 and 4 with the Stage 3 
form of organisation appearing only as a product 
division expands to such an exg3nt as to merit 
geographical decentralization. 
2.'5.2.1 Identifying the Stages of Development 
It is clear that as firms start up and develop and 
are successful, they experience a number of important 
changes. .For example, 
Sales and expenditures rise ' 
Gross profits as a percentage of sales may in-
crease as the production functions "learns" to 
refine production techniques and as scale economies 
are brought into being, 
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The assets employed in the firm will increase, 
Managerial roles and activities increase in number 
and functional specialization, 
Operating problems will increase in scope and 
complexity,, 
The number of products sold and produced may in-
creaser 
The number of geographical markets in which the 
product are sold will increase, 
The products will be marketed to an increased 
markets or consumer segments, 
The information systems to plan, monitor and 
control these increasingly complex tasks will 
have to be continually updated to provide the 
wider span and increased levels of management 
with actionable data. 
The "universe" of firms in an economy ranges in size 
and complexity from the small individual proprietor or "Mom 
and Pop" store, to the sprawling multinational giants like 
Anglo American and the Rembrandt organisation. Scott has 
developed the following five-stage model to cover the spec-
trum -of companies, based largely on the managerial problems 
faced at each stage of development. See Table ?-3. 
Table 2-3 
The Five Stage Developmental Model of the Firm 
Stage 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Description_ 
Very small firm witJ1 .little or no 
full time management. 
One function, one area 
Deparbnent structure with head-
quarters and field units. 
Central office and multi-
deparbnental structure. 
Multi-divisional structure 
Key Problem 
Expansion of volume 
Expansion geographically 
Vei'tical integration (new 
functions 
Diversification 
Resource-allocation 
Source: Adapted from Scott, Bruce R., op. cit. page 3, based on 
Chandler, Alfred D. , Strategy and_ Structure, op. cit. , pages 
16-17. 
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The classification into five stages may appear to be 
an oversimplification, of the real world situation. Scott, 
accepting the problem of oversimplification, collapses 
the five groups into three groups and justifies the move 
to three stages as follows: 
"though five classes of firms can hardly 
be excessive for a population numbering 
in the millions,. and though Chandler's 
argument seems a clear and concise one, 
the present model is based on still fewer 
categories. The reason for reducing an 
already modest nuililier of categories is 
the belief that it is useful to develop 
the categories and model upon a cluster 
of internal managerial characteristics 
in preference to Chandler's emphasis on 
structure, and totably to his emphasis 
on levels within the structure. Roughly 
speaking, we will collapse his first and 
second categories into a single.one, and 
his third and fourth into another, thus 
leaving three instead of five. 11 84 
The three "collapsed" stages suggested by Scott and 
derived from the five stages proposed by Chandler in Table 
2-3 above, are presented in Table· 2-4 below. 
Stage 
1 
Table 2-4 
Scott's Three Major Stages of Development 
Description Key Problem Area 
Small company with one or a fe-N Growth in volume, geographic 
functions perf orrned by one nianager coverage an:1 through vertical 
integration to Stage 2 
2 Multi-departmental enterprise Diversification.to Stage 3. 
with specialized :rranagerial de-
partrrents based upon function 
3 Multi-divisional enterprise with Resource allocation 
divisions based on product-market 
relationships. 
r 
, 
Source: Adapted from Scott, Bruce R., StA.ges of Corporate Developrrent -. Part J 
Unpublished Paper, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard Univ. 
Boston, 1971, ICH 9-371-294, Page 4. 
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Scott has been able to describe each of the three 
stages in terms of nine distinctive characteristics. 
"Eight of which describe actual charac-
teristics of the way the firm is managed, 
while the ninth describes ~he scope of 
strategic choice which characterizes 
the strategic framework of the respec-
tive stages of development. The first 
two characteristics denote critical 
aspects of the relationship between the 
firm and its environment, while the next 
six denote important aspects of the part-
whole relationships within the firm. 11 85 
Each of the stages, with the relevant characteristics 
are presented in Tables 2-5, 2-6 and 2-7, for stages 1, 2 
and 3 respectively. It will be useful, to follow the 
development of the firm through the stages of development 
to facilitate the development of performance and risk 
hypotheses developed later in the study •. 
Stage 1 
Almost all successful firms start off as the result 
of some entrepreneur's "vision" or "dream". These firms, 
and their less successful counterparts begin operations 
as a "one man show". The owner, is typically also the 
general.manager and thus he· maintains both ownership and 
control. The organisation of the firm is simple and 
reflects the owner's close control over operations. See 
Figure 2-10. 
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Table 2-5 
Scott's Classif~cation System: Stage 1 
Co. Characteristics 
1. Product line 
2. Distribution 
3. Organization structure 
4. Product-service 
transactions 
5. R&D 
6. Performance measure-
ment 
7. Rewards 
8. Control System 
9. Strategic choices 
Staqe 1 
Organization~l Development 
1. Single product or single 
·line 
2. One channel or set of 
channels 
3. Little or no formal struc-
ture - "one man show" 
4. N/A 
5. Not intitutionalized-
oriented by owner-manager. 
6. By personal contact and 
subjective criteria 
7. Unsystematic and often 
paternalistic 
8. Personal control of both 
strategic and operating 
decisions · 
9. Needs of owner vs. needs of 
. firm 
Source: Scott, Bruce R., "Stages of Corporate Development -
Part I", Unpublished Paper, Graduate School of 
Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston 
1971, page 7. 
I[ . 
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Table 2-6 
Scott's Classification System: Stage II 
Co. Characteristics 
1. Product line 
2. Distribution 
3. Organization structure 
4. Product-service 
transactions 
5. R&D 
6. Performance 
measurement 
7. Rewards 
8. Control system 
9. Strategic choices 
Stage II 
Organizational Development 
1. Single product line 
2. One set of channels 
3. Specialization based on 
function 
4. Integrated pattern of trans-
actions 
D~Market 
5. Increasingly institution-
alized search for product or 
process improvements 
6. Increasingly impersonal using 
technical and/or cost 
criteria 
7. Increasingly systematic with 
emphasis on stability and 
service 
8. Personal control of strategic 
decisions, with increasing 
delegation of operating de-
cisions based on control by 
decision rules (policies) 
9. -Degree of integration 
-Market share objective 
-Breadth of product line 
Source: Scott, Bruce R., "Stages of Corporate Development", 
Unpublished Paper, Graduate School of Business Admin-
istration, Harvard University, Boston 1971, page 7. 
r 
! 
'~ 
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Table 2-7 
Scott's Classification System: Stage III 
Co. Characteristics 
1. .Product line 
2. Distribution 
3. Organization 
:structure 
·4. · Product- service 
5. R&D 
-;6. 'Performance measurement 
-7 .. ·Rewards 
-::S. Control system 
9. Strategic choices 
Stage III 
Organizational Development 
1. Multiple product lines 
2. Multiple channels 
3. Specialization b3.sed on 
product;....market relation-
.ships 
4. Not integrated 
~ ' ~ . . Marketsl 
5. Institutionalized search 
for new products as well 
-.as for improvements 
6. Increasingly impersonal 
.using market criteria 
.(rt::turn on investment and 
0 market share) 
74 Increasingly systematic 
'With variability related 
:to performance 
S. Delegation of product-market 
decisions within existing 
. business, with indirect 
control based on analysis 
of 11 results." 
9. -Entry and Exitfrom Industries 
-Allocation of resources by 
industry 
-Rate of growth 
Source: Scott, Bruce R., "Stages of Corporate Development", 
Unpublished Paper, Graduate School of Business Ad-
.ministration, Harvard University, Boston, 1971, page 7. 
r 
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Figure 2-10 
Typical Organisational Structure of a Stage 1 Firm 
. Employe-;:;J 
I 1 
Emp~oyeel 
The production-marketing system within the Stage 1 
firm also tends to be simple. Pigure 2-11 represents such 
a system. 
Figure 2-11 
Typical Production-Marketing System for a Stage 1 Firm 
::: Productio:t 1 -·~ B Raw Materialsi------<r_>tll n !·----"« Sal~-~-'9· Market 
.. Process _J _ ···~ 
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The problems of a Stage 1 firm are well known and due 
to the limited resources, limited skills, emphasis on 
sales and operations and vulnerability to changes die-
tated by suppliers, customers and the economic environ-
ment, management of ten tends to be very short term orien-· 
tated and the. entrepreneur is often swamped by detail 
due to his inability, and often unwillingness to delegate. 
Stage II 
It would seem that, once the firm has managed what 
could be termed the "survival" stage, a critical strategic 
decision is taken. MacArthur and Scott identified two 
basic types of product-market strategies. The first 
strategy leads to an integrated undertaking. Such a 
strategy consists of a "closed system" which would re-
quire central coordination by functional specialists. 
This strategy is described as follows: 
"The first type involves an integrated 
sequence of operations where the aim is 
to relate the sequence of operations 
so as to facilitate the flow of the 
product or service from one operation 
to the next. 11 86 
The refining of oil and its distribution is an example 
of such a sequence. Figure 2-12 illustrates the sequence. 
I 
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Figure 2-13 
Product~Market Flow in a Stage II Firm 
.___..,.._F-._ ___ ___, 8 0 % 
20% 
Market 
20% 
Market 
1 0% 
Market 
Stage II firms often attempt to break the firm into 
meaningful prof it and performance centers or to use the 
branch manager concept of management. But despite these 
attempts, the firm remains built around a single business --
steel, oil, beverages or banking for example. Stage II 
firms are less dependent on external factors for their 
survival than Stage I firms. 
Stage III 
The second strategy which could be adopted by Stage I 
firms, as identified by MacArthur and Scott, is that of the 
diversified operation. 89 In this case the firm is separated 
into different divisions, each of which serves a different 
product-market and which operates largely independently of 
the other divisions. These divisions thus operate as an 
"open system" and are described thus: 
I 
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In the diversified undertaking, on the 
other hand, the divisions are-designed 
to stand on their own in their respective 
markets. Hence there is no comparable 
product flow to relate the divisions . 
... strategic choice, far from aiming to 
relate to the division, aims for selec-
tive use of resources in those divisions 
which have the highest expected economic 
return .... Thus, each division operates 
approximately as an open system, trans-
acting business with its environment 
more than with other divisions of the 
company; and the parent organisation 
treats the division as members of a 
loose confederation rather than as in- 90 dispensable parts of an integrated whole." 
This stra~egic option is illustrated in Figure 2-14. 
Figure 2-14 
Product Flow in a Diversified Firm 
Top Management and 
Corporate Head Office 
·-
l 
Construction Retailing Chemical 
Division Division Division 
I I 
100% 100% 100% 
l· ! ·! 
Market Market Market 
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The distinguishing feature of this stage is that the 
corporate head off ice appears to "play the portfolio 
game" where the cash flow from cash ~1enerating divisions 
{or cash-cows) are reinve·sted in those divisions where 
returns are expected to be the highest. Those divisions 
which are considered unsatisfactory are liquidated or 
disposed of. 
The Stage III firm is a formidable enterprise. Cer-
tain of these firms are larger than many countries. The 
divisions are often highly integrated Stage II firms on 
their own and are managed by specialized and highly 
skilled functional managers. The diversified nature of 
their operations tends to make them less suxceptible to 
cyclical swings in any single industry and their cash 
flow patterns enable them to invest in business areas at 
a scale that State I and Stage .II firms would often be 
unable to match. 
Study of the nine characteristics of the three stages 
as given in Tables 2-5, 2-6 and 2-7, will suggest and 
highlight the key differences in strategy that the three 
stages signify. These strategic differences are very 
important and some emphasis on these issues seems appro-
priate. 
The resource allocation problem, which is regarded 
by Bower as so crucial, is very different between Stage II 
and Stage II firms. 91 In the Stage II firm the emphasis 
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must be on achi~ving and maintaining a balance between 
the different production stages of the integrated process. 
To return to the integratE~d oil firm illustration in 
Figure 2-12, it will serve little purpose to expand dis-
tribution and marketing efforts if refining is unable to 
produce the products in the required quantities. Similarly, 
an expansion of the transportation f a.cility would result 
in unused capacity if the refining stage were unable to 
process the increased crude oil being delivered or if the 1 ~· 
market were unable to absorb the increased production. 
The objective is thus one of "balance" between stages 
' yet in many cases, marginal increases in capacity at the 
different production stages may be difficult, if not 
impossible to achieve. Economy of scale factors often 
demand that capacity be added in large amounts - there is 
no such thing as a "small" oil refinery today. Thus 
demands for expansion at different stages of the produc-
tion process tend to be "lumpy" and result in financing 
as well as capacity and production problems. The Stage II 
firm can however, obtain significant economies of scale 
by specializing in aproduction process and the integrated 
nature of the process. 
A further major distinctive characteristic between 
these two stages is that of organisational structure. 
Scott's model states that Stage III firms will be multi-
divisional based on product-market relationships. 
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Wrigley's research has shown that this is true for united 
States firms. 92 His analysis of a sample drawn from the 
"Fortune 500" showed that the vast majority of these firms 
had already reached Stage III of Scott's model. Wrigley's 
findings, showed that of the 80 firms which were diversi-
f ied according to his classification system (which will 
be discussed in depth in a later chapter) , 86 percent 
,__. . h d. . . 1 . d 93 were opera~ing using t e iv1s1ona_1ze structure. · 
Thain has developed an extremely detailed breakdowns 
of the key emphases of general management, the key emphases 
in the management process, the general emphases in busi-
ness functions and the major internal and external blocks 
94 to transition from each stage to the next. 
2.5.3 The Wr~gley Classification Scheme 
As stated above, Wrigley, in his 1967 study of the 
"Fortune 500" which was built on both Chandler's and 
MacArthur's and Scott's study, found that the vast 
majority of these firms had already reached Stage III of 
Scott's model. 95 This led him to examine the population 
in more detail in order to separate out any additional 
meaningful distinctions. His studies showed that various 
definitions of diversification used by previous researchers 
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were not meaningful to the management of the enterprise. 
Flowing from his efforts to produce a more meaningful 
definition he developed a new concept which he termed "the 
core skills" which he defined as the critical skills re-
quired by the firm to enable it to compete within a given 
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or chosen product-market area. Those companies that 
adopted a strategy of diversification into areas related 
to their 11 core skill" were termed "related" while those 
firms which diversified into areas which were unrelated to 
their 11 core skills 11 were termed "unrelated 11 • 97 These 
concepts proved to be very powerful as Wrigley found these 
two categories of firms exhibited differing managerial 
ch~racteristics. Wrigley's study also revealed another 
category of firm which had adopted a more limited strategy 
of diversification and which he determined empirically 
to be 30 percent of total corporate sales. He states: 
11 At one stage in the research, a serious 
attempt was made to discover whether the 
basis of a diversification system could 
be the proportion of the 11 main 11 product 
in the total output. If this were success-
ful it would haveled to an ordered set of 
magnitudes of the kind (in percent): 100; 
90; 80, 70; 60; 50; 40; 30. However, the 
attempt met with a particular phenomenon 
among firms in the sample. While there 
were some 14 firms in the category 80-100 
percent, few firms were in the category 
60-80 percent. It seemed that in design-
ing a strategy for expansion, businessmen 
did not adopt which might be called 
"half diversification"; they tended either 
to diversify by a small amount in relatioy 
to total output or to go the whole way."9 
• 
' 
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Those firms which had diversified to the extent of 
less than 30 percent of sales, Wrigley called "dominant" 
product firms. These firms possessed the distinguishing 
feature that one major product line produced over 70 per-
cent of corporate sales. Again, Wrigley found that this 
group also exhibited different managerial characteristics 
to both the 11 related 11 and 11 unrelated 11 groups of firms. 
Wrigley demonstrated these significant and managerial 
characteristics of these three types of multi-product 
divisional structures and the results are given in Table 
2- 8. This Table showes that the degree of autonomy of 
the divisions varied according to the nature and degree 
f d k d • • f • • 99 • 1 I 1 • o pro uct-mar et iversi ication. Wrig ey s c assi-
fication scheme is analyzed in further depth in the 
following chapter where diversification patterns and 
motives are developed. 
( 
, 
I 
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Table 2- 8 
Wrigley's Findings Regarding Divisional Autonomy 
and Diversification 
' 
x 
A 
, i/ 
x 
Dominant 
Product 
Goals 
Mgt * 
Dev. 
-
Supplies 
·Product 
Strategy 
Routine 
Operations 
DIVISIONAL LEVEL 
DECISIONS 
CORPORATE LEVEL 
Related DECISIONS 
Product 
Goals 
Mgt * U:::-irelated 
Dev. Product 
Goals 
Mgt * 
Supplies Dev. 
Product Supplies 
Strategy 
Routine Product 
Operations Strategy 
Routine 
Operations 
, 
X = Amount of divisional autonomy (or corporate/divisional 
scope). 
Y = Amount of diversification (or order of diversification 
categories). 
* = Management Development. 
y 
r 
\ 
122 
2.6 Summary 
The preceding sections have reviewed the literature 
pertaining to the development of the firm over time. The 
dangers of the trend toward increased concentration of 
corporate power as predicted by many writers does not 
appear to be occurring as rapidly as expected and indeed, 
research and observation suggests that this trend is not as I 
inexorable nor as serious as feared. Large firms are con-
tinually being challenged by smaller, more flexible and 
more highly motivated rivals. The theorists in the field 
of strategy formulation and implementation appear to reach 
the same conclusion in that strategy appears to result from 
both "conscious" and "evolving" activity within the firm. 
The firm is seen to evolve over time and in terms of 
its internal sophistication. Planning, control ~nd reward 
systems are seen to develop as the firm's strategy develops 
in response to changing internal and external environments. 
This Chapter has provided the conceptual framework 
which will form the basis of the analysis and discussion 
of the fundamental growth strategies which firms employ to 
achieve their goals. Despite the simplified "stages of 
development" system proposed by Scott, each of·those 
stages contains important sub-ca.tegories. Diversification 
and growth are achieved by the adoption of very different 
strategies. The following chapters will identify and intro-
duce and discuss the diversification strategies that have 
proved to be valuable in the study of corporate strategy and 
performance. 
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3. CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION: CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS AND THEORY 
3~1 Introduction 
This chapter will build on the framework established 
in Chapter which was based on the theory of corporate 
development and the manner in which firms adapt to their 
envitonment. This chapter will use the writing of Chandler 
and Scott discussed in the previous chapter as the founda-
tion from which the study of corporate diversification and 
its impact on corporate performance and risk will be based . 
. 3.2 Concepts and Definitions 
3. 2. ·l. Conoepts 
Firms have always been diversified in one way or 
apother. Stigler supports this statement when he states: 
I 
"There never was a business with only one 
productive process and one final product; 
there never will be. A firm that merely 
bought the same comodity would find that 
it was engaged in a host of different 
productive processes .... A firm that appears 
to make only "one" product almost always 
makes this product in a variety of quali-1 
ties, with different sizes of order, speeds 
of delivery, period of payment .... Diversi-
fication and integration in the strictest 
sense are universal." 
Contrary to popular belief, diversification in the 
corporate sense has not been confined to the last two de-
cades. Gort quotes the example of the firm Jakob Fugger II 
which was eng~ged in such diverse activities as mining, real 
estate, banking and the spice trades as early as the six-
2 teenth century. Lynch however, has distinguished between 
.. 
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"diversification" and "the acquisitive conglomerate". He 
sketches the development process as follows: 
"The multifirm horizontal consolida-
tion dominated the industrial seene at 
the turn of the century; large scale 
vertical integration, particularly in 
the basic riletals industries, o·ccurred 
during that same period and again in 
the 1920s ; the multilayered public 
utility holding company was prevelant 
in the 1920s and early in 1930s. The 
phenomenon of the 1950s and 1960s has 
been the "acquisitive conglomerate", 
the corporation growing through a con~ 
tinuing program of aggressive, diver-
sified acquisition. 11 3 
There appears to be an increasing tendency for firms 
to difersify not only "horizonta.lly" and "vertically", but 
also into "related" areas and into many different industries 
and products that are in no way related to the traditional 
product market areas of the firm. These have become known 
as "unrelated" firms or "conglomerates". The term "conglom-
erate" does imply a mixture of no form of logic and many 
executives of these firms avoid use of the term and deny 
that they organisations are "conglomerates". 
Roy Ash, President of Litton Industries believes that 
the term does not "fit" his firm and appeared to perceive 
his firm as belonging to a unique classification system when 
he stated: 
"I am not sure that the company fits into 
.any of the usual classifications. Our own 
concept is that we are a technological 
company - I know that isn't sufficiently 
descriptive for most people - and that 
our business is to take the many different 
technologies of today and find ways of 
using them to develop commercially useful 
products. 4 So we are a multi-industry 
company." 
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Royal Little, regarded by many as the founding father 
of the conglomerate movement and who changed Textron's 
charter to enable the firm to go into any type of business 
I 
as early as 1952, maintains that - "I dislike the conglom-
erate label - unrelated diversification is more descrip-
tive. 115 Consequently, these firms are refered to by a 
variety of names~ "diversified", "multi-market", "multi-
industry", and "free form" companies. 
3.2.2. Definitions 
•rhis apparent confusion requires .definition of the 
terminology. The term "diversification" itself is subject 
to differing interpretations by a single individual. In an 
historical review of the role of the chief executive at 
General Electric Company, James P .. Baughman has noted 
that Ralph Cordiner used the term in at least six different 
senses. These were "developmental (Research and Develop-
ment) "diversification", "functional diversification", 
"product diversification", "customer diversification", 
"geographic (international) diversification'', and "diver-
sification of the means of financing. 116 In other words, a 
ch~nge in any of the strategies above could be regarded 
as diversification. Diversification may also refer to many 
activities in the firm. In Cordiner terms the word refers 
to research, managerial functions, products, customers, 
geographic areas and financial activities. Thus it may 
~ ' 
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relate to either the firm's functions, production facili-
ties and processes, its markets or its products. An 
examination of the literature suggests that the theory can 
be divided into two broad groups: 
1. That which regards diversification as an expansion of 
the products produced; and 
2. That which regards diversification as an expansion of 
the products sold. 
Obviously, these two classes are related but from a 
managerial point of view, it is possible to distinguish be-
tween the two groups on the basis of a production versus 
marketing/sales orientation. The first approach is of an 
extremely specialized firm and conforms to the traditional 
economist's view of the firm. For example, the noted 
economist Stigler defines diversification as more than one 
activity, such that any single activity could be regarded 
as the business of a more specialized firm: 
" ... We view diversification broadly as 
the encompassing within a single company 
of two or more activities each of which 
constitute the sole activity of more 
specialized companies .•.. 11 7 
Penrose adopts a similar .view: 
"For the purpose of analyzing the 
process of diversification we can say 
that a firm diversifies its productive 
activities whenever, without entirely 
abandoning its old line of products, it 
enbarks upon the production of new 
products, including intermediate products, 
which are sufficiently different from 
the other products it produces to imply 
some significant differences in the 
firm 1 s production or distribution 
programmes. 11 8 
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If this view of diversification is accepted it would 
mean that an increase in the variety of products sold would 
mean diversification as illustrated in Figure 3-1. 
Figure 3-1 
Non-Diversified and Diversified Operations as Defined 
by Varieties of Products Sold 
Non-Diversified Diversified 
~Teabag-;1 
-~ ..... ....::_; 
Tea Tea 
Market 
This definition of diversification would also include 
the addition of products as the result of an increase in 
functions or processes. This concept is illustrated by 
Figure 3-2 below. 
Figure 3-~ 
Non-Diversified and Diversified Qperations as 
Defined by Increased Functions 
Non-Diversified Diversified 
Tea Growing) 
T 
[Market J Market 
135 
This view of diversification as being measured by the 
number of different products produced is shared by certain 
business executives. Brown, a V.i.ce President of General 
Motors has sta.ted~ 
"By diversified, I mean where the variety 
of products manufactured by a varied number 
of machines come into the final assembly 
operations as constiutent parts of the 
finished product that might be turned out 
by the plant. 119 
Brown made his statement in 1927, when the vast pro-
portion of General Motors production lay in motor vehicles. 
·Although the firm still sold "one product 11 (the motor car), 
the management regarded the firm as diversified due to their 
acceptance of the definition of a diversified firm as a 
firm which operated different production processes. This 
is substantially different from the alternativ~ view which 
measures diversification according to the products sold and 
thus the markets served by the firm. 
-This more conuuon usage of the term occurs when refer-
ing to product-market diversificati6n. This is in agreement 
with Gort's definition: 
11 Diversification may be defined as an 
increase in the heterogeneity of markets 
served by an individual firm. Hetero-
geneity of production is distinct from 
diversification if it involves minor 
differences of essentially the same 
product, or if it takes the form of 
vertical integration. 11 10 
This definition is deceptively simple. Firstly, it 
requires definition of a "product 11 - but this in turn re-
quires definition of the industry since the identical 
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product may be used in different markets for different 
purposes. This being so, it is more than likely that the 
seller will have to use a different marketing mix and thus 
a different marketing strategy to reach each market. 
Obviously, a different marketing mix means that the product 
is "different" when viewed from the point of view of the 
marketer or the consumer. Almost everyone has an intui-
tive notion of what an industry is ·- yet this is unsatis-
factory from an analytical point of view. 
From a t.heoretical point of view, two criteria can be 
used to establish the heterogeneity of markets or indus-
tries. These are: 
3.2.2.L Cross-elasticity of demand and 
3.2.2 •. 2 . .Mobility (or immobility) of productive resources. 11 
Clearly if the cross-elasticity between products is 
high, them a rise in price of one, will cause demand for the 
other to rise. ln other words, the higher the cross-elas~ 
ticity of demand, the greater the substitutability between 
the products and thus they can be said to be part of the 
same market. The converse is also true - if the products 
are not good substitutes, they are not competing in the 
same market. This situation would be indicated by low 
cross-elasticities. 
Similarly, if productive resources are able to be 
shifted rapidly and easily from one product to another, 
then these products can be viewed as being in the same 
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industry (or market) from the producers.viewpoint. This 
is true even if the consumer sees them as being separate 
and different. This concept is linked to that of cross-
elasticity of demand in that if productive resources in a 
production capacity sense are readily transferable, then 
changes ih profitability and hence return from the producers 
viewpoint, will result in production shifts, causing prices 
to rise in the product class where production has ceased. 
This will tie followed by a drop in price for the product 
under production due to increased output. 'rhus as Gort 
says, "The phenomenon of interdependance of prices, output, 
and earnings associated with high cross elasticities of 
demand tend to be present also where a high degree of 
mobility of resources exist. 1112 Gort summarizes the theory 
as follows: 
"Diversification may be defined as an in·-
crease in the heterogeneity of output from 
the point of view of the number of markets 
served by that output. Two products may 
be specified as belonging to separate 
markets if their cross-elasticities of 
demand are low and if, in the short run, 
the necessary resources employed in the 
production and distribution of one cannot 
be shifted to the other. 11 13 
However, as is almost inevitable in economic analysis, 
certain problems in this definition arise. The measurement 
of cross-elasticities of demand is extremely difficult and 
even if it were possible to obtain accurate data, it would 
still be necessary to stipulate at what point of cross-
elasticity products could be regarded as belonging to 
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separate markets. The measurement. of, and availability of 
data, and the problems associated with defining limits also 
exists for the resource-mobility approach. An example will 
serve to illustrate the extent of the problem. A tea 
packaging firm is likely to have very little impact on the 
strategy of a construction. firm, but a steel producer may 
have an influence ori an aluminum producer. This is due to 
the fact that steel and alUi.llin-ll!TI compete as substitutes in 
certain markets and the production facilities are probably 
transferable up to a point. The question is whether steel 
and aluminum are in different industries or not? Al~o, 
since "Thatch" roofing also competes with steel and alum-
in um roofing in certain segments of the construction in-· 
dustry, should the "I'hatch craftsman" be regarded as a 
competitor in the steel and aluminum industry? 
The problems of industry definition have been dis-
cussed in considerable depth in the literature relating to 
industry concentration and yet the issue is far from 
resolved. From a managerial viewpoint, definition of the 
industry is also subject to debate. Certain writers, 
notably Levitt, maintain.that a wide, encompassing view 
. . d 14 is require . Tilles on the other hand, maintains that 
a much narrower view is essential and makes a strong case 
f '' f d '' . - 1.. • d 15 or a more ocusse view or t11e in ustry. 
Another approach to the determination of whether a 
firm can be described as diversified or not is to adopt a 
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"product" rather than a "market" o.r "industry" view. 
However, the term of a "produc;t" is also subject to prob-
lems of definition. What is a "product"? Salter puts 
the dilemma neatly: 
"Is a product defined by the raw materials 
in it? If so, a transistor and a vacuum 
tube are two different products although 
they serve similar functions. Is a pro-
duct defined by the type of customer to 
which it is sold? If so, dresses for 
women and dresses for "Misses" are dif-
ferent products. Is a product defined 
by the manufacturing process? If so, a 
handcrafted pot and a machine-made pot are 
two different products, or are they?"l6 
In the most definitive study of economic performance 
and its relationship to product-count measures of diversi-
fication, Gort has found almost no correlation between 
diversification in product count terms and growth and 
profitability. Gort has stated: 
"To ascertain the association between 
company growth and diversification, two 
tests were employed~ In the first, 
growth was measured by the ratio of total 
assets in 1954 to total assets in 1939. 
This ratio was then correlated with the 
composite D3 diversification measure. For 
the 109 companies, the coefficient of 
rank correlation (Spearman's) was only 
0.16. In the second test, the 111 
companies were groriped by deciles on the 
basis of growth and total assets for the 
1929-1939 and 1939-1954 periods. The 
frequency of product additions in the 
various deciles in the two periods was 
then examined. Companies associated 
with higher growth deciles did not reveal 
greater frequencies of product additions 
in 1929-1939 than those in lower deciles. 
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For the 1939-1954 period, there is indication 
of positive relation between growth and 
frequency of additions, at least starting 
in the third decile. The decline in fre-
quencies from the first to the third decile 
suggests£ though inconclusively, a u-shaped 
curve. 11 11 
In discussing his findings in respect of rates of 
return, Gort states: 
"Using data for 110 companies, average net 
income after taxes for the period 1947-1954 
was expressed as a ratio to average net 
worth for the same interval of time ..•• 
The coefficient of rank correlation 
(Spc·arman' s) for the indicated measuBe 
of rate of return and D3 was -.04." 1 
In another, more recent study, Berry has studied 460 
of the largest firms in the United States. He finds that: 
"Probably more significant than this in-
crease in diversification, particularly 
as an indicator of the future structure 
of the industry, is the much larger in-
crease in the number of products reported 
by these firms between 1960 and 1965 
probably, because the evidence is partially 
contradictory. In terms 6f growth related 
activity, entry serves as a slightly 
better explanatory variable for corporate 
growth than does increasing diversifica-
tion •••. Nevertheless, there is evidence 
during this period that increasing diver-
sification was related to the growth of 
large firms. But there is MUCH stronger 
evidence, in a similar setting, that 
corporate earnings were a more important 
factor in relative growth within this 
population of the largest industrial cor-
porations." 19 (Emphasis added) 
These studies, based largely on product-count measures 
of diversification show almost no relationship between 
diversification and performance, yet certainly in the United 
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States, firms have shown considerable interest in th.is 
form of corporate development. The fact that these studies 
are unable to explain the tendency suggests a weakness in 
either methodology or perspective. The research is either 
analysing variables.which are not. adequate measures of the 
real, or managerial benefits provided by diversification 
•or the classification system and definitions of di.versi-
1 
f ication are based on incorrect or methodologically con-
venient methods and do not reflect the strategic, classi-
fication system, more likely to be used by managers. 
Such a scheme, which is more meaningful from a man-
. 1 . f . h b . d - b . 1 20 h. ageria point o v1.ew as een provi ea y Wrig ey. T is 
framework, introduced in the previous chapter, was based on 
his .concept of "core skills" which he described as the 
skills required by the firm to compete in a particular 
product-market area. Those firms thit adopted a strategy 
of diversification in which new product-areas were related 
to the "core skill" of the firm were termed "related" 
while those that entered new product a.reas which bore no 
relation to "core skills" were· termed "unrelated". Those 
firms,-which had adopted a strategy of limited diversifi-
cation in that the distinguishing feature of these firms 
was that the new product area did not contribute more than 
30 percent of sales, were termed "dominant product" firms. 
The definitions of the four major categories are as follows: 
•••-'--;-'"~-··.-:-••-••- ·-•: ··--··'T"·_,.-,.~,.......-- • • ·-•-· -:-~··~·~- -•••· ._,.,.... '~-· .. ·---· 
142 
' , 
Single Product (S) : Firms which a row by the expansion :J .. 
of one main product line such 
that at. least 95 percent of 
sale~ lie within this single 
product area. 
Dominant Product (D) :Firms which grow primarily by 
the expansion of one main 
product line, but which in 
addition, have added secondary 
product lines making up 30 
percent, or less, of the total 
sales volume. These secondary 
activities may be related or 
unrelated to the primary 
activity. 
Related Product (R) :Firms which grow by entry 
into related markets, by the 
use of related technoiogy, by 
related activities, or some 
combination of these, such 
that no one product line 
. accounts for 70 percent of 
total corporate sales. 
Unrelated Product (U) :Firms which grow by expansion 
into new markets, and new 
,.J - .. •.,, 
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technologies, unrelated to 
the original product-market 
scope, such that no one product 
line accounts for 50 percent 
of the total corporate sales. 
Wrigley provided a classification system in which 
·the different categories demonstrated differing managerial 
characteristics and which appeared to be meaningful from a 
managerial point of view. These categories have provided 
the basis for the classification system used in the present. 
study. 
The next section examines the trends in diversifica-
tion in the United States, the United Kingdom I France r' Italy 
and West Germany. 
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3.3 _The Trend Toward Corporate Diversification 
The United States 
The pattern in the United States appears to be cyclical 
and to follow the stock market bull and bear markets. The 
possible reasons for the tendency to follow the stock market 
appears to be closely related to the fact that high share 
prices and the correspondingly high price-earnings ratios 
enabled many firms to increase their earnings-per-r3hare. by 
purchasing firms with lower price-earnings ratios. The number 
of acquisitions in the United States during the period 1954 
to 1976 is given in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1 
Corporate Acquisitions in the United States: 1954-1976 
1954-1955 
1967-1969 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Number of Acquisitions 
+ 535 
-
per year 
+ 2346 per year 
-
2840 
2354 
1460 
1048 
1081 {preliminary) 
Number Over $10 Million 
+ 50 per year 
+ 150 per year 
60 
64 
62 
59 
77 
Source: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 
Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions, 
November 1979; and Markham, Jesse, w., Conglomerate 
Enterprise and Public Policy, Division of Research, 
Graduate School of Business, Harvard University, 
Boston, 1973. 
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The United States experience also seems to confirm 
Berg's findings that "for large firms - the conventional 
route to entry or diversification is the corporate acqui-
sition or merger 11 • 21 Table 3-2 shows that large firms are 
by far the most active acquisitors in that the largest 200 
companies have consistently accounted for approximately 
35 percent of large acquisitions and over 50 percent of 
\ . d 
'acquire assets. 
* 
1954 
1967 
1969 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Table 3-2 
Large Acquisitions by 200 Largest Firms in 
The United States* 
-------·-----
Percentage of No. 
of Acquisitions 
Percentage of Assets 
Acquired 
63.7 
63.6 
54.8 
39.2 
1976 (preliminary) 
37.8 
37.7 
34. 8 
35.0 
39.0 
37.1 
32.2 
20.8 
56.l 
42.0 
52.4 
31.9 
Large acquisitions are defined as those acquisitions where the 
acquired assets exceed 10 million dollars. 
Source: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 
Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions, 
November 1977. 
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Table 3-3 provides an analysis of assets acquired in 
large mergers (again defined as those margers which involved 
assets exceeding 10 million dollars) , as a percentage of 
total new investment. The cyclical nature of the acquisi-
tion pattern is readily discernable and the hyper-activity 
during the "bull" market of the late 1960s is also empha-
sized. 
Table 3-3 
Comparison of Acquired Assets to New Investments for 
Large Manufacturing and Mining Companies 
Year New Investment* Acquired Assets** Acquired Assets 
($ Billions) ($ Billions) as Percentage of 
New Investment 
1948-1953 10.6 per yr. 0.3 per yr. 2.8 
1954-1966 17.7 per yr. 2.4 per yr. 13.7 
1967-1969 31. 2 11.6 37.2 
1970 33.8 6.6 19.5 
1971 32.2 3.1 9.8 
1972 33.8 2.7 7.9 
1973 40.8 3.6 8.7 
1974 49.2 5.1 10.4 
1975 51.7 5.5 10.7 
19 7 6 (prelim. ) 56.9 6.6 11.7 
* Defined as total expenditures for new plants and equipment 
by manufacturing and mining firms. 
** ~cquired firms with assets of $10 million or more. 
Source: Bureau for Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 
Statistical Report for Mergers and Acquisitions, 
November 1977. 
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The above tables do not distinguish between acquisi-
tions which were non-diversification and those which were 
diversification oriented by nature. Table 3-4 shows this 
breakdown as defined by the Federal Trade Commission in 
the United States. -
TablE>. 3-4 
Large Diversifying Acquisitions: Percentage of 
Total Assets ··Acquire~* -
Year FTC Broad Definition+ F'TC Narrow Definition++ 
Percentage of Assets Percentage of Assets 
1952-1955 52.0 3.6 
1956-1959 Not available 14.0 
1961-1970 78.5 30.4 
1971 79.2 45.3 
1972 59.2 16.8 
1973 65.3 36.8 
1974 68.2 38.0 
1975 94.6 68.3 
;L 9 7 6 (prelim. ) 87.2 56.9 
* Defined as acquired firms with assets exceeding $10 
million or more. 
+The broad definition defines such an acquisition which ex-
tends operations beyond the present product or geographical 
market. 
++Defined as an acquisition where two firms are functionally 
unrelated in marketing or production. 
Sources: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 
Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions, 
November 1977; and Markham, Jesse w., Conglomerate 
Enterprise and Pub lie Policy I Di vision of Research' 
Graduate School of Business, Harvard University, 
Boston, 1973. 
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Clearly, as the discussion relating to definitional 
problems above suggests, this evidence is likely to contain 
certain weaknesses but nevertheless, emphasizes the overall 
importance of diversification activity. For example, in 
1975, over 94 percent of acquisition activity could be defined 
as diversification oriented whilst the figure for 1976, 
although preliminary, suggest that almost 90 percent could be 
regarded in a similar light. These findings are based on 
the "broad definition" of diversification which includes 
all acquisitions beyond present product or geographic markets. 
The."narrow definition" which requires that the acquisition 
be unrelated in a marketing or production sense is probably 
more meaningful. The figures are no less dramatic in that 
there is a definite increase in diversification activity 
apart from the sudden decline in activity for 1972 and that 
in recent years, more than half the acquisition activity has 
been "unrelated"'in nature. 
The analysi,s of the diversification pattern of large 
firms has tended to focus on the "Fortune 500". Wrigley's 
analysis was the first to examine the breakdown from a more 
managerially based viewpoint. As stated earlier, his 
analysis of a sample of 100 firms from the "Fortune 500" 
indicated that a large proportion of these firms had al-
ready reached Stage III of Scott's model. 
Wrigley's findings, based on his breakdown into four 
major categories according to the proportion of total sales 
14.9 
attributable to a single product area, are given in Table 
3-5. 
Table 3-5 
Composition of Fortune 500 Using. 
Wrigley's Classification System - 1967 
Strategic Cetegory Percentage of Firms in Category 
Single Product 
Dominant Product 
Related Product 
Unrelated Product 
6 
14 
60 
20 
Source: Wrigley, Leonard, "Divisional Autonomy and 
Diversification", Unpublished Doctoral Dissita-
tion, Graduate School of Business, Harvard 
University, Boston, 1970. 
However, Wrigley's sample is cross-sectional and does 
not indicate the trend, if any, in the mov.e toward diver-
sification. In a study covering the thirty year period 
1949-1969, Rumelt, using the same classification system 
developed by Wrigley, produced evidence of a steady trend 
d 1 d d 1 .d f f d. . r. • 22 towar re ate an unre ate orms o iversi:cication. 
His findings are presented in Table 3-6. 
Table 3-6 
Composition of Fortune 500 Firms for 1949, 1959 and 1969 
Estimated Percentage of Finns in Each Category 
Strategic Category 1949 1959 1969 
Single Business 34.5 16.2 6.2 
Dominant Business 35.4 37.3 29.2 
Related Business 26.7 40.0 45.2 
Unrelated Business 3.4 6.5 19.4 
Source: Rumelt, Richard P.,"Strategy, Structure & Economic 
Performance, Doctoral Dissertation, Graduate School 
Qf Busines~ Administration, Harvard Univ., Boston 
""" 
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Rumelt states that: 
"It does not require sophisticated.analysis 
to see the most dramatic pattern of change 
revealed by the data. Between 1949 and 
1969, the number of truly diversified cor-
porations more than doubled; the percentage 
of firms following related or unrelated 
business strategies of expansion rising 
from 30 percent to 65 percent in this 20-
year period. Clearly, there has been a 
basic change in the product-market scope 
of the largest United States corporations. 
The most striking change in any individual 
group is the decline in the nurnber of single 
business firms amongst the largest 500. 
Comprising more than one-third of the 500 
in 1949, by 1969 firms deriving 95 percent 
or more of their revenues from one busine§3 
had dropped to 6. 2 percent of the total. 11 ~ 
Commenting on the trend toward increased diversity as 
evidenced by the increase in the Unrelated Business 
category, Rumelt: maintains: 
"Equally noteworthy was the increase in 
large firms that follow Unrelated Busi-
ness strategies. In 1949 this group 
accounted for only 3.4 percent of the 
500 largest, but by 1969, one out of 
every f ive 2airms fell into the Unrelated 
category." · . 
The United Ki_!29:dom 
In another important study, based also on the frmnework 
established by Wrigley, Channon analysed a sample which 
he defined as "the largest 100 manufacturing companies by 
sales volume operating or registered in Great Britain, 
chosen from the Times 500 list of 1969-1970. 1125 The results 
are given in Table 3-7. 
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•rable 3-7 
The Composition of Large British Firms 
- By strategi<:T-catego~7 7 -1969-=Tm--
Strategic Category Percentage of Firms in Each Category 
Single Business 6 
Dominant Business 34. 
Related Business 54 
Unrelated Business 6 
Source: Derived from Channon, Derek F. , 11 ,The Strategy . and 
Structure of British Enterprise" Doctoral Disser-
tation, Graduate School of Business, Harvard 
University, Boston, f971. Chapter 4·-1, pages 
5-18. 
Channon comments: 
France 
" ... by 1970, 94 percent of the sample 
population had diversified to some degree, 
and.some 60 percent of the companies had 
moved into the related or non-related pro-
duct classes ...• The observations in 
general tend to support the proposition 
that there will be an increasing propor-
tion of the population with diversified 
product-market scope during the period 
coupled with a decline in the number of 
single-product firms ..• The evidence, 
therefore, suggests that the tendency to 
diversity has been rapid over the whole 
period (and that) a strategy of full 
diversification w~~ less common in 
earlier periods."-
I 
Dyas, following Wrigley and Channon has analysed the 
strategic development of French industrial enterprise 
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over the period 1950, 1960 and 1970 and classifying using 
Wrigley's methodology produced the results given in Table 
3-8.27 
·Table 3-8 · 
The Composition of Large French Firms 
By Strategic Category~ 19$0-1970 
Strategic Category Percentage of Firms in 
1950 1960 
Single Business 42 28 
Dominant Business 21 27 
Related Business 33 40 
Unrelated Business 4 5 
Each Category 
·----1970 
16 
32 
42 
10 
Source: Dyas, Gareth P., "The S~ructure of French Industrial 
Enterprise", unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
Graduate School of Business, Harvard University, 
Boston, 1972. p. 162. 
The sample observed was the largest 100 manufacturing 
firms in France ranked on sales volume. 
The trend in French industry toward increasing diversity 
is obvious. Analysis of the Single Business category re-
veals a steady decline with corresponding transitions from 
Dominant to the Related a.nd Unrelated categories. 
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Pavan, using the Wrigley strategy classification scheme, 
28 
also analysed the 100 largest manufacturing firms in Italy. 
The companies were ranked by sales volume and had to be 
operating in Italy; Pavan ranked the firms on sales volume 
to enable comparison with Wrigley's findings which were 
also based on a ranking in terms of sales volume. 29 Pavan's 
I 
I 
research differed from that of Wrigley in that Wrigley 
examined a sample of firms at a particular point in time 
while Pavan classified the firms in his sample population 
over the post-war period. Since the ranking according to 
sales was based on the 1969 sales figures, certain firms, 
due to changes in structure and ownership did not exist or 
did not quality for inclusion in the top 100 firms and thus 
the sample size various over the period 1950 to 1970. 
Pavan's findings regarding the trend toward diversity are 
given in Table 3-9. 
Table 3-9 
Diversification of Large Italian Firms, 1950-1970 
Strategic Caterogy Percentage of Firms in Each Category 
1950 1960 1970 
Single Business 30 23 10 
Dominant Business 24 20 33 
Related Business 43 53 52 
Unrelated Business 4 3 5 
Number of firms in sample 84 94 100 
Source: Pavan, Eobert J., "The Strategy and Structure of Italian 
Enterprises." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
Gradua.te School of Business Admj_nistration, Harvard 
UniversitY:--Boston, l972, Chapter 4, Page 23. 
-- ---- ------·~ ·------ ~---~---· . ---.~ . ~----------···-~--~-___.. __ . ·---~-~~--- -· .. ;..,_.~·· ·~· ... -··-
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Pavan comments on his f ind:Lngs as follows 
"{The research) indicates that the 1950 
population showed a low level of diversi-
fication although 70 percerit were diver-
sified beyond a single business. More 
than half the population was composed of 
single business (no diversification) 
companies and dominant business (little 
diversification). Related business 
companies were the largest category with 
43 percent •.• By 1970 more than half 
the total population \.vas composed of 
related and unrelated business companies. 
Whereas 20 years earlier the sing-le and 
dominant group were the majority. Now 
90 percent of the population had diversi-
fied beyond the single business company. 
The single business category has steadily 
declined during the period studied." 30 · 
West Germany 
Adopting a similar approach to Channon, Dyas, and 
31 Pavan, Thannheiser analyzed German firms as of 1970. 
Thannheiser confined his sample to the 100 largest manu-
f acturing firms in Germany and in order to ensure compara-
bility between his and the parellel studies, companies 
were ranked by sales volume in 1970. A manufacturing 
firm was defined as .a firm in which at least 50 percent 
o·f activities fell into the manufacturing sector. 
Thannheiser's findings were.presented in Table 3-10. 
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rrable 3-10 
·Diversification of West Germany_l._!]~dustria.1 Firms 1950-1970 
Strategic Category Percentage of Firms in Each Category 
1950 1960 1970 
I 
\Single Business 34 22 22 
1Dominant Business 2G 28 22 
Related Business 32 . 40 38 
Unrelated Business 7 9 18 
Source: Thannheiser, Heinz T., "Strategy and Structure of 
German Industrial.Enterprise." Unpublished Doctorai 
Dissertation, Graduate School of Business Admin-
istration, Harvard University, Boston, 1972, 
Chapter 5. 
Thannheiser states that: 
"(The findings) support the proposition that 
the proportion of diversified population would 
increase. In 1950, 66 of the companies fell 
into one of the diversified business categories; 
in 1970, there were 78. The number of Single 
Business companies declined correspondingly 
from 34 to 22 .... In the decade from 1950 to 
1960, there was a major shift from the 
Single Business category. All but two of 
the presently diversified companies that had 
been Single Businesses in the 1950/55 period 
began to diversify in this decade - three : 
became Dominant, six Related and three Un-
related Businesses. In the next decade, from 
1960 to 1970, the major move was toward the 
Unrelated Business category which gained nine 
companies, mainly from shifts out of the 
Dominant Business category. 11 32 
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3. 3 .. 1 Conclusions 
The general pattern appears to be unmistakenly towards 
increased product-market diversification. The fact that 
the management of large firms has pursued a strategy 
towards increased diversification in a wide variety of 
countries is significant in itself. These economies have 
all experienced different rates of economic growth, their 
governments have adopted different policies over time 
and yet the response of firms has been to diversify, 
albeit at different rates. These economies are all significantly 
different from South Africa in the sense that they can 
all be classified as developed and mature. South Africa 
is still a developing economy and it is of interest to 
examine the response of firms in this economy to determine 
the extent of diversification and the performance of the 
firms relative to firms in a more developed environment. 
The question, that the evidence toward increasing 
diversification in product-market terms raises, is; 
- Why do there firms diversify? 
- What factors could contribute toward this pattern? 
- What performance differentials can be expected by 
firms following a particular strategy of diversifica-
tion. 
The following section of this chapter will explore the 
reasons for diversif ica~ion, the possible objectives of 
such a strategy and will examine the evidence regarding 
performance as provided by the available literature. 
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3.4 The Reasons for Diversification 
In almost all companies with vigor, certain natural 
driving,forces exist which can generate new feelers and 
the embryos of new activities and challenges. For some 
reason, the management decision makers will decide to 
irealign the firms' product-market relationships. 
'' 
In terms of the "planned conscious strategy" approach 
suggested by Andrews discussed in Chapter 2, the management 
of the firm will continually establish and evaluate objec-
tives, monitor the environment, establish opportunities 
and threats, assess corporate strengths and weaknesses 
and adapt strategy and tactics to ensure profitability 
and survival. In the terms of the Cyert and March approach 
or that of the "instrumentalists", the firm will react to 
major and minor crises in a spasmodic fashion. In many 
cases the activity is a natural extension and development 
of improvements in production processes, sales territories 
and market demand patterns. On the other hand the firm 
may decide to behave in a proactive manner and take ad-
va.ntage of gaps in the environment. Whatever the reason, 
it appears that many firms operating in diverse industries 
and markets, in many different countries, have adopted 
strategi~s of diversification. In Ansoff's terms certain 
"trigger" signals have caused firms to react in this fashion 
and to "enter" new business areas which are either related 
or unrelated to the existing product-market areas. 
'"··..-·-~~ 
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3.4.1 Related Diversification 
A review of the literature suggests that no single 
criterion is of much use in defining and determining which 
business areas are related and which are unrelated. It 
would seem that if manageme~t believes or perceives bus~-
. 33 
ness areas to be related, then they are related! Thus 
T.W. Beckett's entry into the canned and powdered fruit 
juice market can be regarded as related to the tea and 
coffee or beverage market because the products are related 
as they both use similar distribution systems. McCarthy-
Radway, the motor car distributors and retailers entry into 
motorcycles can be viewed as related as both products are 
means of transportation and are related in terms of selling 
skills even though the products are marketed to different 
market segments, and differ in pricing and technology. 
Salter maintains that business areas can be considered 
related "if they either share common functional skills 
and critical success factors or operate at different 
stages of the same commercial chain thereby processing 
complementary skills and resources. 1134 According to Salter, 
if one of four characteristics is present, then.the busi-
ness can be regarded as related. 
3.4.1.1. If it involves businesses serving similar markets 
and/or using similar distribution systems, 
3.4.1.2. If the businesses employ similar production tech-
nologies, 
3.4.1.3. If the businesses exploit similar science-based 
research, 
3.4.1.4. If the businesses involved do not share the same 
functional skills or critical success factors as 
long as they operate at~different stages of the 
same commercial chain. 3 J 
Table 3-11 is a summary of the potential benefits of 
related diversification as seen by Salter . 
. Table 3-11 
Potential Benefits and Requirements for 
Successfull Related Diversification 
Factor 
Product-market 
orientation 
Transferable 
resources with 
greatest potential 
for creating value 
Nature of 
potential bene-
fits 
Relative ease of 
achieving potential 
benefits 
Benefits and Requirements 
Diversification into businesses .with 
similar marketing and distribution 
characteristics, or similar produc-
tion technolo~ies, or similar science 
based research activities. 
Operating and/or functional skills: 
excess capacity in distribution 
systems, production facilities, 
or research operations. 
increased productivity of corporate 
resources through operating synergies, 
improved competitive position accru-
ing from increased size of business, 
and reduction in. long-run operating 
costs can lead to a reduction in 
the variability of a company's in-
come stream and/or a larger income 
stream than that available from 
simple portfolio diversification 
Relatively difficult due to organi-
zational problems associated with 
intergrating formerly self-sufficient 
companies into the acquiring company. 
T 
Source: Adapted from Salter, Malcolm S., Unpublished manu-
script, Graduate School of Business Administration, 
Harvard University, Boston, 1978 • 
.. --- - ------ --··--------~~ .. ----..-.:-·~~-
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3.4.2 Unrelated Diversification 
Salter's definition of unrelated diversification is 
11 a move into businesses which do not share any of these 
f h • • II 36 our c aracteristics . The acquisition of Tiffany's by 
Avon Products and that of O.K. Bazaars by South African 
Breweries can be regarded as unrelated diversification. 
I 
Similarly, the purchase of Ellerines' by Tedelex is an 
I 
unrelated move by the television manufacturer. Table 3-12 
is a summary of possible benefits and requirements for 
successful unrelated diversification. 
Table 3-12 
Potential Benefits and Requirements for Successful 
Unrelated Diversification 
Factor 
Product market 
orientation 
Transferable 
resources with 
greatest potential 
for creating value 
Nature of potential 
benefits 
Relative ease of 
achieving potential 
·benefits 
Benefits and Requirements 
Diversification into product-markets 
.• ~ith key success variables un-
related to the key success variables 
of the acquiring firm's principal 
business. 
General management skills; simple 
financial resources. 
More efficient cash management and 
allocation of investment capital, 
reduced cost of debt capital, and 
growth in profits through cross-
subsidization can lead to a larger 
income stream than that available 
from simple portfolio diversification. 
Relatively easy to achieve capital 
efficiencies and benefits from 
cross-subsidization. 
Source: Adapted from: Salter, Malcolm S., Unpublished Manu-
script, Graduate School of Business Administration, 
Harvard University, Boston, 1978. 
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The next section of this cnapter provides a brief 
overview of the "entry process". The factors and charac-
teristics which are believed to furnish the firm with 
advantages when undertaking diversification are discussed 
in greater detail in the follow section of this chapter. 
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3.5 Analysis of the Entry-Decision Process 
The theory underlying the decision to enter a new 
product-market area by the management of a firm must draw 
heavily on the studies performed in the area of individual 
structure and industrial economics. This is so because it 
is an expansion of the considerations relevant to the 
number of and type of competitors in an industry to the 
I 
'possibilities of new entry and the resulting effect on the 
structure and behavior patterns of the industry. The theory 
of industrial economics is also of value in the identifica-
tion of the major features of an industry that may be per-
ceived as a "diversification trigger".. Thus, in the 
analysis of diversification motives, we should be con-
cerned with factors contributing to both exit and entry. 
3.5.1 Definition of Entry 
The most quoted definition of entry seems to be that 
of Bain who defines entry as follows: 
" •.. The establishment of an independent 
legal entry new to the industry ... and the 
concurrent building or introduction by the 
new firm of physical production capacity 
that was not used for ptoduction in the 
industry prior to the establishment of the 
new firm. 11 37 
This definition is too narrow being only concerned 
with the addition of production capacity by a new firm in 
the industry to be tantamount to new entry. Clearly a 
· firm can enter an industry by utilizing excess production 
capacity belonging to an existing firm in the industry. 
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Brazen recognises this and considers entry »any expansion of 
~s 
capacity, whatever the source."_, Certain other writers 
have considered wider definitions: For example, Clark con-
siders that the replacement of control may constitute 
entry: 
nit (entry) is generally conceived as the 
establishment of a new firm, either creating 
new physical facilities or adapting existing 
facilities to an industry in which they had 
previously not been used. It is quite proper 
to distinguish it from the new business 
unit, replacing a previous one which does not 
re-enter the business, and continuing to use 
the facilities in the same branch of produc-
tion as before. It is true that if the new 
firm has fresh ideas and capacities, something 
new has really been added, which may enlarge 
and transform the effectiveness of the produc-
tion unit. However, this is an imponderable 
and uncertain matter and the bare fact of a 
new ownership affords no guarantee that it 
will happen. It is about as likely to happen 
from a revitalization of an existing manage-
ment without transfer to a new firm. 11 39 
Osborne on the other hand, believes that definition 
of industry and market entry can be viewed differently: 
"Entry into markets is vastly easier than 
entry into industries. For example, there 
has been very little recent entry into 
steel, but I would not.like to have to 
list the numerous entrants into market~ 0 formerly served exclusively by steel." 
Once again, as in the discussion of the literature 
in the field of industry definition, the concepts are 
complicated by different interpretations of the termin-
ology. 
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3.5.2 The Conditions of Entry 
In classical economics, the analysis of the competi-
tive system was regarded as being "perfect". This meant 
the free entry and exit of firms in a perfectly competitive 
market which would produce an efficient equilibrating 
mechanism and.which i.n turn would ensure that excess profits 
would be eliminated. In the real world these conditions 
I 
'are rarely experienced and each firm will possess different 
information sets regarding the "attractiveness" and poten-
tial available in a particular industry. The potential 
entrant will decide on the relative attraction of an 
industry based on: 
3.5.2.1. The factors it considers important to assist in 
the managerial decision making process; and 
3.5.2.2. How these factors are seen to affect the firm's 
goals and ability. 
These factors can be defined as follows: 
~ barriers to entry 
- inducements to enter 
- probability of success. 
To quote Bain: 
"A potentially important set of forces 
affecting the emergence of monopoly in 
any industry is found in the variety 
of basic environmental circumstances 
which influence the ability and dis-
position of successive additional 
sellers to enter the industry. 11 41 
... J . 
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3.5.3 Entry Considerations 
3.5.3.1. Profitability 
Probably the most important indicator of an attractive 
or "rich" environment is the profitability_of that industry. 
Porter believes that "rates of return are a thermometer 
for measuring.the intensity of competition. 1142 He also 
isees four major factors as contributing to.the competitive 
I 
1 . f . ~ 43 l . comp exion o an inaustry. T 1ese aJ.:-e: 
3.5.3.1.1. Rivalry Among Firms in The Industry 
Firm to firm competition on price, advertising, service, 
product quality, technical sophistication etc. Price and 
non-price rivalry either reduce revenues or increase costs., 
thereby reducing profits. 
3.5.3.1.2. Rivalry With Substitute Products. 
The price, quality and the degree of substitutability 
if substitute products puts a ceiling on the pi.ices and 
profits in the industry. (The effect of the introduction 
of television into South Africa and its effect on the 
cinema industry is a good example of this effect.) 
3.5.3.1.3. Bargaining Power of Buyers and Suppliers 
The rivaly of firms in the industry with firms in ad-
jacent stages of production and distribution can affect 
profitability. Buyers have potential bargaining power 
to force down prices, and suppliers have potential bargain-
ing power to inf late the costs of purchased inputs or re-
duce their quality. Thus powerful buyers and suppliers 
reduce profits in an industry. (The purchasing power of 
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large supermarket chains such as Pick'n Pay makes this 
firm a powerful influence over the profitability of many 
grocery suppliers.) 
3.5.3.1.4. Entry of New Competitors and Exit of Existing 
Competitors 
Entry of new firms reduces the sales of existing firms, 
forces down prices, or inflates costs, all reducing 
profits in the industry. Exit has the opposite effect. 
Profitability is thus determined by: 
- The intensity of rivalry in the industry, 
- The intensity of rivalry with substitutable 
profits produced by closely related industries, 
- The relative bargaining power of suppliers 
and customers, 
- The barriers to entry and exit. 
These forces are illustrated in Figure 3-3. 
The firm's perception of the potential of new entry 
into an industry will depend on the firm's view of the 
industry's structural determinants of profitability as 
depicted in Figure 3-3. The "barriers" as perceiv~d will 
be a combination of both "natural" and "artificial" 
barriers. "Natural" barriers are those which are those 
\.1 ~ \ 
inherent in the nature of the business. There may for 
example be technological scale economies which require a 
particular scale of operation - an oil refinery may have 
to be a certain minimum size. "Artificial barriers" are 
·those that are erected by industry participants to deter 
potential entrants. "Excessive" advertising expenditures 
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Figure 2-12 
Sequence of Product Flow in an Integrated Oil Firm 
Top Management 
Exploration Production Trans-
portation 
efining Distri- ~ 
_ _,,,11 Markets 
ution 
Scott maintains that the level of integration is a 
major distinction between the Stage I and Stage II firm 
"because it (the stage I firm) does not have sufficiently 
specialized sub-units. 1187 The key distinction between the 
two stages then lies in the transition from the "one man 
show" to the functionally specialized management team and 
the "closed system" or integrated flow of operations. 
Scott maintains that "the point is not that 100 percent 
"pure" integrated or non-integrated firms are the rule, 
but that companies can be distinguished by the proportion 
. . 88 
of internal and external transactions." The Stage II 
firm is likely to follow a pattern similar to that illus-
trated in Figure 2~13. 
! 
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Figure 3-3 
Key Determinants of Industry Profitability 
uppliers~~~--~~~~-:t·~ 
Relative 
power of 
suppliers 
. ·~ 
NEW. ENTRANT FI RMS 
Ex-participant Firms 
./ 
Exit from Industry 
INDUSTRY 
Buyers Rivalry amongst firms 
in the industry No--~~~~~~~~ 
Rivalry with substitute 
products 
. r 
INDUSTRIES PRODUCING 
SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS 
Relative 
power of 
buyers 
Source: Adapted from Porter, Michael E., "Note on the Struc-
tural Analysis of Industries", Unpublished Paper, 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard 
University, Boston, 1975. 
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are an example of such a barrier. Pickering has stated 
for example that: 
"Certainly the existence of scale advantages 
both in the current period and through the 
affect of past advertising activities may 
constitute a major barrier to competition 
from smaller and new entrant firms. This 
view has been given qualitative support 
by the Monopolies Commission in its report 
on detergents where it decided that the 
advertising and promotional activities of 
the two leading firms constituted a barrier 
to entry and on cigarettes where the 
Commission reported that advertising had 44 helped to preserve the power of a few firms." 
However, the foundations for the analysis of entry 
conditions remain those stipulated by Bain: 
"The essential characteristic of the sit-
uation in which easy entry prevails 
should furnish a direct clue to the de-
terminants of the condition of entry in 
general. For easy entry, three condi-
tions must in general be simultaneously 
fulfilled. At any stage in the relevant 
progression of entry, 
1. Established firms have no absolute 
cost advantages over potential 
entrant firms; 
2. Established firms have no product 
differentiation advantages over 
potential entrant firms; and 
3. Economies of large scale firms are 
neglible, and in the sense that the 
output of a firm of optimal (lowest.-
cost) scale is an insignificant 45 fraction of total industry output." 
Bain's study based on the empirical analysis of twenty 
industries led him to identify the three sources of entry 
barrier quoted above. These are absolute cost advantages, 
product differentiation and economies of scale. 
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3.5.3.2 Absolute Cost Advantages 
The established firm will have an absolute cost ad·-
vantage when it's costs are lower than those of the new 
entrant across the production range. Figures 3-4 and 3-5 
are an illustration of absolute cost advantages for fixed 
and variable costs. 
Figure 3-4 
Absolute Fixed Cost Barriers to Entry 
cost 
---------------------------New Entrant firms 
Established firms 
Production Volume 
Figure 3-5 
Absolute Variable Cost Advantage as a Barrier to Entry 
Average 
Variable 
cost per 
unit of 
Production 
Production Volume 
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These cost advantages can arise in a number of ways. 
Examples of fixed cost advantages .could be favourable 
location or lower costs of capital whilst variable cost 
examples include patents or control over raw materials. 
The following examples illustrate common absolute cost 
advantages: 
3.5.3.2.1. Locations: Retail outfits, shelf space (A 
major advantage with South African Breweries 
possessed over Louis Luyt was their control 
over liquor outlets). 
3.5.3.2.2. Patents: Control over process ( Sasol) 
Control over products (pharmaceutical 
products). 
3.5.3.2.3. Trade Secrets: Technicological Skills (Coca-Cola, 
Polaroid) 
3.5.3.2.4. Raw Materials: Control over scarce material 
or facilities (gold mines). 
3.5.3.2.5. Distribution: Limited distribution availability 
(De Beers control of world diamond market}. 
3.5.3.2.6. Capital: Established firms may have lower capital 
cost (Barlows would obtain more favourable 
interest rates on loans than a small firm}. 
3~5.3.3 Product Differentiation Barriers 
These are believed to be more powerful in consumer 
good industries. These occur because the established firm 
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is able, through price, quality, design, franchises, 
customer service and other marketing mix and promotion 
variables, to obtain buyer preference. The established 
firm is thus able to obtain a higher margin than the new 
entrant due to the goodwill established through brand name 
loyalty and design features. To overcome this barrier 
the new entrant will have to be willing to of fer "better 
value" for the same price as his established competitor or 
be willing to incur high start-up costs by generating and 
obtaining product differentiation for his new product. 
The net effect is that the new entrant will for an initial 
period at least, be at a profit disadvantage. 
3.5.3.4 Economies of Scale Barrie~s 
These are seen as a barrier when a new entrant, if he 
is to operate at opti1num production scales, will have to 
produce such a large proportion of industry output so 
as to affect existing firms and to illicit response. Scale 
barriers also exist where the costs for the new entrant 
are different and higher for the new entrant than for the 
existing, established firm.· Thus economies of scale refer 
to the level and shape of the cost curves of the firm. 
Most of the empirical work in this field has focussed on 
production cost curves and very little has been done in the 
. analysis of marketing costs. A number of further economies 
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can be identified under the broad umbrella. of the economies 
of scale. Such economies of the firm refer to the econ-
omies flowing from mass-production techniques and task 
specialization. It is also possible to distinguish between 
"real" and "pecuniary" economies which refer to the use of 
smaller amounts of input required to produce a unit and the 
ability to obtain cost reductions through the use of "bar-
gaining power" respectively. 
Economies of scale affect entry if the new firm will 
incur higher costs per unit of production than established 
firms until it has achieved a "threshold" market share. 
The higher the market share:µecessary to achieve costs 
comparable to those of the established firms - the higher 
the barriers to entry a.s a result of economies of scale. 
Figure 3-6 illustrates the economies of scale entry barrier 
situation. The shape of the average cost curve in Figure 
3-6 is used for illustrative purposes only. The actual 
shape is open to controversy. In Figure 3-6 the curve 
is depicted as falling rapidly as production rises and 
then remaining relatively flat in the high production ranges. 
This may not be the case in all, or even most, cases. 
This effect is due to the benefits caused by the 
massing of resources. With more equipment and machinery 
being used for the same purposes the chances that machinery 
.breakdown will seriously interrupt production is lessened 
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Figure 3-6 
Economies of Scale as a Barrier to Entry 
Average cost C2 
per unit of 
output 
Interpretation: 
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Production Volume 
• A-B is the average, long run cost curve of the industry. 
• O-X2 is total production required to satisfy market 
demand • 
• 0-Xl is the "threshold" share of production that a firm 
must produce/sell to obtain the lowest cost 0-Cl . 
. • Any production less than Xl will mean that the average 
cost will be higher than the average cost of the estab-
lished firms. (A production volume of X3 gives costs 
of C2 which makes this level of output uneconomical) 
. i 
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and repaired, set up, and maintenance work can be scheduled 
more efficiently. Inventory levels can be expected to rise 
at the same rate of production capacity ~nd in many cases 
could be reduced as a supplier may be requested to deliver 
on a daily basis. The large hypermarkets in South Africa 
are good examples of these economies. Further economies 
,may be realized in marketing and distribution. Not only 
\ 
are these economies of production scale - but certain 
benefits from the effects of cumulative output over time 
may also arise .. This is known as the "learning· curve" 
effect. Learning is normally believed to occur at the 
result of the repeated execution of the same task and thus 
assembly operations and similar repetitive functions are a 
particularly important source of "experience curve" benefits. 
However, it also seems likely that all activities in a 
firm may be subject to similar economies over time to a 
greater or lesser degree. A considerable amount of 
46 impirical work has been performed in this area. Hartley 
47 
and Sturney have analysed "learning curve" economies in 
the aircraft industry and indications are that a 20 per-
cent cost "decay" occurs for every doubling of output. 
Other industries also appear to obtain similar benefits. 
In the semi-conductor industry the decay for a doubling 
48 
of output appears to be in the 20 to 30 percent range 
and in certain machine tools the reduction in costs has 
been found to range between 16 and 25 percent for a doubl-
49 ing of output. 
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It can thus be seen that the factors influencing entry 
into a new business area will depend on a wide range of 
considerations. These range from analyses of demand factors 
such as market size, growth rates, segments and product 
differentiability potentials, suppliers and cost analyses, 
to a careful analysis of competitors already in the indus-
try as well as other potential entrants. 
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3.6 Why Do Firms Diversify? 
Firms will tend to diversify and change their product-
market environment for a wide variety of ·reasons. Ansoff 
lists four major reasons as follows: 50 
3.6.1. "Firms diversify when their objectives can no 
longer be met within the product-market scope 
defined by expansion." 
This is almost certainly a major diversification trigger. 
This situation can arise for two reasons: 
3.6.l.l.Product-life cycle effects of market matura-
tion and saturation may indicate that achiev-
able performance will fall below the objective 
or target performance. Figure 3-7 illustrates 
the concept of "gap analysis" and Figure 3-8 
that of the product life cycle. 
The period O to T1 in Figure 3-7 gives 
management an indication of the time horizon 
available for them to take action to "fill 
the gap". This gap can only be filled by 
expanslonary or diversification efforts. 
3£.1.2. Management revises its objectives upwards. 
This may be due to a variety of reasons. 
Ansoff also stresses the importance of flexibility as 
an objective in the decision to diversify. The company 
may have become too dependant on a single industry or 
customer or on an individual supplier of raw materials 
and in order to remain flexible decides to spread the firm's 
activities. A decision to diversify to obtain flexibility 
is similar, yet different from the decision to diversify 
as a result of market maturation and saturation expectations 
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Figure 3-7 
Gap Analysis 
02 R Required 
Performance 
Objective GAP (Sales, 
1profits} 
A Expected 
Actual 
Performance 
c 
0 Tl Time 'r2 
Interpretation: 
• At time O, the firm projects expected actual perfor-
mance as illustrated by curve CA. This curve declines 
in the future due to the effects of market maturation 
and saturation. (See Figure 3-8.} 
• The corporate management will require compounded growth 
for the projected variable which could be sales or 
profits - this objective is represented by curve CR . 
• At time period T2, a significant gap between required 
and actual performance exists. This implies that the 
actual perf orrnance lags behind required performance by 
02-01 at time T2· 
• The "gap" begins to appear at time period T1. 
178 
Figure 3-8 
The Product Life Cycle for a Hypothetical Product 
Rand 
Sales 
Time 
Losses 
Introduction Growth Maturity Saturation Decline 
~nterpretation: 
• Sales are seen to rise slowly at firms due to the 
relative "newness" of the product, then grow rapidly. 
Growth then begins to slow as the market becomes 
mature and ultimately saturates when demand peaks. 
Certain products will then go into decline until they 
are finally withdrawn. 
• Losses and expenses are incurred before introduction 
due to research and development, start up and produc-
tion costs and investments. During the early stages 
of the life cycle, losses are still likely due to 
high promotional expenditure. The product will (hope-
fully) break-even during growth and then profits peak 
and ultimately fall as sales decline. 
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caused by product life cycle effects. A firm may decide 
that, despite satisfactory growth expectations in the 
pre~ent product-market area, a new area may be a more 
attractive investment area due to "flexibility" benefits. 
3.6.2. "Even if attractive expansion opportunities 
are still available and past objectives are 
being met, a firm may diversity, because the 
retained cash exceeds the total expansion 
needs_. 11 51 
Where the firm finds itself in the situation where the 
present product-market operations generate excess cash -
the so-called "cash cow", it has two basic options. These 
are, firstly, to return the funds to the shareholders in 
the form of dividends and thereby to liquidate the firm 
over time. This option would be followed if shareholders 
believe that they could earn a greater return with the 
funds so distributed than the firm could expect to earn 
if the funds were retained in the firm. 
The second alternative would be to use the funds to 
enter new industries, where returns are expected to exceed 
the rate of return that shareholders would earn if the 
funds were returtied to them in the £orm of dividends. 
3.6.3. "Even if current objectives are being met, a 
·firm may diversify when diversification oppor-
tunities promise greater E~ofitability than 
expansion opportunities." 
A firm would consider a diversification opportunity 
if say, that opportunity promised a return in excess of 
the firm's cost of capital despite the lower returns as 
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a result of reduced "synergy" effects brought about by 
the fact that the firm would possess no "core skills". 
Another factor which would facilitate diversification 
moves is the ''throw-off" from research and development 
efforts. Many firms which contributed to the "space 
race" during the 1960s have found consumer markets attrac-
tive. Solar heating is a good example of such a tech-
nology. 
3.6.4. "Firms may continue to explore diversification 
when the available information is not relia-
ble enough to permit the conclusive comparison 
between expansion and diversification. 11 53 
Ansoff supports his statement when he maintains that 
"in such situations many firms have shown in the recent 
past an unfortunate tendency to plunge rather than probe. 1154 
A classic example of the problems defining whether a po-
tential market acquisition represents a move into a 
"related" area or a "unrelated" move which represents 
diversification, is that of Heublein Incorporated's move 
to acquire the Hamm's Brewing Company. Heublein apparently 
believed the acquisition of a "beer" company was a related 
move for a company primarily involved in the marketing of 
liquours - more specifically, the well known vodka 
"Smirnoff". The move proved to be a corporate disaster 
and the move actually represented radical diversification 
from the "core skills" of Heublein management. The South 
African experience has been no less traumatic - the South 
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African Breweries take over of o.K. Bazaars is perhaps an 
excellent example of a plunge rather than probe approach 
to diversification. 
Another reason which can result in an active diversi-
fication policy and which is related to those listed by 
I 
f Ansoff is the desire to build on a "core skill". The 
i 
critical skill in this approach is the definition of the 
"core skill". The Gillette Company's ,definition of its 
'core· skill" has been described as "the marketing of con-
sumer goods". This has led the firm into a wide range of 
fast moving consumer products including shaving razors, 
shaving "support" products, cosmetics, deodourants, sun-
glasses, calculators and electronic wristwatches. In 
South Africa, T.W. Beckett and Company has sought products 
which can be readily distributed by their powerful and 
well controlled sales force. 
-Competi ti ve1 threats can also pressurize a company into 
diversification. Salter uses the example of Xerox's 
interest in typewriters and IBM's interest in copiers to 
illustrate this cause for diversification. 55 The thr~at 
of Rupert's Rembrandt organisation has probably contributed 
to United Tobacco's efforts to move into diversified 
areas such as food. 
Bright has summarized the key justifications for the 
pursuance of a diversification policy as he sees them 
as follows: 
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3.6.3.1. A desire for more growth than the present line 
yields. 
3.6.3.2. A need to reactto external pressure. 
3.6.3.3. A desire for better use of resources and facilities. 
3.6.3.4. ~ desire to avoid concentration in a government 
regulated area of business. 
3.6.3.5. A need to obtain the services and skills of one 
or more key people. 
3.6.3.6. A desire to use 2rofitably, new technology developed 
in t.he company.So 
A checklist of reasons why firms may choose to diversify 
is given in Appendix I. 
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3.7 The Routes to Diversification 
Given that corporate management has decided to achieve 
objectives by diversification, the next critical decision 
is concerned with the manner in which the preferred level 
of diversification is to be achieved. Ansoff's view is: 
"The process of strategy selection was 
carried out in broad terms without reference 
to whether the firm will grow by acqui-
sition or develop from within. The 
decision on whether to "make or buy" new 
product-markets is needed before strategy 
can be implementea.. 11 57 
Other writers share Ansoff 's view of a choice between 
the external or acquisition approach and the interna'i de-
velopment approach and that the strategy over time is 
likely to contain elements of both strategic alternatives 
although other entry methods such as licensing and other 
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contractual arrangements also permit entry. 
Clearly the strategy selected or emphasized at any 
time will depend on the assessment of the entry conditions 
prevailing. Thus the strategy selected will depend on 
the perceived entry barriers. As Narver has noted: 
flAny given barrier to eritry is least 
prohibitive of entry by merger, some-
what more effective as a deterrent to 
internal diversification, and most 
effective as a deterrant to entirely 
new firms. We offer no judgement 
whether it is good or bad that entry 
into some markets can be effected 
only by merger or some internal ex-
pansion by established f irrns rather 
than by new firms. We note only that, 
by definition, the complete absence 
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of barriers to entry in any market 
could mean that entry is possible for 
the entirely new firm. 11 59 · 
'rhis implies that the merger and acqulsi tion route is 
easier - yet this is not necessarily so and the process 
by which the acquired firm is integrated into the parent, 
and if required, corrective and expansionary steps are 
·\implemented, may be difficult and extend over a consider-
able period. As Miller has observed: 
"Special conditions must pervail before 
a company becomes available for acqui-
sition. Usually the business needs 
substantial outside support to sustain 
an expansion or modernization programme. 
If its management has an improvement 
program already planned, headquarters 
may be reluctant at first to take an 
active role in the new business other 
than provide new capital for it. In 
other words, the diversifying company 
does not create the conditions necessary 
to make acquisitions, nor can it step in 
immediately after an acquisition to 
manage a business it knows nothing 
about. It can only orient its contacts 
towards the kinds of businesses it 
wants to acquire, exert considerable 
patiengs to wait for the right oppor-
tunity, bring matters to a head with 
a concrete offer, and then establish 
the kind of communication system that 
will allow it to understand the new 
business gradually. 11 60 
The dive~sification decision and the management ap-
preach adopted to implement that strategy will thus 
depend on existing barriers and the anticipated reaction 
of existing firms in that industry. The analysis of ex-
pected competitive behaviour is obviously more complicated 
and difficult than the analysis of present behaviour. 
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Several assumptions or scenarios could be formulated 
with respect to how established firms will react to entry 
and to how entrants expect established firms to react. 
These reactions could be positioned.on a continium ranging 
from "no reaction 11 to "violent reaction". Certain writers, 
notably Modigliani, have analysed the position from the 
most pessimistic viewpoint. Modigliani, in an analysis 
of another study has called this approach the "Sylos 
Postulate 11 • 61 Another approach could be to assume post-
entry behavior will follow pre-entry behavior or to work 
backwards as suggested by Weinberg: 
"If you were to ask me, let us say, to 
forecast what would happen if I acquired 
a certain company, this would be a dif-
ficult thing for me to do. But what I 
could do with a high degree of assurance 
. would be to use the mathematical prin-
ciple of inversion. Here is how it 
works: I can ask myself,'If I acqrilre 
this company for so much money, what 
has to happen in the marketplace for 
this to be an attractive investment?' 
You see, I am not forecasting what is 
going to happen for that company to be 
an attractive investment. If I know what 
has to happen, I can then apply my log-
ical, qualitative judgement to the lik-
lihood of it actually happening. 11 62 
Despite Weinberg's contingency, bayesian approach, the 
analysis of the conditions that a new entrant can expect 
is, at best, vague and subjective. Needham has described 
the problem in this way: 
"Whereas the behaviour of potential 
entrants depends on how they expect 
established firms to react to entry, 
the behavior of established firms de-
. pends on how established firms think 
potential entrants expect them to re-
act to entry. 11 63 · 
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Ansoff maintains that the internal versus external 
route decision revolves around the consideration of two 
important variables - startup costs and timing: 
"In internal development the costs 
are incurred by product development 
and introduction, and by building of 
new facilities and organisations. 
Acquisitions pay for these costs too; 
however, over and above them is a 
premium which frequently has to be 
paid as a compensation for the risks 
which have been taken by the seller ... 
Because of this premium, it .is some-
times argued that internal develop-
ment is cheaper. 11 64 
The only empirical evidence regarding the timing of 
internal expansion versus external acquisition is that of 
65 Nelson. The major hypothesis tested was that developed 
b 1 . l' d 66 y Ne son in an ear ier stu y. In that earlier study 
Nelson hypothesized as follows: 
"The merger may be accomplished only 
when the expansion of the various 
firms has proceeded to the point at 
which they are operating at capacity •.. 
We might thus expect to find merger 
activity occurring at the stage in a 
cyclical expansion when many indus- 67 tries have reached capacity production." 
In his study to test this hypothesis, Nelson found the 
contrary applied. That is to say that "the time sequence 
of peaks (in the activities of plant expansion and mergers) 
suggests that mergers reach their zenith first, followed 
by contracts for plant, orders for equipment and finally 
.by stock prices. 1168 Nelson confesses his surprise at the 
findings and in his discussion of the implications of the 
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evidence, he confirms Ansoff's statement. It would appear 
that mergers are financed with capital costing more than 
that used to finance plant expansion - that is a price 
premium is paid for acquired firms. This is to be expected 
because the execution of an acquisition move can be carried 
out in a matter of weeks as compared to the lengthy new 
product development process and the time taken to obtain 
a return on the funds invested. 
In an interesting and more recent study carried out by 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith of the recent 
flurry of merger activity on Wall Street - seems to confirm 
Nelson's findings regarding the premium price paid for 
acquisitions. They state that: 
"Corporations with high growth rates 
and sound financial condition have 
been willing to pay substantial prem-
iums over market - an average of 
50 t 11 69 percen ... 
The study also suggests that the wage of mergers is 
in advance of a peak economic activity and that the trend 
is not "conglomerate" in nature. The fact that most 
acquisitions are being made in the same or related busi-
ness sector is also of inteiest. The pattern of the 
underlying reasons for the majority of the acquisitions 
appears to be a part of the corporate strategies of the 
buying firm and not some random process. 
In a study performed in South Africa, Lipworth and 
Strebel have commented on the difference between the South 
African economic environment and the tendency of South 
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African firms to favour the external, take over route: 
" ..• The South African economy is 
quite different from the larger Western 
economies, in which the cost of re..;. 
producing an operation internally is 
not as adversely affected by skilled 
manpower constraints, and consequently, 
is often less expensive than external 
acquisition. Thus in contrast with 
overseas economies in which the greater 
external benefits from operational 
synergies of ten are cancelled out by 
the greater external cost, in South 
Africa the structure of synergistic 
benefits and costs associated with 
acquisitions tend to favour the ex-
ternal over the internal route. 11 70 
This section has summarized the managerial reasons 
and routes open to firms seeking diversification. Both 
internal and external routes and some empirical findings 
relating to the timing of the route alternatives were 
presented and discussed. The following section seeks to 
evaluate the performance of the two routes to diversifica-
tion by examining the empirical studies in the literature. 
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3. 8 Performance Evaluation of Internal Development Strateg_ies 
Entry by a·firm into a new market represents diversifi-
cation and in many cases has been the majur reason for 
corporate survival where the older, established product 
has declined due to product life cycle effects. Many of 
the largest firms in the 1970s have moved from single 
products to participation in many product areas. For ex-
! 
ample, Rembrandt began in the cigarette market in the late 
1940s and now operates in instant coffee, food, beer, 
liqueur and mining. Barlows, had its beginnings as a 
single retail outlet and now operates in construction 
equipment, television, radios, household appliances, min-
ing, steel and motor retailing amongst other markets. On 
the international scene the situation is even more 
dramatic with many of the major corporate giants entering 
. new markets continually. 
A number of factors suggest that entry into a new 
market is likely to have a greater probability of success 
if the new entrant is an established firm. Such a firm is 
likely to have established markets and administration, and 
economies of scale, lower costs of capital, reputation and 
excess cash flows which can be diverted to the new area --
almost all of which are not possessed by a new firm. 
Hines sees "superior information" as a major advantage 
.possessed by an established firm and that these many ad-
vantages can produce a situation "in which new firms cannot 
enter at all, whereas established firms can. 1171 
-· -- ~--~-·- ·---··-~·----·----.---. ___ ,_,.........,_ ....... ,. ................ ,,.... ....... ~~ ..... -..-...., I....1 
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~owever, the literature contains little evidence on 
·the performance of new entrants. The only major study in 
this area is the Biggadike study which is discussed in 
<letail below. The theory implies that losses can be 
expected during the early stages. In 1951, Andrews 
theorized as follows: 
"'It would not be realistic to require 
that, on entry, they should be able to 
-get normal profits. They will expect 
higher costs in the beginning than they 
achieve ·later as they get experience, and 
will hope for increasing goodwill to en-
large their share of market. Their 
entry into the industry will be decided 
on the basis of estimates of what they 
-can hope to achieve at some _relatively more 
mature stage."72 
· Biggadike appears to be surprised by the J.ack of 
~mpirical evidence and research in the field of new entry 
when he states: 
~"'In spite of its importance, there is 
little hard data ... there is no cross-
industry evidence on how long entrants 
.have to wait, (to become profitable) 
how much higher their initial costs 
are or how lonq it takes them to enlarge 
,a_h • h 117-;j 
.\,.. ei.r s are .. 
He is critical of the individual case study ~pproach 
·'and states: 
"This type of evidence is not suitable 
to serve as a basis for building empirical 
generalizations which can improve under-
standing of entry. For example, the 
frequency of the negative performance 
results (reported on an individual 
company basis) is not known. How many 
entrant businesses contribute only losses, 
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over what time period, to their 
parent companies? How can the per-
formance of entrants be explained? 
Unfortunately, existing research 
has not studied entrant businesses 
specifically and t~us cannot answer 
·these questions. 11 7 
Biggadike examines the performance of forty established 
firms which entered new business areas. His research 
analysed their performance over a four year period. These 
data are then compared to a separate sample of businesses 
extracted from the Profit Impact of Marketing Strategies 
(PIMS) data base which contains information on performance 
for a second four year period. The combination of Biggadike's 
and the PIMS data thus provides an eight-year history of 
entrant business performance. 
The research shows that the first two years after 
entry are subject to considerable variation in financial 
performance. Certain interesting factors can be highlited. 
'• 
Pretax return on investment was oµ average, a negative 
value of 78 percent. The reported returns ranged from a 
positive 80 percent to a negative 442 percent. Pretax 
profit on sales revenue averaged -94 percent while the 
gross margins averaged 12 percent. These two ratios are 
related_as gross margin is calculated before research, 
distribution and marketing expenditure while the pretax 
profit to sales ratio is calculated after these expenses 
·but befoe interest and taxes. The comparison of the two 
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ratios provide a measure of the importance of these expense 
items during the early stages of a product's life. Biggadike 
comments as follows: 
"Expenses in general, and marketing and 
research and development expenses in 
particular, were the causes of negative 
financial performance. Out of the forty 
entrant businesses, only 12, or 30 percent 
showed a negative gross margin/sales 
revenue ratio. The ad~erse influence 
of initial entry expenses needs emphasis 
because, although expected in new 
product introductions, there is a 
tendency to believe that the entry 
problem is one of an initially low re-
turn on investment because of signifi-
cant capital requirements ... During the 
first two years, the sample mean market 
(expenses)/sales revenue (expenses) was 
. 41 percent ... and the research and de-
velopment (expense)/sales revenue mean 
was 51 percent. . . Both these sumrnary 
· statistics show that entry is particularly 
demanding on these two expense items in 
the early years. To put this point an-
other way, mean marketing and research 
and development costs amounted to 92 
percent of the sales dollar, about the 
same as the 89 percent of the first two 
year sales dollar spent on purchasing 75 inputs and manufacturing line product." 
In years three and four following entry the performance 
of the sample showed considerable improvement - although 
still unsatisfactory. The ratios are roughly "half as 
negative in the second two years as they were in the first 
76 two years." The return on investment rose to -43 percent 
to -78 percent. The findings show rapid increases in 
sales revenues and the expected fall in sales revenue 
related ratios. Some 98 percent of the sample showed 
revenue increases. •An interesting finding is that marketing 
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and research research and development expenditures con-
tinue to increase in the first four years after entry. 
I 
This is contrary to research findings as reported in 
the literature. Biggadike quotes the Buzzell and Nourse 
·study which indicated that absolute marketing expenditures 
on new food products dropped between 30 and 60 percent 
. th d f . d . 77 in e secon year a ter intro uction. However, the 
-disparity in the findings can be explained by the fact 
that Biggadike's research focussed on new business areas 
and not new products. Biggadike finds that marketing ex~ 
penditures increased dramatically in the second two year 
period. In the sample, 89 percent increased marketing 
expenditures with the most increases of two or three times 
and certain firms increasing by as much as ten times the 
expenditure in the first two years. 
Biggadike then analysed the available data over an 
eight year period with his original sample providing the 
first four year period and the PIMS data base the second 
four year period. The PIMS sample consisted of frl firms 
and these were refered to as the "adolescent" group. In 
addition, the PIMS data base also provided 454 firms which 
could be regarded as being "established" firms. Analysis 
over the eight_ year period provides an answer to the ques-
tion, "How long, on average, do entrant businesses take to 
achieve the performance characteristics of established 
businesses?" 
. . 
_,.,,_, __ _.:_ ___ .. ___ ·- ---- ---·-............ ...-~~ .. ~~_.;,,.-,__..., __ 1~ 
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'Table 3-13 shows the performance findings for new 
entrant firms, as well as the "adolescent" and "established" 
groups. In general, the results can be regarded as fairly 
depressing. In Biggadike's words: 
"It seems that entrant businesses need 
about eight years before their return on 
investment and return on sales become 
positive ... In the fourth two years, 
mean return on investment was +5 percent 
with a median of +7 percent and mean 
return on sales was +l percent with a 
median of -4 percent. Although these 
two measures are at least positive in 
the fourth two years, they still have 
some way to go before attaining the 
mean 21 percent return on investment 
and 10 percent return on sales of the 
established businesses in the PIMS 
sample. In fact, a time projection of 
the values in each cf the four periods 
predicts that entrant businesses will 
attain established business performance 
in their fifth to sixth two years; that 
is to say, it seems that ten to twelve 
years elapse, on average, before en-
trant businesses return on investment 
and sales equals that of the established 
businesses. 11 78 
The position is even more bleak from a cash flow point 
of view. Many executives appear to be more concerned with 
cash flow than traditional performance measures. Indeed, 
Henderson of the Boston Consulting Group has written -
"Cash is all that counts. Profit is a promise. 1179 
Biggadike's findings indicate that "cash flow/sales does 
not become positive at all in the eight year period" and 
that entrants can only expect a positive value for this 
80 
measure in year twelve. 
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In the analysis of ma.rket share performancer the 
findings are equally depressing. Table 3-14 shows 
comparative market share performance for the new entrants 
as well as the "adolescent" and "established" groups. 
The new entrants appear to gain a share and which then 
stabilizes arbund a mean value of 15 percent. This is 
suggested by the fact that entrants and adolescents have 
a mean market share of 15 percent over the eight year 
period. This is not an encouraging finding according 
to the researcher: 
"What is so disturbing, however, is that 
the adolescent businesses, after eight 
_ years of commercialization, were still so 
far behind the share performance of the 
established businesses. 11 81 
Table 3-13 
Comparison of Financial Performance Over Eight Years 
and Against Established Businesses - Means in Percentages 
Financial Performance New Entrants Adolescent Businesses 
Ratios - Means Years Years Years Years 
1 and 2 3 and 4 5 and 6 7. a.ld 8 
( n = 40) (n = 28) (n = 61) ( n = 61) 
Pretax Return on Invest. (1) -78 -43 -5 +5 
Preta"{ Return on Sales (2) -94 -35 -13 +l 
. 
Cash Flcrw/Sales(3) -127 -50 -10 -5 
Gross Margin/Sales (4) +12 +26 +22 +24 
1. Defined as Net Pretax Income/Average Investment. 
I 
I 
2. Income defined as in 1 above as a percentage of sales and lease expenditures. 
Established Bus. 
( n= 454) 
+21 
+10 
+2 
+27 
3. Net income times one half minus all investment in year 1 and incremental in years t+l as a 
ratio to Sales Revenue. 
4. Sales revenue minus purchases, manufacturing and depreciation as a ratio to sales revenues. 
Source: Biggadike, Ralph, "Entry, Strategy and Performance 11 , Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard Universityr Boston, 1976. Tables 
4-1 and 4-12. 
I-' 
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Table 3-14 
Market Share Statistics for Entrants, Adolescents and Established Businesses 
----... 
Market Share I New Entrants I Adolescent Businesses f Established Bus. Statistics Years Years Years 5 and 8 
1 and 2 3 and 4 
(n = 37) (n = 25) 
I 
(n = 61) 
I 
(n = 454) 
Mean Share I 15 15 15 23 
Source: Biggadike, Ralph, "Entry, Strategy and Performance 11 , Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1976? Table 5-3. 
Table 3-15 
Market Share Frequency Distribution for New Entrants and Adolescents 
Market Share Frequency 
Distribution 
- Less than 1% share 
1 % to 10% share 
- 11% to 20% share 
- 21% to 30% share 
-·More than 30% share 
Years l and 2 I 
Number of I Entrants t 7 62% 16 I 6 19% 1 
7 19% 
37 = 100% 
Years 3 and 4 Years 5 and 8 
Number of Number of 
Entrants Adolescents 
3 64% I 0 51% 13 31 
4 16% 16 30% 0 2 
5 20% 12 20% 
25 = 100% 61 = 100% 
Source: Biggadike, Ralph, ''Entry, Strategy and Performance", Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1976, Table 5-3. 
f-' 
\0 
.....; 
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Clearly, the results are not encouraging. The findings 
presented here are really the result of two separate 
studies, namely, the PIMS research and Biggadike's study 
and the results are remarkably consistent. 
3"8.1 Conclusions 
The research findings presented above are a summary of 
the most recent research into the effectiveness of what is 
termed 11 internal development". Biggadike fells that the 
relatively poor performance is due partly to management 
objectives being too conservative and that the performances 
are "self-inflicted". It would appear that entry on a 
large scale is a necessary requirement for success in 
rapid growth markets. The firms analysed in the Biggadike 
study entered markets growing at an average rate of 50 per-
cent per anum. This means that the maximum market share 
that a new entrant can achieve falls rapidly each year. 
Thus a new entrant into the market, who constructs a plant 
with a capacity of say 30 percent for his entry bid, finds 
that after three years, his maximu.i"'Tl potential share has 
fallen to 30/338 or 8.8 percent. If the new entrants' 
market share objective was 15 percent in year 3, not an 
unreasonable target, this objective is impossible to 
achieve since his maximum potential share is only 8.8 per-
cent. To achieve a 15 percent market share in year 3 
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would require an initial capacity of .15(338) = 51. It 
would be a bold new venture manager who would construct a 
plant with a capacity of 51 percent of the present market. 
It could be argued that the logical strategy would be to 
obtain a 11 toe-hold 11 ·and then expand plant capacity - but 
again, it takes considerable courage to increase investment 
.when the return on investment figures suggest an average 
return of -78 percent in the first two years and cash flow 
to sales is -127 percent in years one and two and -50 per-
cent in years three and four! 
The problem of successful internal development is 
further complicated by the fact that many firms use return 
on investment as an evaluation device and the tendency of 
this measure to contribute to short planning horizons 
will discourage investment in projects with long term pay-
off. 
Biggadike makes an interesting point in that his re-
.search suggests that the traditional entry barriers such 
as price competition are not as important as suggested in 
the literature. He states that his research: 
" •.• indicated that .difficulties arose not 
so much from incumbents' 'ganging up' on 
the entrant, the usual naive conception 
of the entrant's problem in theory. 
Rather, entrants difficulties are in-
herent in starting up something new: 
these difficulties are the initial, 
inevitable stages of a new learning 
curve - the process of 'debugging' an 
incremental innovation. Consequently, 
poor judgements and decisions occur; 
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such as entering too small, misjudging 
the impact of rapid market growth and 
mis-calculating relative price and 
quality levels. There is,· therefore, 
a 'natural' as opposed to a 'malevolent' 
explanation for the new entran~'s dif-
ficulties in product markets." 2 
It should also be noted that the results of Biggadike's 
\ study are actually an understatement of the actual situa-
•tion. The study analyses only "survivor" performance and 
! 
thus it can be assumed that all entrant performance was 
considerably worse. If the findings regarding new product 
failure are accepted as an indicator of failure then the 
failure rate is probably very high. In addition, Biggadike 
confined his study to highly diversified and successful 
firms. These firms were also very large as they were 
selected from the top two hundred firms in the "Fortune 500". 
These firms can be expected to be more successful at the 
launching of new business ventures as they were already 
diversified and can be expected ~o employ very experienced 
i 
managers. 
The fact that new entrants can expect considerable 
problems and that the internal development route can take 
a decade to implement are undoubtedly important reasons 
why firms have tended to use acquisition as an entry-
vehicle. The findings and reasons of the attraction of 
this the "external development" route are discussed in 
. the following section. 
--~ 
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3.9 Performance Eval~ation of External Development Str~tegies 
This section seeks to review the literature pertaining 
to the externally oriented growth strategy which is 
typified by the takeover or merger. The survey will begin 
with the review of the evidence provided by previous 
studies which cover the possible sources of improved per-
1 formance which are said to be available to the firm di-
versifying and growing by acquisition. 
3.9.1. Financial Performance and Market Value 
'I'here does seem to be a relationship between superior 
financial performance and the market value of a firm's 
shares. Earnings per share in particular, appear to have 
an important influence on price-earnings ratios. A number 
of studies have suggested that earnings per share are 
closely correlated with price-earnings ratios. Benishay, 83 
Wh . 8 4 d . 11 d d . 1 . . 8 5 h 'I- th ippern an Mi er an Mo ig ian1 ave s11own at 
·this relationship is positive. The practicing business-
man also appears to· be concerned about reported earnings 
per share. This concern is particularly noticable in 
statements made by executives in conglomerate-type firms. 
For example: 
- Harry Figgie, Chairman of Automatic Sprinkler Corpor-
ation stated "There must be an increase in earnings 
per common share; we will never dilute the earnings 
. 86 
on common shares." 
/ 
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- William Duke, President of Whittaker Corporation 
states, 11 We will not dilute earnings per common share 
in any acquisition or merger.H 87 
George Sharffenberger, President of City Investing 
Inc., stated, "It (an acqaisition) must add, when 
joined t.o City, at least 20¢ a share in earnings. 1188 
- Charles Allen, Vice-President of Finance of TRW 
Corporation states, "The price of an acquisition must 
be such that it will not dilute earnings per share 
' 89 
on a fully converted basis now or in the future." 
- Martin Stone, President of Monogram Industries is 
quoted as saying, "Remember, constar1tly increasing 
90 
earnings per share is the name of the game." 
- Clyde Skeen, President of Ling, Temco, Voight stated 
his company's objectives as follows, "We desire to 
grow but as we grow we will always keep our eye on 
that precious commodity - the earnings of our company. 
Our objective is to grow in terms of sales and 
. 't h . 1191 earnings per equ1 y s are ... 
- Harold Geneen, President of ITT, speaks of "Aiming 
at and achieving a sustained 10-12 percent compound 
1 h l 1192 annua per s are growt1 ... 
The acquiring firm is able to increase earnings per 
share by issuing ordinary shares at a price earnings 
ratio above that of the acquired firm. The following 
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example will illustrate this process. Assume two firms, 
Purchaser (P) and Seller (S), and the following data: 
Purchaser Seller 
1. Profit after tax 10,000 25,000 
2. Shares outstanding 5,000 10,000 
I 
: 3. Earnings per share (1 ~ 2) 200¢ 250¢ 
I 
! 
4. Price earnings ratio 15X 12X 
I 
;5. Market price of Shares (3 x 4) 3,000¢ 3,000¢ 
6. Market value of firm (2 x 5) 150,000 300,000 
If P decides to acquire S by a share transaction based 
on market prices, P will issue 10,000 shares with a market 
value of 2,000¢ each. (R 300,000 .;. 3,000¢). The post 
.acquisition position is thus as follows: 
1. Profit after tax 
2. Shares outstanding 
3. Earnings per share 
Purchaser (post acquisi-
si tion of S) 
R 35,000 
15,000 
233.33¢ 
Thus by a "miraculous" (and illusuory) process, earn-
ings per share have increased by 16.67 percent. It could 
also be suggested that "everyone wins" at this game. If 
one assumes that the Purchaser will retain a price earnir.gs 
ratio of 15 than shareholders of Seller would now own 10,000 
shares with a market value of 233.33 X 15 X 10,000 = R350,000. 
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Thus. their "wealth" will have risen R50,000. The owners of 
Purchaser shares will also be seen to have gained. A 
holding of 1 Purchaser share is now valued at 233.33 X 15 = 
3,500¢. This is a 16.7 percent rise. Thus everyone wins! 
This procedure holds true for all cases where the purchaser 
,firm acquires seller firms using exchange of shares at market 
prices and where the purchaser firm.'-s price-earnings ratio is 
. greater than that of the seller and does not decline. 
It would appear that during the development phase of 
the conglomerate era, earnings per share were an imp9rtant 
influence on the price-earnings ratios of such firms. The 
price-earnings ratio was seen as an important source of 
growth given the impact of earnings-per-share which re-
sulted from acquisitions using the technique illustrated 
above. May has summarized the situation as follows: 
"Sometime during each generation, the 
nagic of the chain letter is rediscovered. 
The phenomenon has reappeared this time 
in a very unusual and unlikely locale 
and form; it has seduced the investment 
community ••.. It is not a trick with 
numbers. Companies ... have created and 
are continuing to create money machines. 
The increases in market value of their 
stock are real and the shares trade 
just like any other securities. 11 93 
As the stock market investors seemed to emphasize 
earnings per share and to value companies with rapid 
earnings per share growth very highly thereby improving 
the price-earnings ratios of those companies, management 
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was forced to pay more attention to this measure of per~ "-~ 
I 
I 
formance. Textron's Vice Presideht of Finance described 
the influence of the trend toward emphasis of earnings 
per share as follows: 
"We have to be concerned with increasing 
our earnings per share, just like every-
one else, because that seems to be the 
way the game is scored in the stock 
market~ The market seems to value 
increasing earnings per share more tha§4 a. high return or corporate net worth." 
Corporate management were forced to obtain and maintain 
high price-earnings ratios in order to fuel their acqui-
sitive growth strategy. Wall has given the following ad-
vice on the methods to obtain and maintain a high price-
earnings ratio: 
"Get hold of th~ speeches and annual 
reports of the real savvy swingers who 
know the lingo and can make it sing ... 
You have to project the right image to 
the analyst so they realize you're the 
new breed of entrepreneur. Talk about 
the synergy of the free form company 
and its interface with change and 
technology. Tell them you have a 
windowless room full of researchers ..• 
scrutinizing the future so your 
corporation will be opportunity-
technology oriented ... Analysts and 
investors want conceptually oriented 
conglomerates, preferably in high 
technology areas. That is what they 
pay the high price-earnings ratios for, 
and life is a lot less sweaty with a 
high multiple. 11 95 
Dreyfus, in similar vein, commented as follows: 
"Take a nice little company that has 
been making showlaces for forty years 
and sells for a respectable six times 
earnings per ratio. change the name 
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from Shoelaces Inc. to Electronics 
and Silicon Furth-Burnes. In today's 
market the words 'electronic' and 
'silicon' are worth fifteen times 
earnings. However, the real play comes 
from the word 'furth-burners', which 
no one understands. A word that no 
one understands entitles you to double 
your entire score. 'rherefore, we have 
six times earnings for the shoelace 
business and fifteen times earnings 
for electronic and silicon, or a 
total of twenty-one times earnings. 
Multiply this by two for 'furth-burners 1 
and we now have a score of forty-two 06 
times earnings for the new company.u~ 
The performance of the acquisitive conglomerate firms 
was phenomenal. Malkiel describes the process by which 
Automatic Sprinkler was able to generate its performance 
record as follows: 
"Between 1960 and 1968, the company's 
sales volume rose by over 1400 percent. 
In the middle of 1967, four mergers 
were completed in a twenty-five day 
period. These newly acquired companies 
were all selling at relatively low 
price-earnings multiples, and thus 
helped to produce a sharp growth in 
earnings per share. The market re-
sponded to this 'growth' by bidding 
up the price-earnings multiple to over 
50 times earnings in 1967. This 
boosted the company's stock from about 
$8 per share in 1963 to $73 5/8 
in 1967. Mr. Figgie, the President 
of Automatic Sprinkler performed the 
public relations job necessary to 
help Wall Street build its castle in 
the air. He automatically sprinkled 
his conversations with talismanic 
phrases about the synergy of the free 
form company and its interface with 
change and technology ..• Wall Street 
loved every word of it."97 
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The above examples suggest that during the "conglomerate 
era" earnings per share growth was seen as a major invest-
ment guide and companies were able to use rapid earnings 
per share growth to generate high price-earnings ratios 
which in turn assisted the firm to acquire firms which 
further improved earnings per share. However the price--
earnings ratio is a reflection of future growth prospects. 
In the situation where the acquirer, purchases a firm which 
warrants a lower price-earnings ratio, this means that 
the acquired firm has low growth prospects and hence will 
serve to reduce the overall growth rate of the combined 
firms. Thus, despite an improvement in earnings per share, 
the overall growth rate falls. A number of writers have 
commented on this effect. 98 Others, including Stern99 and 
M lOO h . d th d f . < • ay ave pointe to e angers o_ using earnings per 
share to evaluate performance. 
3.9.2 Exploitation of Debt Capacity 
A firm which has adopted the external route for growth 
will seek firms which have "unused" debt capacity. This 
implies that the acquiror will be able to determine the 
"optimal" capital structure for the acquired firm and 
perhaps use any unused capacity to assist in paying for 
that firm. The concept of an "optimal" capital structure 
· for a firm rests on the relationship between market value 
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and the employment of debt. This issue has been the 
subject of a vast number of studies and is as yet, un-
resolved. The major problems appear to be those of 
measurement and the elimination of biases. As Lynch has 
noted: 
"Such studies have typically been re-
gression analyses or cross-sectional 
samples within given industries. Firms 
in a given industry which choose to 
employ greater leverage are likely to 
be those which have lower business 
risks, higher rates of return, and 
therefore greater growth, lower capital 
costs, and higher market prices. It 
is difficult to hold 'everything else 
the same' in evaluating the effect of 
leverage on market value. In addi-
tion, firms within a given industry 
typically do not provide a very wide 
range of leverage ... The point, 
however, is that the evidence regard- 101 ing this relationship is only suggestive." 
The evidence in the literature is also inconclusive. 
Weston and Brigham state that: 
"The effect of leverage on the cost 
of capital (and hence on the value 
of the firm) is much less clear; in-
deed, this issue has been one of the 
major controversies in finance for 
the past 20 or so years, and perhaps 
more theoretical and empirical work 
has been done on this suba'1ct than 
any other in the field."1 
Weston and Brigham summarize the opposing views as 
follows: 
"The.traditional view suggests that the 
average cost of capital declines rapidly 
with debt over a certain range and then 
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begins to rise rapidly. The result is 
something approximating a U-shaped 
average cost of capital curve. The 
average cost of capital, according to 
Modigliani and Miller, is constant in 
a world with no taxes, but declines 
continuously with increases in debt 
when corporate income taxes are con-
sidered. Thus, the Modigliani and 
Miller model suggests that a firm 
that pays no corporate taxes need not 
worry about its capital structure, 
while the firm that does pay taxes 
should take on as much debt as it 
can get. Under the compromise view -
which reflects our own feelings ·- the 
average cost of capital curve is more 3 .J..U 
saucer ~ shaped than. than U-shaped." 
In a study of the South African position, Bethleham 
has found no consistent relationship between debt and 
return on equity for South African finns during either 
b . . . d . h 104 com or recession perio s in t e economy. According 
to the theory of financial· leverage, a highly geared firm 
should be capable of rates of growth and return greater 
than those of an ungeared firm. Table 3-16 illustrates 
these· concepts. It is clear that the firm employing 
higher debt levels is able to: 
3.9.2.1. Show a superior return on equity performance. 
(15 percent versus 10 percent) However, it 
must be stressed that this increased return is 
required by the investor to compensate for the 
increased financial risk. 
3.9.2.2. Show superior earnings per share (15 cents 
versus 10 cents). 
3.9.2.3. Achieve superior asset and earnings growth 
rates. 
If one assumes that these growth rates will continue 
then the ungeared firm will double in size in 14.2 years 
while the geared firm will double its size in only 8.2 years. 
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Table 3-16 
Impact of Leverage on Returns and Growth 
Ungeared Firm. Geared Firm 
(assume zero debts) (assume 50% debt) 
Year 1 Year 2 . Year 1 Year 2 ..L. 
1. Fquity (l+ 11)' 1000 1050 500 537.5 
2. Debt (2+12) 0 0 500 537.5 
3. Total Funds/Assets 1000 1050 1000 1075 
4. Earnings before in-
terest & tax (assume 200 210 200 215 
20% on assets) 
5. Interest at 10% 0 0 50 53.75 
6. Earnings before Tax 200 210 150 161.25 
7. Tax (assume 50% rate) 100 105 75 80.625 
8. Earnings after Tax 100 105 75 80.625 
9. Available for dist. 100 105 75 80.625 
10. Dividends (assume 50 52.5 37.5 40.3125 
50% payout) 
11. Retained earnings 50 52.5 37.5 40.3125 
12. Additional debt to 0 0 37.5 40.3125 
maintain ratio 
I 
13. Total funds reinvested 50 52.5 / 75 80.625 
14. Asset growth rate 5% 7.5% 
15. Feturn on Investment 20% 20% 20% 20% 
(before tax) 
16. Return on Invesbnent 10% 10% 10% 10% (after tax) 
17. Earnings per share 10¢ 10.5¢ 15¢ 16.125¢ 
. (assume Rl shares) 
18. Return on Equity (8..;-1) 10% 10% 15% 15% 
19. Earnings per share 5% 7.5% grc:Mth rate 
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~ further advantage possessed by the geared firm is 
that it is able to use debt as a competitive weapon. 
~able 3-17 illustrates this position based on the data in 
Table 3-16. If the management of the geared firm believes 
that their shareholders require a 10 percent return on 
equity it is possible for management to lower prices, in-
crease marketing expenditure or use the "competitive funds" 
·sc released in other areas. 
Table 3-17 
Competitive Funds Released by Use of Debt 
Ungeared Geared Conpeti ti ve Geared 
Finn Finn Firm 
1. F.quity 1000 500 500 
2. ll:bt 0 500 500 
3. Total ~..ssets/Funds 1000 1000 1000 
4. Earnings before interest 150 
and tax (assurre 20%) 200 200 {RSO avail. ) 
5. Interest at 10% 0 50 50 
6. F.arnings before tax 200 150 100 
7. Tax at 50% rate 100 75 50 
8. Earnings after tax 100 75 50 
9. Return on F.quity (8.;.l) 10% 15% 10% 
'Ihe oonpetitive funds released by the competitive, geared 
firm are R50 in this case as the competitive, geared firm is 
able to provide its shareholders with the desired 10 percent 
return and have R50 available prior to the calculation of 
earnings before interest and taxes. 
f 
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It should be noted that the improved return on equity 
and earnings per share performance of a geared f .irm will be 
taken into account by the sophisticated investor. Such an 
investor would require the improved returns to compensa.te 
for the added financial risk of the geared firm. However, 
the basic hypothesis should still hold, mainly, that 
geared firms should produce improved return on equity 
ceteris paribus. The South African findings in this regard 
are confined to' the study by Bethlehem who has found that 
no significant relationship between gearing and return on 
equity for South African firms exists. This finding holds 
for both boom and recessionary economic conditions. 
3.9.3. Improvement of Operations 
The firm using the external acquisition route to 
achieve growth is likely to attempt to imprqve performance 
through improved management systems and controls and in 
extreme cases, by replacing management. The acquiring 
finn will either seek to purchase successful firms which 
will require relatively little effort by the acquiring firm's 
management - or it will purchase ailing firms where the 
acquiror will hope to employ its managerial skills to 
imp.nave performance. The choice between successful firms 
and ailing firms will depend partly on the rate of acqui-
sit.ion. Clearly, if the pace of acquisition is high, and 
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if those acquisitions are expected to make an irrmediate 
impact on earnings per share, then these firms must have 
positive earnings. Furthermore, the more ·rapid the pace 
of acquisition, the less time ma.nagement will have to assist 
in the turna:cound of ailing firms. There:Eore acquisitions 
\which will require limited managerial attention and inputs 
from the parent firm are likely to be sought where a rapid 
I 
acquisition programme is planned. 
The so-called "strippers" are likely to be interested 
in firms which are in "trouble" but which possess a core 
of profitable operations. The major objective in this case 
would be to isolate and keep the profitable area and sell 
the unprofitable and weak areas. The strategy of Abercom 
limited appeared to follow this route during the early 
1970s. The decision to acquire ailing firms will require 
an appreciation of the managerial effort required to turn 
the firm around. 
It would appear the most active acquiring firms prefer 
to take the first route, namely, the acquisition of success-
ful firms and then to retain the existing management. 
Judelson, President of Gulf and Western stated his view as 
follows: 
"Good acquisition oriented companies 
make the presence of sound management a 
prerequesite to almost any merger. The 
few exceptions to this rule occur in 
cases where potential is extremely great -
and even then there must be a supply of 
good lower-level managers to offset any 
weaknesses at thetop. 11 105. 
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It would seem that the management of the acquiring 
firm has relatively little opportunity to make significant 
improvements to performance by changing operations and 
increasing efficiency. Blair believes that this inability 
to influence the efficiency of operations is particularly 
true for the unrelated type of acquisition and that con-
ditions for improvement favour the vertical or horizontal 
type of a6quisition: 
"Of all types of merger activity conglom~­
erate acquisitions have the least claim 
to promoting efficiency in the economic 
sense. The lower costs that might re-
sult in a horizontal acquisition from 
the-pooling of skills and know-how gained 
in the production of the same product 
from different facilities are absent. 
Likewise the conglomerate acquisition 
affords little opportunity for the clos-
ing down of the less efficient facilities 
and the centralization of production in 
the more efficient. Similarly, the gains 
in a vertical acquisition which might 
result from a more logical and orderly 
arrangement of facilities employed in 
the successive stages of the production 
process are not present. Because what 
is involved in the production of un-
related products the conglomerate acqui-
sition provides few opportunities for 106 the securing of economic efficiencies." . 
This view is open to some criticism in· that there are 
likely to be certain areas where efficiency may be improved 
even if the actual production process is unrelated. Blair's 
perception of diversification leans toward the economist's 
definition discussed earlier in this chapter and suffers 
from the fact that management appears to view diversifica-
tion differently. Turner has suggested that significant 
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opportunities for improved operating may exist for the 
conglomerate type of merger. He states: 
"Conglomerate acquisitions involving 
no significant economic relationships 
have been relatively infrequent as 
compared to those that 'fit' the 
operations of the a.cquirer in some 
tangible respect. Companies looking 
for new lines of business tend to buy 
into those fields with which they have 
at least Some degree of familiarity, 
and where economies and efficiencies 
from assimilation are at least 
possible. 11 10'/ 
The economies and ef :Eiciencies which may arise include 
the provision of capitalr improved managerial incentive 
and controls and information systems. Kitching believes 
that the provision of needed funds is probably the most 
important advantage flowing from a merger. 108 Lynch 
however, argues that the human element may be the single 
most important when he states: 
" .•. it will be concluded that for the 
acquisitive conglomerate it is the 
knowledge, the expertise, the 
personnel, or in general the special-
ized human resources which play the 
more important role ...• All too often, 
it seems studies of merger activity 
have .ignored the power and the 
importance of the human element, the 
quality of managerial and technical 
expertise. Emphasis has been placed 
on the other factors of production. 
·These factors are viewed as inflexible 
quantities whose possible interactions 
are both known and predetermined. 
Thus, a merger may affect efficiency 
if it changes the conditions which 
govern these interactions.ril09 
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The above section has examined the theory which re-
lates to the performance of related and unrelated diversi-
fication using the external or acquisition route. The 
objective has been to isolate the key factors which are 
believed to be the most important influences on performance 
of firms which have selected this strategy to achieve 
their objectives. The existing evidence implies that 
I 
the major benefits arising from a strategy of "external 
development" lie in the area of financial performance. 
It would appear that firms have been able to show rapid 
increases in earnings per share as a result of their 
acquisitions and in many cases the earnings per share 
performance has resulted in increased market value. How-
ever, the ability of these firms to maintain these high 
market values over the long term is questionable. It 
appears that improved performance through operational changes 
is limited, and that the benefits so arising decline as the 
degree of relatedness to the "core skill" of the parent is 
reduced. The theory further sqggests that operational 
efficiencies are more likely to occur where the acquisition 
is regarded as being "vertically" or "horizontally" orien-
tated. However, the impact of a changed managerial , 
climate, introduced by the possibly more aggressive parent, 
may have an impact on operating performance. 
One important influence which has not been discussed in 
this chapter or section has been the theory relating to 
217 
the impact of size or acquisition performance. Apart from 
the study by Lipworth and Strebel quoted above, who found 
that size does not play an important role in acquisition 
performance, relatively little research, both in more 
developed and less developed economic environments, has 
been carried out. The industrial policy of many countries 
i incorporates size as a major criterion yet the performance 
of firms of differing sizes in the developing economies 
has not been well documented. 
The following section will examine the empirical , 
studies concerned with the external route to diversified 
operations which have bee~ undertaken. Before moving on 
to the topic of size and performance which is of importance 
for firms which have adopted either of the two expansion 
strategies. 
3.9.4. External Strategy Performance Findings 
The studies of the performance of the externally 
orientated, acquisitive, conglomerate-type firms that 
will be discussed here are those of O'Hanlon, Lynch and 
Rumelt. 
3."9.4.1. O'Hanlon 
This study was a special research project carried out 
. 110 
on the "Fortune 500". Two questions were analysed. 
The first was concerned with the number of industries 
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which each firm operated in and secon.dly, the relationship 
between diversification and performance. O'Han1on's study 
followed the methodology adopted by Gort in that the 
Standard Industrial Classification Manual (SIC) was used as 
the basis for measuring diversification. It will be re-
membered that Gort's study which was discussed earlier in 
this chapter, found no significant relationship between 
performance and diversification. However, Gort's study 
was concerned with growth in assets and return on equity 
while O'Hanlon focussed on earnings per share. 0 1 Hanlon 
finds that conglomeration was not as widespread as he had 
expected. He finds for example, that 102 firms, comprising 
some 20 percent, could still be classified as single 
category firms. The 500 firms and their distribution ac-
cording to SIC categories is given in Table 3-18 below. 
O'Hanlon classified firms which operated in 8 or more 
categories as "conglomerates" and on this basis, 46 firms 
could be so classified. O'Hanlon's sample is given in 
Table 3-19. To provide an answer to the question as to 
the relationship between diversification and compounded 
growth in earnings per share a correlation anilysis be-
tween 1956 and 1966, was performed. In O'Hanlon's words: 
"The answer to the question is surprisingly 
negative; the coefficient of correlation 
turns out to be 0.086, a figure that is 
not statistically significant. In short, 
there isn't any relationship to speak of 
between diversification and earnings growth. 
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The median growth rate for companies in 
eight or more categories is 5.86 percent 
a year. By contrast, the median for the 
least diversified, or single category 
companies, is 6.27 percent. The median 
for the 500 is 6.21 percent - but none 
of these deviations is significant 
either. 11 111 
Table 3-18 
"Fortune 500: Firms by Number of .SIC Classifications - 1967 
Number of SIC Classification No. of Firms 
1 102 
2· 89 
3 74 
4 72 
5 46 
6 52 
7 19 
8 17 
9 10 
10 8 
11 4 
12 2 
13 2 
14 1 
17 1 
18 1 
Source: O'Hanlon, Thomas, "The Odd News About Conglomerates," 
Fortune, 15th Jun~, 1967. Reprinted in The Con-
glomerate Commotion, edited by the Editors of Fortune, 
The Vicking Press, New York, 1970, page 13. 
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Table 3-19 
O'Hanlon Study of Conglomerate Performance in 
Earnings P~r Share - 1956--1966 
Company Categories 
Allied Chemical 9 
American Cynamid 9 
American Machine and Foundry 10 
Armstrong Cook 8 
Bendix 10 
Borden 9 
Borg-Warner 12 
Brunswick 11 
Castle & Cooke 8 
Chrysler 7 
Consolidated Electronics 8 
Dow 10 
Du Pont ~ 9 
Eagle-Picher 8 
Eltra 11 
Evans Products 8 
FMC 10 
Fairchild 8 
Firestone 10 
Ford . 8 
General Dynamics 10 
General Electric 14 
General Percision 8 
General Tire 17 
Goodrich S 
Goodyear 8 
W.R. Grace 12 
I.B.M. 8 
I.T.T. 13 
Johnson & Johnson 8 
Kaiser 8 
Kidde 11 
Litton 18 
Lockheed 10 
Minnesota Mining 8 
National Distillers 9 
~~n 9 
Olin Mathieson 9 
Rexall 10 
Texas Instruments 9 
Textron 13 
Universal American 8 
* Brackets indicate negative values. 
Average Growth 
in EPS 1956-66 
(Percent) 
3.61 
4.9 
5.35 
8.63 
3.17 
5.86 
2.28 
(7.48)* 
5.71 
22.37 
2.08 
6.15 
0.02 
1.79 
19.44 
(3.72) 
13. 37 
24.54 
5.00 
9.96 
3.05 
4.28 
11.12 
15.15 
0.77 
. 6 .16 
7.32 
20.63 
7.55 
9.42 
1.18 
4.03 
36.53 
11.80 
12.90 
4.12 
1.59 
4.03 
12.43 
26.90 
16.15 
4.77 
Source: O'Hanlon, 'Ihorras, "The Odd News About Conglomerates", Fortune, 
15th June, 1967. Reprinted in The Conglomerate Corrrnotion, edited by the 
Editors of Fortune, The Vi.eking Press, New York, 1970, page 13. 
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3.9.4.2. Lynch112 
This study, using a vigorous definition for an "acqui-
sitive conglomerate'', analysed a sample 0£ 28 firms. In 
1967 these 28 firms produced revenues of 17.7 billion 
dollars, made 588 acquisitions during the six-year period 
1962-1967. The financial performance of this select 
1
sample of high performance firms is ou.tstanding. The 
analysis of performance covered a period of between 4 and 
six years. Table 3-20 contains a list of the firms 
analysed by Lynch with selected performance criteria. 
It should be noted that Lynch's findings are in direct 
conflict with those of O'Hanlon's findings. O'Hanlon 
found no significant performance differences between 
those firms which he defined as conglomerates and other 
firms. Lynch on the other hand, finds that his conglom-
erates experienced very rapid earnings per share growth. 
His sample of 28 firms averaged earnings per sha-re growth 
of 50 percent per year over the period 1962-1967. In 
discussing his findings, Lynch states that: 
"It should be evident at this point 
that the 'average acquisidlive con~ 
glomerate' is not like the 'average' 
U.S. corporation. On the dimensions 
of acquisition activity, expansion 
and performance, the acqusitive 
conglomerate on the average displays 
characteristics far exceeding min-
imum criteria which, in turn, sig-
nificantly exceed those dis~i~yed 
by 'average' corporations." 
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Table 3-20 
Financial Characteristics of Acquisitive 
Conglomerat~s: Lynch Stud~ 
Company 
Automatic Sprinkler 
Automation Industries 
Bangor Punta 
Con dee 
FMC 
W.R. Grace 
Gulf and Western 
Hydrometals 
I.T.T. 
Kidde 
Litton Industries 
LTV 
Mid-Continent 
Monogram 
.MSL Industries 
Nytronics 
Occidental 
Ogden 
Royal Industries 
Signal Companies 
Teledyne 
Textron 
TRW 
Tyco Labs. 
U.S. Industries 
Venitron 
White Consolidated 
Whittaker 
Average for Sample 
1967 Sales 
($ millions) 
242 
55 
161 
75 
1313 
1576 
645 
40 
2761 
424 
1562 
1833 
27 
27 
108 
14 
826 
815 
60 
1505 
451 
1446 
1041 
10 
283 
22 
173 
225 
633 
Average Annual 
Increase in 
Earnings per 
Share, 1962-67 
(in percent} 
55 
65 
19 
43 
17 
10 
72 
125 
14 
73 
29 
33 
28 
91 
11 
39 
23 
38 
54 
13 
93 
23 
20 
90 
81 
51 
134 
63 
50 
Source: Lynch, Harry H., Financial Performance of Conglom-
erat~s, Division of Research, Graduate School of 
Business Administration, Harvard University, 
Boston, page 73. 
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A possible explanation for the differing research 
results lies once again, in the definition of a "conglom-
erate" firm. 0 1 Hanlon uses the number of SIC codes in 
which a firm operated as the basis on which to classify 
firms. His findings support those of Gort, discussed 
earlier, which reveal no significant performance differ-
ences. Lynch's criteria are once again, more managerially 
orientated and classify firms according to their "style" 
or "pattern" of behaviour. 
114 3.9.4.3. Rumelt 
This study, extending the strategic classification 
framework proposed by Wrigley and adopted by Channon, Dyas, 
Pavan and Thannheiser, which was discussed earlier, also 
found significant differences ip performance between 
different strategies. Rumelt's extended classification 
system is the basis on which this study is based and a 
detailed discussion of the classification methodology 
follows in a later chapter. 
In order to facilitate the review and comparison of the 
research findings of the studies which have examined ex-
ternal acquisitive corporate growth performance, H.umelt's 
findings on the performance of acquisitive conglomerates.is 
presented in Table 3--21 below. 
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Table 3-21 
Acquisitive Conglomei.·ate Performance Compared to All 
Companies in Sample 1951-196~: .. Rurnei:t-Study ---
~-·---·-·-·· 
---··--- ~---
Average Growth 
:in Sales 
Average Gcowt.11 
.:L11 Earnings 
Av2rage G:ruNth 
in EPS 
Ac..."qUisitive Conglomerages 20.64 18.64 9.46 
1
\ Average of Sanple 9.01 8.72 6.57 
Source: Adapted from; Rumelt, Richard P., "Strategy, Struc-
ture and Econornic Perf orma.nce" ,. Doc·toral Dissertation, 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard 
University' Bos ton f 19 '7 2, ··p.:i"~Te 16 6. 
Rumelt' s findings indicated significant per:~orma.nce dif~ 
ference between acquisitive conglomerate firms and the 
other firms in the sample. The differences between the 
means are all statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 
3.9.5. Summary of Findings 
An additional study which is of particular interest in 
~hat it contains performance data on diversified firms 
during the period 1972-1976 is that provided by a Harvard 
; 115 Business School Note. Although the sample is defined 
as "widely diversified" firms, all the firms have achieved 
their diversified states through a process of acquisition 
and merger. This data is the only published data which is 
comparable to the data analysed in the present study. 
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O'Hanlon's study was based on the period 1956-1966, the 
Lynch study on the period 1962-1967 while Rumelt's research 
covered the two decades 1950-1970. The relevant data are 
summarized in Table 3-22 •. 
Table 3-22 
Historic Financial Performance of Selected .Widely 
Diversified Companies - 1972-1976 
Return on Return on Average Cam-· 
Invested Equity pounded Sales 
Company Capital(%) (%) Grovvth (%) 
Minnesota Mining 
and .Manufacturing 17.2 19.1 12.7 
General Electric 14.5 17.9 8.0 
Textron 12.3 15.4 5.9 
Union Carbide 11.8 16.3 11.3 
Eltra 11.6 13.4 10.6 
TRW 11.4 16.3 10.2 
Northwest 11.2 39.6 6.9 
White Consolidated 9.9 20.4 10.0 
Sybron 9.9 12.3 9.4 
General Tire 9.6 13.0 9.3 
Borg-Warner 8.4 9.5 8.8 
G&W 8.4 19.6 12.1 
I'IT 8.4 11.2 15.3 
Martin Mariel ta. 8.0 12.1 5.8 
U.S. Industries 6.7 7.4 10.2 
Kaiser Industries 6.6 7.1 11.9 
Westinghouse 6.6 8.2 8.9 
LTV 5.8 12.3 6.5 
AVCO 5.8 8.3 1. 7 
Allis-Chalmers 5.1 6.2 9.1 
Fugua 4.2 2.7 12.2 
Whittaker 3.4 2.7 2.4 
Litton 1.9 0.5 7.1 
Sample average 8.64 12.24 9.00 
Standard deviation 3.64 6.72 3.22 
All :indust.i.-y average 9.1 12.7 11.8 
N.A.: Not available 
Average Com-
pounded F...PS 
Growth (%) 
9o4 
10.7 
5.5 
17.0 
10.1 
6.9 
31.1 
23.2 
6.7 
13.6 
6.2 
21.9 
4.9 
7.5 
-10.7 
11.4 
-0.3 
N.A. 
0.2 
N.A. 
-25.6 
-22.0 
-44.1 
3.98 
17.32 
9.4 
Source: Adapted fran: "Historic Financial Performance of Selected Widely 
Diversified Conpanies", Harvard Business School, ICH 4-378-166, 
page 2. 
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The research findings pertaining to acquisitive and 
diversified firms are of considerable interest for two 
reasons. Firstly the studies that adopted a product 
count method of measuring diversification revealed no 
significant performance differential between diversified 
and other, less diversified firms. This research, when 
and number of SIC categories occupied is unable to reveal 
significant performance differences when traditional per-
formance measures such as earnings and sales growth and 
returns on capital and equity are adopted. Secondly, 
the earlier, pre-1970 studies all r~veal relatively high 
growth and return values for the acquisitive and diversi-
fied firms, .. Rumelt, for example, finds that his acquisi-
tive conglomerate group outperforms the total sample by 
129 percent in sales growth, by 114 percent in earning~ 
' growth and by 44 percent in earnings per share growth. 
The contrast between Rumelt's study and that of the Note 
on the Financial Performance of Selected, Widely Diversi-
fied Companies discussed above, reveals that the rate of 
growth has declined dramatically after 1970. This decline 
has been so severe that the diversified group, operating 
in the 1972-1976 U.S. business environment, is now below 
that of the all industry average. 
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· -The implications are that these firms are unable to 
maintain~their performance in the mature economy. The 
relatively low economic growth experienced in the United 
States since 1972, primarily as a result of the oil crisis, 
has had a serious detrimental effect on the performance 
of this group of firms both in terms of growth in sales 
and earnings per sha~e, and returns on capital and equity. 
Despite the relatively poor performance of the diver-
.; 
sified and acquisitive group, this strategy would appear 
to .be superior to that of internal, new product develop-
ment as revealed by Biggadike's study. The "internal 
development" route which requires an average of eight 
years before returns on investment and sales become posi-
tive and some ten to twelve years before reaching the 
·average returns from est~blished businesses, is clearly 
not attractive. An equally bleak picture exists for in-
ternal development from cash flow and market share point 
of view according to Biggadike. •rhe external development 
route is likely to be less risky in that returns and cash 
flows are more certain and "closer" - the firm to be 
acquired has a history and reasonably accurate estimates 
of returns can be made. The forcasting of returns eight 
to twelve years in the future is clearly more risky and 
consequently, less attractive. 
I 
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3. 10 SUi'llrnary 
This chapter has discussed the different definitions 
and the conceptual problems associated with these defini-
tions. Economists and managers appear to adopt widely 
differing views of what constitutes diversification and 
what criteria should be used to define a conglomerate. 
A number of independent research studies conducted in 
the Unite.d States and major European countries reveals 
consistent trend towards increased diversification. The 
reasons for diversification were introduced and the the6ry 
relating to entry was discussed to highlight both the 
difficulties and conditions which facilitate and encourage 
entry into new areas of operation. 
'rhe major studies which examine the performance of 
the strategies of internal development and external de-
velopment were discussed. These studies suggest that 
during periods when the economy is growing, the external 
route provides significantly superior financial pe~for-
mance but that during periods of slower economic growth, 
the external, acquisitive firms produce· below average 
performance. Yet, the overall impression gained is that 
the external route is more attractive and is likely to be 
prefered by management because: 
- The acquisition price can be determined, 
- The returns and profits can be estimated with 
reasonable accuracy, 
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- The firm to be acquired has a demonstrated per-
formance and market record. 
'11he internal, new product development process appears 
to have none of these advantages. Management is unsure 
of the investment that will be required to produce the 
required return and is afraid of being caught in a "cash 
trap". Furthermore, positive returns and cash flows have 
very long time horizons. 
This chapter has provided a review of the literature 
a.nd theory of corporate diversification and will serve as 
the research hypotheses which are developed later. These 
hypotheses will be based on the existing theory of corp-
orate strategy and performance in mature, developed 
economies since all previous research has concentrated on 
firms operating in these environments. The following 
chapter seeks to introduce the concepts of risk and return 
in the context of modern portfolio theory. The studies 
discussed above have.tended to concentrate their evalua-
tion of performance on return and have ignored the impact 
of risk. The following chapter will provide a framework 
which will enable the financial performance of various 
strategies to be evaluated in terms of both risk and 
return. 
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4. THE THEORY OF RISK,. RE'l'URN, DIVERSIFICATION AND THE 
CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL 
4 .1 Introduction 
Previous chapters have been primarily concerned with 
the various concepts and theories of corporate strategy, 
the development of firms over time and the identification 
of and evaluation of the different diversification and 
growth routes available to firms. The concept of corporate 
strategy becomes a meaningless academic abstraction 
unless it can be used operationally to achieve some pur-
pose. Financial theorists maintain that the objective of 
the firm is to maximize shareholder wealth. This implies 
providing the shareholder with the minimum of a satisfac-
.tory or "required" return on his investment. Most dis-
cussions of managerial decision.making focus on the concept 
of return. Return.is corrunonly refered to in terms of 
profits, return on investment, equity and similar measures. 
Yet any analysis of return is of limited value unless the 
return provided on an investment is measured against the 
risk of that investment. It is impossible to meaningfully 
evaluate the return on an investment without assessing the 
risk of that investment. 
The research into the various alternative diversif ica-
./.· 
tion routes in the previous chapter pay scant attention to 
the concept of risk. Similarly, the theories of corporate 
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strategy mention risk btit make no attempt to measure this 
important aspect of decision making. Corporate strategy 
should, in its simplest sense, direct the unique competences 
of the firm towards opportunities in the environment, in 
order to provide a certain minimum return, for a given 
level of risk. The strategy must seek to maximize the 
return at a certain stipulated level of risk, or it must 
seek to reduce the risk while holding the return at a 
certain level. A review of the literature in the field 
of corporate strategy reveals that theorists have made 
little attempt to quantify risk in their research. What 
little research has been conducted in this area has been 
undertaken by theorists fiom the field of finance. 
This research seeks to apply the well developed 
theory of risk measurement and assessment to the field of 
corporate strategy. In order to achieve this objective 
this .chapter will introduce theories and research drawn 
from the field of financial economics. This chapter will 
provide the basis for the evaluation of corporate strate-
gies in terms of their impact on the risk profile of the 
firms included in the study. 
4.2 Risk, Risk Aversion and Portfolio Diversification 
4.2.l Risk 
As stated above, the·theory and quantification of risk 
has been developed in the field of financial economics. 
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Consequently, risk ha~~ been analysed from the perspective 
of the individual investor" Webster defines risk as "the 
chance of injury, damage, or loss. 111 This definition is 
qualitative in nature and will be interpreted subjectively 
by different individuals. Such interpretations will not be 
concise. Modigliani and Pogue refer to this problem as 
follmvs 1 "Not everyone agrees on how to define risk, let 
1 h , .. 2 a one .ow to measure it. This lack of definitional 
percision has obvious disa~vantages and thus a quantita-
tive surrogate has been developed. 
In terms of an.investment, risk of "damage or loss" 
refers to the chance that a loss or unsatisfactory return 
will be realized since the future prices and dividends 
from that investment are unknown in advance. Thus risk 
refers to either a capital loss or a return below that 
expected. Thus, from a financial point of view, risk 
refers to the probability distribution of an investment's 
returns. Risk can therefore be defined in statistical 
terms as the variability of returns, or the dispe.rsion 
of positive and negative deviations from the expected 
return. Obviously, an investment with a wide range of 
possible returns has a higher risk than an investment with 
a narrow range of possible returns. Figure 4-1 illustrates 
four investments with differing levels of risk as defined 
above. 
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Figure 4-1 
Risk Defined as the Variability of Returns 
Risk Free Investment Low Risk Investment 
Return Return 
Medium Risk Investment High Risk Investment 
Return Return 
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An investor is likely to perceive risk as the probability 
that his investment produces returns that are damaging and 
thus are below his expectations. In addition he would 
analyse an investment's past return behaviour if such in-
formation were available and this is likely to influence 
his estimate 6f the investment's risk. A further require-
rnent would be that the distribution of returns so measured 
would not change significantly over time and that the dis·-
tribution of returns in reasonably symmetric and is not 
"skewed" either to the left or the right. Fortunately 
empirical research has shown ·that distribution of portfolio 
returns are not significantly skewed 3 and do not change 
. . f. 1 . 4 s1gn1 icant y over time. These problems are discussed 
in more detail later in this chapter. Figure 4-2 illus-
trates the returns from a 100 security portfolio over a 
25 year time span. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
243 
Figure 4-2 
Rate of Return Distribution for a Portfolio of One Hundred 
Securities. {Equally Weighted). 
January, 1945 June, 1970 
Range Frequencies 
·-13.6210 -12.2685 1 
* 
-12.2685 -10.9160 2 
-10.9160 ' -9.5635 2 ** 
-9.5635 -8.2110 3 
-8.2110 -6.8585 8 
-6 .8585 -5.5060 9 ********* 
-5.5060 -4.1535 17 8 ****"k*********** 
-4.5135 -2.8010 18 ****************** 
-2.8010 -1.4485 27 *************************** 
-1.4485 -0.0960 28 **************************** 
·-0.0960 1.2565 30 ****************************** 
1.2565 2.6090 50 ************************************************** 
2.6090 3.9615 35 *********************************** 
3.9615 5.3140 33 ********************************* 
5.3140 6.6665 18 ·. 8***************** 
6.6665 8.0190 14 ************** 
8.0190 9.3715 4 **** 
9.3715 10. 7240 2 ** 
10. 7240 2.0765 2 
12.0765 13.4290 3 *** 
Scaling Factor = 1 
Average Re:turn 
Standard Deviation = 
Number of Observations = 
0.91% per month 
4.45% per month 
306 
Source.: Modigliani, Franco, and Pogue, Gerald A. , "An Introduction 
to Risk and Return". Financial Analysts Journal, March-April, 
1974. Page 72. 
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Modigliani and PO.gue have noted as follows: 
11 If risk is defined as the chance of 
achieving returns less than expected, it 
would seem logical to measure risk by 
the dispersion of the possible returns 
below the expected value. However, risk 
measures based on below-the-mean varia-
bility are difficult to work with and 
are actually unnecessary as long as the 
distribution of future returns is 
reasonably symmetric about the expected 
value ... Empirical studies of realized 
rates of return on diversified portfolio 
show that skewness is not a significant 
problem. If future distributions are 
shaped like historical distributions, 
then it makes little difference whether 
we measure variability of returns on one 
or both sides of the expected return. 
If the probability distribution is 
synunetric / measures of the total varia-
bility will be twice as large as measures 
of the portfolio's variability below the 
expected return. Thus if total varia-
bility is used as a risk surrogate, the 
risk rankings for a group of portfolios 
will be the same as when variability 
below the expected return is used. It 
is for this reason that total variability 
of returns has been so widely used as a 
surrogate for risk."5 
The measure most commonly adopted to measure this 
variability of return is the standard deviation. 6 
4.2.2 Risk Aversion 
A number of characteristics of investment, particularly 
in the ordinary shares of a business fi:rm, combine to make 
the investor "risk averse". These are: 
4. 2. 2 .1. 'The Gambler's Ruin" Outcome 
4.2.2.2. Consumption Effects, and 
4.2.2.3. Liquidity Preference 
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The "Gambler's Ruin" outcome refers to the situation 
where the individual can, as a result of a "disaster", 
be barred from reentering the "game". This would pccur 
where an investor would lose everything and therefore has 
no reserve to reserves to enable him to reinvest and re-
cover. from his misfortune. 
Consumption effects refer to the liklihood of the in-
vestor to consume part of his income over time and thus 
such an investor would require some measure of return. 
Thus a high return and high risk investment opportunity 
may not be as attractive as an alternative low risk, low 
return investment which is more likely to produce stable 
returns. 
Risky investments will, by definition, fluctuate 
about some expected or average value but the investor will 
attempt to avoid those investments which although market-
able,_ may be at a low price or value when cash is required. 
Thus from a liquidity point of view, a shareholder will 
prefer an investment which will reduce the probability of 
having to liquidate the investment during a period of 
depressed value quite apart from the more attractive longer 
term prospects of a risky, volatile investment. 
Thus, these three factors.contribute to the average 
investor's risk averse viewpoint and result in his attempts 
to alter his levels of return and risk to suit his require-
ments. 
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While it appears to be true that investors are risk 
averse, these same investors can be observed investing in 
very high risk ventures on occasion. A casual stroll near 
bookmakers at a horse racing meeting will serve to verify 
this statement. It would seem that investors will under-
take .high risk.if they.are compensated for it. Brealey, in 
support of this hypothesis states that, ~The fact that 
common stocks became tended over a long period to give a 
higher rate of return than bonds supports this belief." 7 
Two further empirical studies have confirmed the fact that 
high returns are associated with high risk. Douglas 
examined returns on a sample of 616 shares over the period 
1946 to 1963. 8 The second study was Arditti's often 
quoted study of the Standard and Poor Composite Index. 9 
Both studies found a strong, positive correlation between 
price variation and rates of return. Arditti's study raised 
an additional important consideration regarding the skewness 
of, the distribution of the returns for individual shares. 
{J Shares are likely to have a positive skewness due to the 
fact that it possible to obtain a return in excess of 
100 percent. While the loss· in the event of "disaster" is 
bounded by a minus 100 percent. One cannot lose more than 
100 percent but can gain over 100 percent. Thus a positive 
bias is introduced. In summary however, high rates of 
.return are associated with higher risks and investors will 
attempt to use portfolio diversification to optimize their 
risk/return situation. 
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4.3 Portfolio Diversification 
As stated above, investors are believed to be risk-
averse. Portfolio theory developed by Markowitz, is based 
on this premise and seeks to provide the investor with the 
tools necessary to reduce risk while providing a certain 
. . 10 
m1n.1mum return. 
This can be demonstrated by an example. Assume two 
shares, Firm I which markets ice cream and Firm S which 
markets soup. The sales, cash flows and profits of both 
firms during periods of varying weather conditions result 
in the returns shown in Table 4-1. 
'I'able 4-1 
Hypothetical Returns Under Varying Weather Conditions 
Firm I 
R(I) Return in % 
Firm S 
R(S) 
Sunny Conditions 33 -9 
Normal Conditions 12 12 
Cold Conditions -9 33 
:, 
Standard Deviation of Returns ( .21 .21 
The return on a portfolio can be defined as follows: 
E (RP) = w a E (Ra) + wb E ( ~) ' 
Where; E(R ) =expected return on portfolio P, p 
= proportion of funds invested in 
investment A, 
E(R ) = expected return on investment A. 
a 
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If the investor were to invest in a portfolio consist-
ing of 50 percent in Firm I and 50 percent in Firm B, the 
expected return can be calculated by subst~tuting the 
values in Table 4-1 into the formula above: 
E(R)::.: .5(RI) + .S(R) p s 
By diversifying in this manner, the investor will have 
reduced his risk (defined as variability of returns) no 
matter what weather conditions pervail. The expected 
return from the portfolio consisting of 50 percent invested 
in both Firm I and Firm S is as follows: 
Sunny conditions return = .5(.33) + .5(-.09) = 12 percent, 
Normal conditions return = .5 (.12) + .5(.12)=12 percent 
Cold conditions return = .5(.09) + .5(.33) = 12 percent 
Since the portfolio will have a standard deviation of 
zero, whereas each firm has a standard deviation of .21, 
the variability of return is eliminated and the portfolio 
will _yield 12 percent whereas investment in any one of the 
firms will have produced a return ranging from +33 percent 
to -9 percent. The portfolio has a return of 12 percent 
with no variability and is thus very low risk. The total 
elimination of risk in this example is possible since there 
is a perfect negative correlation between the two firms 
under consideration. Obviously in practice this perfect 
negative correlation is rare but does occur. Gold invest-
· ments for example, often move up when other investments 
249 
fall and vice versa. _ Malkiel states: 
"As long as there is some lack of 
parallelism in the fortunes of the 
individual companies in the economy, 
diversification will always reduce 
risk •.. where there is a perfect 
negative relationship between companies' 
fortune (one always does well while 
the other does poorly) , diversifica-
tion can totally eliminate risk. Of 
course, there is always a rub, and 
the rub in this case is that the 
fortunes of most companies move pretty 
in tandem. When there is a recession 
and people are unemployed, they may 
buy neither summer vacations or um-
brellas. Therefore one should not 
. expect in practice to get the neat ~ 
kind of total risk elimination (just 
shown above). Nevertheless, since 
company fortunes don't always move 
completely in parallel, investment 
in a diversified portfolio of stocks 
is likely to be less risky than in-
vestment in one or two single secur-
ities. 11 ll · 
Since the returns on investment are typically not 
perfectly negatively correlated but do exhibit degrees of 
covariance, measurement of the risk of a portfolio is more 
complicated. Risk of a portfolio of n assets as measured 
by the standard deviation, is defined as follows: 
=) 
where; 
n 
L 
j 
W. W. a- . . , and where n = 2; 
l. J l.J 
w~ ,,. . 2 + w~ er . 2 2 W r .. er + w. . l.J i a-. J l. l. J J l. J 
a" p = standard deviation of the portfolio's rate of 
return, 
tr I = 
l. 
the variance of returns of the ith asset (equiv-
alent to the standard deviation) , 
W; = the proportion of funds invested in the ith asset. 
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r .. = 1] the correlation between assets i and j 
By applying these formulae to a mix of investments, 
the individual is able to improve the risk/return relation-
ship of his portfolio. An example of a two share situation 
will serve t:o illustrate the ability of "Markowitz diversi-
f ication" to reduce risk and obtain the same return or 
improve the return while reducing the risk. See ~able 4-2. 
·Table 4-2 
Risk and Return of Hypothetical Shares A and B 
Assets Expected Return E (R) ·Risk, U- in , 
in percent percent 
Share A 20 7.56 
Share B 10 3.75 
Correlation between A and B -.5 
.Table 4-3 provides the format to analyse the return 
and risk profile as a result of varying the proportion or 
weight invested in each share. 
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Table 4-3 
Calculation of The Return and Risk of Different 
Portfolios of Shares A and B 
Production of Return on the Risk of the 
Investment in Portfolio (%) Portfolio 0-
Portfolio Share A Share B ~ p 
Pl 100% 0% 120.0 7.56 
P2 75 25 ;17.5 5.264 
--· 
P3 50 50 .;i.s .o: · 3.273!:> 
P4 25 75 'ii .. ~ 2.483 
. . ' . "' . ~ 
PS 0 100 lO_!p 3.75 
The return and risk of the portfolios in Table 4-3 are 
plotted in Figure 4-3. If the points representing each 
portfolio are joined, the line P4, P3, P2, A, and Pl is 
obtained. This is known as the "efficient frontier'.'. 
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Figure 4-3 
Graphical Representation of the Risk and Return of 
Hypothetical Portfolio of Shares A and B 
20 
19 
.18 
,., 
o::> 
Pl, 
i1---------------
16 
Return 15 ~ra=nt) 
14 
13 
1.2 
11 
10 
0 
t 
1 2 x J 4 6 7 8 
Risk (standard deviation) 
.It should be noted that the shares A and B are nega-
tively correlated as r = -.5. If they were perfectly 
"correlated the returns and risk would lie along the line 
P5 CP1 • Thus by employing negatively correlated shares the 
investor is able to reduce his risk/return situation. Any 
point in the area bounded by the area P1CP5P4P 3P 2 is 
superior in risk/return terms to any point along the line 
P1cP5 • Such points, which refer to portfolios are said 
to be "dominant". For example, Point A, which lies on the 
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"efficient frontier" is dominant to portfolio C since it 
yields the increased return OS-OT for the same risk Y. 
Similarly, H. is superior/dominant to c since it yields 
--· 
the same return T for reduced risk OY-OX. Thus an effic-
ient portfolio can be defined as a combination of assets 
which has: 
1. The maximum expected return in its risk class, or 
2. Provides minimum risk at its level of expected 
return. 
Thus, because of the less than perfect correlation 
between investments, portfolios can be constructed which 
yield more efficient combinations of risk and return than 
that provided by individual investments. There are 
obviously many different investment opportunities avail-
able to an investor and the combination of these invest-
ments will yield an efficient frontier in relation to 
the securities available. Figure 4-4 depicts such an 
efficient frontier. 
Figure 4-4 
The Efficient Frontier and Various Investment Opportunities 
Expected 
Return 
B 
A 
Risk (standard deviation) 
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4.4. The Capital Market Line 
In Figure 4-4 the line AB is the efficient frontier. 
Figure 4-5 represents the investment, borrowing and 
lending opportunities in equilibrium if investors were 
all diversified and had the same expectations. 
Return 
(%) 
Figure 4-5 
The Formation of the Capital Market Line 
5 
Capital Market 
(.. Line 
Risk (standard deviation) 
It can be shown that investors would borrow at rate 
Rand that M represents· the "market portfolio". The line 
extending from R, which represents the risk free asset 
(it will be noted that this asset has zero risk and is 
analogous to Government Bonds), and passing through· the 
market portfolio M, where it is tangent to the efficient 
frontier, is known as the "Capital Market Line". 
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The capital market line is defined as "a linear relation-
ship between expected return and total risk on which only 
portfolios will lie. 1112 A further important development 
from this analysis is concerned with the extent to which 
risk can be eliminated. As shown above, risk can be reduced 
by investment in a diversified portfolio. It has been 
shown however, that most of the benefits of diversification 
are obtained after only moderate diversification. "Naive" 
diversification implies that a portfolio of 100 shares is 
10 times more diversified than a portfolio of 10 shares. 
However, this is not true. As the number of shares included 
in the portfolio increases, the level of risk decreases 
toward (and eventually becomes asympotic to) the overall 
level of risk in the market. This overall level of risk 
is known as the "systematic" level of risk. Evans and 
Archer analysed the effect on risk of a naive diversifica-
tion ~trategy. 13 They analysed 470 shares listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange over the period 1958 td 1967. 
Sixty randomly selected _and differing size portfolios of 
shares were constructed. Thus 60 portfolios of 1 share, 
60 portfolios of 2 shares, 60 portfolios of 3 shares and 
so on, up till 60 portfolios of 60 shares, were constructed. 
The standard deviation of each of these portfolios was then 
calculated. Their findings show that randomly constructed 
portfolios of between 10 and 15 shares will reduce risk 
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to the "systematic'' level and that further diversification· 
has relatively little impact on risk. 
In a similar, but different study, in that portfolios 
were constructed on the basis of the Standard and Poor 
Stock Quality Ratings, Wagner and Lau also tested for the 
ff t f a . 'f. . . k 14 e ec o. ivers1~1cat1on on ris . As the number of 
issues included in the portfolio was increased, the 
study showed that approximately 40 percent of the risk 
(defined as standard deviation) , was eliminated. Table 
4-4 shows the results based on portfolio~ consisting of 
A+ quality shares. It will be noted that the standard 
deviation falls rapidly at first and then "flattens out". 
'l'able 4-4 
Standard Deviation and the Number of 
Issues,, for Portfolios of A+ Shares 
Number of 
Issues 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10 
15 
20 
Standard Deviation 
Monthly returns from 
June 1960-May 1965 
0.065 
0.047 
0.050 
0.045 
0.043 
0.040 
0.038 
0.038 
Standard Deviation 
Monthly returns from 
June 1960-May 1970 
0.070 
.050 
.048 
.046 
.046 
.042 
.040 
.039 
·source: Wagner, W. H., and Lau, S. C., "The Effect of Diversi-
fication on Risk", Financial Analysts Journal, November-
December 1971, page 49. 
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graph.ical representation of the data in Table 4-4 
and the relationship between the standard deviation and 
the number of shares in the portfolio for the remaining 
share quality groups is given in Figure 4-6. It should 
also be noted that Wagner and Lau randomly selected port-
folios of twenty shares from each of the quality groups, 
performed the necessary computations, and then repeated 
the exercise ten times to reduce dependance on single 
r;amples and then averaged the results. 
Figure 4-6 
The Relationship Between Standard Deviation and the Number 
Of Shares in a Portfolio for Various Share Qua1ity Ratingi 
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Wagner and Lau also measured the extent of the cor:cela-
tion between each portfolio with the market with an un-
weighted index of all New York Stock Exchange shares. 
Their findings are presented in Table 4-5. It will be 
noted that a portfolio consisting of twenty shares has a 
correlation coefficient of r = 0.89 and that the degree of 
correlation rises rapidly at first from r = 0. 511 to r = 0. 79 
as the portfolio increases from one to five shares but 
that to achiever= 0.89, an improvement of 13 percent, 
the number of shares in the portfolio increases from five 
to twenty - an increase of 300 percent. 
Table 4-5 
Number of Shares in Portfolio and Correlation with 
Market Index 
Number of 
Shares in 
Portfolio 
l· 
2 
3 
4 
5 
10 
15 
20 
Correlation 
with Market 
Index 
0.54 
0.63 
0.75 
0.77 
0.79 
0.85 
0.88 
0.89 
( r) Coefficient 
of determina-
ti on (r2) 
0.29 
0. 40 
0.56 
0.59 
0.62 
0.72 
0.77 
0.80 
Source: Calculated from, Wagner, N.W., and Lau, S.C., "The 
Effect of Diversification on Risk", Financial 
Analysts Journal, November-December 1971, page 53. 
\ 
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In discussing their findings Wagner and Lau state. 
"The correlation (between the portfolio 
and the market index) rises as the 
number of holdings increases ... Port-
folios of a small number of securities 
are very undiversified, whereas port-
folios of as few as fifteen to twenty 
have a strong relationship to the 
market index. A little diversification 
goes a long way. "15 
Their study provides strong empirical support for the 
effectiveness of portfolio theory. Wagner and Lau com-
tinue: 
"The most important concept demonstrated 
by this study is how diversification 
can be used to offset the individual 
riskiness of stocks held. As a result, 
portfolios of large numbers of higher 
risk securities may be less risky than 
portfolios consisting of small numbers 
of low risk stocks, yet earn a substan-
tially higher rate of return. 11 16 
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4..5 Systematic and Unsysj:ematic Risk 
The empirical studies discussed above show that,while 
a certain proportion of risk can be reduced or even 
eliminated through diversification, the remainder of the 
risk cannot be diversified away. That portion of risk 
that can be eliminated is known as "unsystematic risk" 
and is defined by Francis as "that portion of total risk 
h • h • • t f'· • d II 17 w.ic is unique o a irm or in ustry. He defines 
"systematic risk" as "that portion of total variability 
of return caused by factors which SIMULTANEOUSLY effect 
the prices of all mark~table securities 11 • 18 This propo-
sition is illustrated by Figure 4-7. 
Figure 4-7 
Graphical Illustration of Unsystematic and Systematic Risk 
Risk 
0 
Systematic or Non-Diversifiable 
Risk 
Number of Shares in Portfolio 
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Here "unsystematic" or "diversifia.ble" risk is shown 
to decline as the member of shares and hence diversifica-
tion increases. This decline eventually slows as the 
number of shares i.n the portfolio rises and becomes as-
ymptotic to that risk which is "non-diversifiable" or 
\"systematic" and is related to the risk of the market as 
a whole. 
The conclusions have important implications. As 
Wagner and Lau have observed: 
"Since unsystematic risk can be di-
versified away, no compensation is 
rewarded for bearing such risk. In 
other words, the return on the port-
folio relates only to that risk which 
cannot be diversified away, that is, 
the systematic risk. 11 19 
Malkiel puts it this way: 
"Now comes the key step in the argu-
ment. Both financial theorists and 
practitioners agree that investors 
should be compensated for taking on 
more risk by a higher expected return. 
Stock prices must therefore adjust to 
of fer higher returns where more risk 
is perceived, to ensure that all 
securities are held by someone. 
Obviously, risk-averse investors 
would not buy securities with extra 
risk without the expectation of extra 
reward. But not all of the risk of 
individual securities is-relevant in 
determining the premium for bearing 
risk. (emphasis added) The unsystem-
atic part of the total risk is easily 
eliminated by adequate diversifica-
tion. So there is no reason to 
think that investors will be compen-
sated with a risk premium for bearing 
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unsystematic risk. The _g_~_t of 
total risk that investors will get 
12aid for be<=!-r"lng is -systernatJ-c risl~, 
the risk that diversification cannot 
help. 11 20 (emphasis adde.d) 
This section has reviewed the theory of risk, return 
and portfolio diversification and has introduced the 
important concepts of systematic and unsystematic risk. 
It has been shown that investors are not rewarded for un-
sy~tematic risk and that this risk element can be eliminated 
by diversification. Investors are assumed to be diversified 
shareholders and thus their risk/return situation is de-
pendant primarily on systematic or market related risk. 
The impact of these propositions and their relevance to the 
present study should be clear. Managers are expected to 
maximize the wealth of their shareholders and do so by 
maximizing share price values. These share prices are in 
turn determined by the perceived risk' profile of the firm. 
Managers should thus only be concerned with attempting to 
reduce the "systematic risk" of their firms since "un-
systematic risk" can be diversified away by rational, 
risk averse investors. The following section of this 
chapter is concerned with the theory and development of 
what has become known as the "Capital Asset Pricing Model". 
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4 .. 6 The Theory of C~_pi !:al Markets 
This theory is based on the theory of portfolio 
analysis discussed above. Portfolio theory is concerned 
with the construction of efficient portfolios of risky in-
vestments. This requires an estimate of the expected 
return of each asset, the variance or standard deviation 
of the asset, and its covariance with other alternative 
investment opportunities. With 1000 investment opportuni-
ties it would require 501,500 statistics made up of 1000 
returns, 1000 standard deviations and 499,500 covariances. 
Thus, due to the computational volumes required, the 
Markowitz portfolio model was not considered of much 
practical va.lue. Sharpe however, provided a simplification 
which made the Markowitz model a practical possibility. 21 
Sharpe noted that since all investments or shares displayed 
high correlation with the market as a whole, it would be 
possible to measure each shares correlation with the 
market as a whole rather than to calculate the correlations 
of each share with each other individual share. 'l1his re-
duced the number of calculations from, n(n + 3)/2 under 
the Markowitz model to, 3n + 2. To illustrate the extent 
of the reduction in calculations, consider 1000 invest-
ment alternatives. 'Under the Markowitz portfolio model 
this would require 501,500 calculations but is reduced to 
3002 using Sharpe's "market" model. 
264 
Sharpe suggests that it is thus possible to consider 
the return for each security as follows~ 
R: = a
1
. + b. r + e. 
1 1 m 1 
where R. = return on the ith security, 
l. 
a. and b. =:least squares coefficients, 
l. 1. 
r 
m 
. e. 
1 
= return on the market index or portfolio, 
= a random independant error term with expected 
value of zero and constant finite variance. 
Thus Sharpe's model maintains that the return on any 
share depends on a constant (a or alpha) , some coefficient 
(b or beta) multiplied by the value of the market portfolio 
as measured say by a market index, plus a random measure-
ment error where positive and negative errors are expected 
to cancel to provide an expected value of zero. 
This equation is known as the 'market model" and can 
be illustrated by a straight line fitted to share returns 
against the returns on the market index. See Figure 4-8. 
Share 
Return 
R 
alpha 
• 
Figure 4-8 
The Market Model 
... 
Slope 
-Market Return 
• 
I 
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It is now possible to derive the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) which states that the expected return on 
any investment or portfolio is related to· the risk-free 
rate and the return on the market. Thus: 
E(R.) =RF+ B .. [E(R) - RF] 
1 1 · m · 
Where E(R.) =expected return on share, 
1 
= the risk-free rate of return, 
- the beta of the ith share which is the 
measure of that share's sensitivity to 
market movements, 
E(R ) = the return on the market. 
m 
The CAPM is illustrated graphically in Figure 4-9. 
Figure 4-9 
Graphical Illustration of the Capital F.sset Pricing Model 
Return 
Rm---------------
Rf ~ Risk-free rate 
1.0 
Risk (beta) 
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Thus the B (beta) term can be thought of as the slope 
of repression line of share returns on market returns. 
This value is a measure of the movement of the share pricE~ 
in response to a market movement. For example 1 i.f a 
share has a B = 1.5, this means that a 10 percent rise in 
the market would be accompanied by a l. 5 (10) = 15 percent 
increase in the share price. 
Obviously, the beta for the market is 1.0. The alpha 
term is in the words of Modigliani and Pogue, "equal to 
the average value over time of the unsystematic returns 
of the stock. For most stocks, the alpha factor tends to 
22 be small and unstable." 
Modigliani and Pogue continue: 
"Using the definition of security returns 
given by the market model, the specifica-
tion of systematic and unsystematic 
risk is straightforward - they are 
simply the standard deviations of the 
two return components. 'rhe systematic 
risk of a security is equal to B times 
the standard deviation of market return: 
Systematic Risk = B 1J (where c> = 
m m 
standard deviation of the market) 
The unsystematic risk equals the standard 
deviation of the residual return factor 
e: 
Unsystematic Risk=~ 
e 
The Portfolio beta factor in turn can be 
shown to be simply an average of the 
individual security betas, weighted by 
the proportion of each security in the 
portfolio. 112 3 
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It will be noted that the CAPM illustrated in Figure 4-9 
differs from the Capital Market Line illustrated in Figure 
4-5 in that risk is measured as beta rather than standard 
deviation. This is not a matter of concern for, as Lorie 
and Hamilton have noted: 
"(In the CAPM) risk is measured by beta 
rather than standard deviation. For 
efficient portfoliosr the two relation-
ships are equivalent. By definition, the 
riskiness of efficient portfolios is de-
termined exclusively by mark.et movements 
and their returns are l.inearly related to 
both the standard deviation and beta. 11 24 
The application of the model can be illustrated by 
assuming that the risk-free rate is say 8 percent and the 
expected market return is6~bercent. The model thus implies 
that by holding the market portfolio instead of the risk-
free asset (such as Government Bonds), the investor will 
receive a risk premium of 6 percent (that is, 14 - 8 = 6). 
On the other hand, should the investor decide to hold a 
risky asset, defined as a share with a high beta of say 
1.5, he would expect a return as follows: 
Expected return (high risk) = .RF + B. (R J. m - R ) F 
= .08 - 1.5(.14 -.08) 
= .08 + 1.5(.06) 
- .08 + .09 
= .17 
-- 17 percent 
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A low risk asset, with a beta of .5 would return: 
Expected Return (low risk) = .08 + .5(.14 - .08) 
= .08 + .5(.06) 
= .08 + .03 
= .11 
= 11 percent 
The model thus confirms expectations. An investor 
holding a completely diversified portfolio such as the 
market can expect to obtain a return equal to the return 
of the total market - that is, the· average return of 14 
percent. High risk assets are rewarded with higher re-
turns and low risk assets with lower returns of 17 percent 
and 11 percent respectively. 
To quote Lori~ and Hamilton: 
"The Sharpe model presents a simple 
and intuitive appealing picture of 
financial markets. All investors 
hold efficient portfolios and all 
such portfolios move in perfect 
lockstep with the market. Portfolios 
differ only in their sensitivity to 
the market. Prices of all risky assets 
adjust so that their returns are ap-
propriate, in terms of the model, to 
their riskiness. This riskiness is 
measured by a simple statistic, beta, 
which indicates the sensitivity of 
the asset to market movements. 11 25 
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4. 7 The Assumptions Underlying CAPM 'I'heory 
Both portfblio theory and capital asset pricing theory 
have a number of underlying assumptions. These are listed 
below. 26 
4.7.1 The rate of return from an investment adequately 
summarizes the outcome from the investment, and in-
vestors see the various possible rates of return 
in a probabilistic fashion. (That is, they visual-
ize a probability distribution of rates of return 
either consciously or subsconsciously). 
4.7.2 Investor's ri~k estimates are proportional to the 
variability of return, (namely, the standard devia-
tion or variance) they perceive for a security or 
portfolio. 
4.7.3. Investors are willing to base their decisions on 
only two parameters of the probability distribution 
of returns, the expected return and the variance 
(or its square root, the standard deviation) of 
returns. 
4.7.4 For any risk class, investors prefer a higher rate 
of return to a lower one. Conversely, among all 
securities with the same rate of return, investors 
prefer less rather than more risk. 
The above four assumptions are necessary for investors 
who will prefer efficient pdrtfolios. The following eight 
27 
assumptions are necessary to develop Capital Market Theory. 
\ 
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4.7.5 All investors are efficient diversifiers who seek 
to attain the efficient frontier. 
4.7.6 Any amount of money can be borrowed or lent at the 
risk-free rate of .interest R. No other borrowing 
is permitted. 
4.7.7 Idealized uncertainty prevails; that is, all in-
vestors visu~lize ident,ical probability distribution 
for future rates of return. They have homogeneous 
expectations • 
. · .4. 7. 8 ... All investors have the same "one-period" time horizon. 
4.7.9 All investments are infinitely divisible. 
4.7.10 No taxes and transaction costs for buying and selling 
securities exist. 
4.7.11 No inflation and no change in the level of interest 
rates exist (or all changes are fully anticipated} • 
4.7.12 Capital markets are in equilibrium. 
Many individuals object to the development of models 
, 
and theories which lean so heavily on unrealistic assump-
tions. As Francis has observed: 
"Some people object to models which 
social scientists' ... build because the 
models are based on simplifying assump-
tions. However, the people should not 
object. Social scientists have as 
much right to seek basic economic 
truth by assuming away realistic 
details like taxes and uncertainty 
as physical scientists have to conduct 
their gravity experiments in sealed 
vacuum chambers where winds ~o not 
blow and birds do not fly." 2 
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Francis continues: 
"Readers wno are unaccustomed to 
economic analysis are probably con-
fused and discouraged by a theory 
which is based on a list of unreal-
istic assumptions, but they should 
not be. The assumptions provide a 
concrete foundation upon which a 
theory can be derived by applying 
the forces of logic, intuition and 
mathematics. Without these assump-
tions, the analysis would degenerate 
into a polemic discussion of which 
historical facts, folklore, and in-
stitutions are significant, which 
are insignificant, what their rela-
tionships are, and what conclusions 
might be reached by a "reasonable 
person~. Such discussions are usually 
not productive. Traditionally, 
economists have based their analyses 
on as. few and as simple assumptions 
as possible. Then a theory is 
derived with conclusions and implica-
tions which are incontestable, given 
the assumptions. Later the assump-
tions are relaxed to determine what 
can be expected in more realistic 
circumstances. In the final analysis, 
the test of a theory is now how real-
istic it's assumptions are not; rather, 
it is the predictive power of the rrodel 
which should be judged. 11 29 
The fact that the value of a model or theory lies in 
its predictive and explanatory power and should not be 
judged by the assumptions on which it is based was 
expressed by Milton Friedman as follows: 
~ ... the relevant question to ask about 
the "assumptions" of a theory is not 
whether they are descriptively "realis-
tic", for they never are, but whether 
they are sufficiently good approxima-
tions for the purpose in hand. And this 
question can be answered only by seeing 
whether the theory works, which means 
.whether it yields sufficiently accurate 
predictions. 11 30 
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As the study will use the CAPM as the basis for measur-
ing the risk of various strategies of diversification, it 
is necessary to examine the models assumptions in some 
detail and a review of these tests follows below. 
'-
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4.8 Tests of the Underlying Assumptions of the CAPM 
The following section provides a brief overview of 
the literature which seeks to examine the efficacy of the 
CAPM as a measure of risk and return. According to 
Modiglaini and Pogue: 
"If th~ CAPM is right, empirical 
tests will show the follow: 
1. On the average, and over long 
periods of time, the securities 
with high systematic risk should 
have high rates of return. 
2. On the average, there should be 
a linear rela.tionship between 
systematic risk and return. 
3. The slope of the relationship 
should be equal to the mean 
market risk premium during the 
period used. 
4. The constant term should be 
equal to the mean risk-free rate. 
5. Unsystematic risk, •.. should play 
no significant role in explain- 31 ing differences in security returns." -
4.8.1 Empirical Tests of the Relationship Between Systematic 
Risk and Return 
4.8.1.1 Individual Shares 
The earliest study which examined this relationship 
was that of Jacob which studied 593 shares over the period 
1946 to 1965. 32 Jacob finds that there is a relationship 
between risk and return but that this relationship is 
weaker than that predicted by the CAPM. She states: 
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" .•. the actual regression lines (for 
both securities and portfolios) tend 
to have positive intercepts and corres-
pondingly smaller slopes. These results 
imply that securities and portfolios 
generally considered naggressive" tend 
to yield average returns less than 
the theory would indicate, while those 
that are "defensive" tend to yield 
returns greater_ than those indicated 
by the.theory. 1133 
For example, Jacob expected the "aggressive" or high 
' 
beta shares with beta values greater than 1.0 to provide 
a return of 10.8 percent for each unit increase in beta 
while the actual results showed that the return was only 
6.7 percent. 
Miller and Scholes analysed 631 shares over the period 
1954 - 1963 and their findings are contrary to those 
34 predictions by the CAPM. Miller and Scholes were re-
35 plicating Lintner's study in which he examined the rela-
tionship between a share's residual variance and its re-
gression with the market. Lintner found 'i:hat these residual 
variances, or unsystematic risk, were significantly cor-
related with returns. Thus both Lintner and Miller and 
Scholes have produced evidence which is contrary to that 
predicted by the CAPM since unsystematic risk is assumed 
to be eliminated through diversification and thus should 
have no effect. Miller and Scholes then examined their 
research to establish whether any biases, such as non-
1inearity and heterodasticity existed. They were unable 
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to identify any significant bias. They concluded however, 
that skewness, combined with measurement errors could 
explain the results and the CAPM could still provide a 
US'.eful model. In their review of the Miller and Scholes 
study, Modigliani. and Pogue conclude that: 
. "In any case, the results do show that 
stocks with high systematic risk tend 
to have high rates of return."36 
The findings regarding individual shares are thus not 
satisfactory and the evidence appears somewhat contradictory 
but may be due to measurement and statistical problems. 
The findings on the relationship between risk and return in 
portfolios of shares is however, much more· encouraging. 
4.8.1.2 Portfolios 
The earliest and often quoted study is that by Sharpe 
himself~ 37 In order to test the theory Shaq:e analysed the 
returns on 34 open-end mutual funds during the period 
1954 to 1963. The results were as predicted by the theory 
and higher risk portfolios obtained higher returns. The 
analysis revealed that the riskless rate of return obtained 
b:y _investors was approximately 3.8 percent and each 1 · 
percent increase in risk was associated with a 0.58 per-
cent increase in annual return. In testing for linearity 
Sharpe found evidence of non-linearity in that a quad-
·ratic regression equation resulted in a slightly higher 
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correlation coefficient of 0.852 in comparison to the 0.836 
value produced by the linear equation. SharrEconcludes: 
" ... the data do lend considerable 
support to the theory tested. 
Mutual fund portfolios that show 
substantial variability in annual 
return provide larger returns on 
the average tha~ do those with less 
variable returns, as predicted by 
the risk-aversion hypothesis. And 
though the relationship between 
average yield and standard deviation 
does not appear to be perfectly lin-
ear, the differences are slight and 
in the expected direction. Finally 
the portfolios exhibit the high 
correlations with the overall market 
as predicted by the theory. 11 38 
Jensen performed the second study~ 39 His sample con-
sisted of 115 open-end mutual funds and the results in-
dicated an average beta of 0.84 and a coefficient of 
d . . f 2 0 865 eterm1nat1on o r = • • He concluded that the 
results.indicated the validity of the CAPM model. 
In order to avoid measurement errors, Black, Jensen 
and Scholes grouped all.New York Stock Exchange shares 
into portfolios of 10 shares for each year of the.period 
1931 to 1965. 40 Black, Jensen and Scholes found that over 
the 35 year period, average ·returns increased by 0.01081 
percent per month for each unit increase in beta. The 
increase, according to CAPM theory should have been 0.0142 
percent per month. Figure 4-10 shows the findings for the 
.period 1931 to 1935 and confirms the linearity of the 
results. 
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,., Figure 4-10 
Results of Bl<:~k, Jensen a.nd Scholes Studv, 1931-1965 
Average 
Monthly 
Returns 
.11 
.10 
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I .04 
.00 
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STD. ERR. = 0.00053 
SLOPE = 0.01081 
STD. ERR. = 0.00050 
- -.02---~--~--~-__. 
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Systematic Risk (beta) I -
* Source~ Black, Fischer, Jensen, Michael C 
Studies in the Theory of Carital Markets 
In discussing these results Modligiani and Pogue con-
elude as follows: 
"This paper provides substantial 
support for the hypothesis that 
realized returns are a linear 
function of systematic risk value. 
Moreover, it shows that the rela-
tionship is significantly p~Iitive 
over long periods of time." 
The Blac~ Jensen and Scholes study did however, reveal 
that the theory was not as "reliable'_' over the short term. 
* Black, Fischer; Jensen, M.ichael C, r and Scholes, Myron S., 
"The Capital Asset Pricing Model : Some Ernpir:ical Tests 11 , 
in .Jensen, Michael c. (Editor) Studies in the ~heor~ 
Capital~arkets, op.cit. Pages 79-121 
* See Ref. 40 Page 292 
... ~- ··- -~·· .... -···~--~------'·~----·------'""·---~------·----~ 
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The Black, Jensen and Scholes study thus finds the 
relationship between risk and return to be very linear, but 
· the intercept term was found to be significantly non-zero 
and thus above the risk-free rate. 
Friend and Blume, in their test of the relationship 
between risk and return, constructed portfolios of New 
York Stock Exchange shares at the beginning of three dif-
. 42 ferent periods of time - 1929, 1948 and 1956. Shares 
were assigned to portfolios on the basis of their beta 
values. Shares with the lot'1est 10 percent of beta values 
were assigned to the first portfolio. Thus ten portfolios 
based on decile values of betas were constructed. The 
portfolios were reconstructed each year to keep the port-
folio beta stable over time. The results of this study 
are given in Table 4-6 below. 
Table 4-6 
Relationship Between Risk and Return over Various 
Periods: Friend and Blume Study 
1929-1969 1948-1969 1956-1969 
Portfolio Beta M=an Beta Mean Beta Mean 
Return % Retmn % Return % 
1 0.19 0.79 0.45 0.99 0.28 0.95 
2 0.49 1.00 0.64 1.01 0.51 0.98 
3 0.67 1.10 0.76 1.25 0.66 1.12 
·4 0.81 1.28 0.85 1.30 0.80 1.18 
5 0.92 1.26 0.94 1.35 0.91 1.17 
6 1.02 1.34 1.03 1.37 1.03 1.14 
7 1.15 '1.42 1.12 1.32 1.16 1.10 
8 1.29 1.53 1.23 1.33 1.30 1.18 
9 1.49 1.55 1.36 l:. 39 1.40 1.15 
10 2.02 1.59 1.67 1.36 1.92 1.10 
Source: Friend, Irwin and Blume, Marshall E., "Risk and Long Run Rate 
of Return on i\lYSE Stocks", Working Paper No. 18-72, Wharton 
School of Corrmerce and Finance, Rodney L. White Center for 
Financial Research. 
279 
Their results indicate a strong relationship for the 
1929 - 1969 period but a weaker relationship over the 1956-
1969 period. Although the results do ind'icate that higher 
risk is associated with higher returns, the relationship 
tends to flatten out for.portfolios with above average 
I betas. 
In a second study Blume and Friend obtained mixed 
43 
results. The slope of the fitted regression line was 
found to be less than predicted theoretically during the 
periods 1955-1959 and 1960-1964, and greater during the 
period 1965-1968. Blume and Friend conclude that the evi-
dence in the study indicates that theCAPM may not be a 
useful explanatory model.of returns on all financial assets 
yet: 
"The fact that the relationship of 
average relaized returns for NYSE 
listed common stocks to their corres-
ponding betas appears very close to 
linear in each case of the three 
periods analysed suggests that the 
capital asset pricing model •.. may 
be useful in explaining returns on 
well-seasoned common stocks. 11 44 
In respect to their findings of the applicability of 
the linear model, Blume and Friend state: 
"However, the comparisons as a whole 
suggests that a linear model is a 
tenable approximation of the empiri-
cal relationship between return and 
risk for NYSE stocks over the three 
periods covered. 11 45 
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Makiel also provides evidence of the relationship 
. 46 between risk and return for portfolios .. 
In discussion of his findings Makiel states: 
The results show a remarkable con-
sistency with the theory. Returns 
are related to beta in a straight-line 
manner just as the theory predicts. 
Over the long pull, hihg-beta port-
folios have provided larger total re-
turns than low-risk ones. (Also when 
examining boom and recession periods} 
the relationship is exactly as pre-
dicted by the theory. In 'up' years, 
high-beta portfolios well outdistanced 
the low-beta ones .•. In 'down' years, 
however, the high-beta portfolio did 
considerably wi~se than the low vol-
atility onesn. . 
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4.9 Beta Stationarity 
While the empirical research indicates that the CAPM 
is robust in that the assumptions can be. relaxed without 
impairing the usefulness of the model, a further issue must 
be resolved before the model can be applied to the analysis 
of corporate strategy. Strategy, by definition, is con-
cerned with the long term relationship between the firm 
and its environment and hence the long run relationship 
between risk and return. The stationarity of betas, or 
their predictability over time, must therefore be resolv~d 
if any meaningful relationship between the long term 
strategy adopted by the firm and its risk/return profile 
is to be established. Fortunately, a nmnber of important 
studies have been completed and will be reviewed in this 
section. The studies can once again be divided into those 
concerned with individual share stability and those con-
cerned with the stability of portfolios. 
4.9.1 The Stationarity of Individual Shares 
Sharpe and Cooper investiga.ted individual share 
stability in their study of the risk and return relation-
ship for all the share on the New York Stock Exchange over 
the period 1931-1967. 48 A beta was calculated for each 
year and each year the shares were divided into ten risk 
.classes based on the beta values. Investment strategy 
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Number 10 was regarded as the highest risk strategy as it 
consisted of the highest beta value shares. The mean beta 
values for the 10 classes ranged from 0.5'8 to 1.42.· Each 
of the ten classes were monitored.over the period of 37 
years. F~part from showing additional strong support for 
the risk-return relationship discussed above, strong evi-
\dence on beta stability was provided. Table 4-7 summ·-
arizes the findings in this regard. 
Table 4-7 
Individual Share Stability: Sharpe and Cooper Research 
Risk Perce..ntage in Sarne Risk- Proportion Within One Ri.sk-
Class Return Class Retlm1 Class 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
~~,,,.......~~~-~~--~~-=-~-~---~·~~-~~-· In Yr. t+l In Yr. t+S In Yr. t+l In Yr. t+5 
.7417 
.4989 
.4091 
.3564 
.3452 
.3535 
.3807 
.4268 
.5091 
.7491 
.3517 
.1835 
.1638 
.1327 
.1389 
.1361 
.1320 
.1588 
.2145 
.4047 
.9129 
• 8800 
.8807 
.7836 
.7758 
.7799 
.8018 
.8418 
.9023 
.9340 
.6927 
.5373 
.4534 
.4092 
.3927 
~4170 
A022 
.4458 
.6089 
.6230 
Source:· Sharpe, William F., and Cooper, Guy M., "Risk-
Return Classes of New York Stock Exchange Stocks", 
Financial Analysts Journal, March-April 1972, 
Table III, page 53. 
~- ............ -· ···- -··--- -~·· H - -- -·--'~ ~ - 0 ..... - .... ._ • 0 
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Figure 4-11 is a graphical illustration of the movement 
of individual share· betas from one 11 r:i.sk class" to another 
over the course of a single year. 
Figure 4-11 
Illistration of the Distribution of Beta Mobility over One 
Year, Risk-Return Class 5: Sharpe .and Cooper Research 
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Source: Sharpe, William ~.,. , and Cooper, Guy M. , "Risk-
Return Classes of New York Stock Exchange Stocks", 
Financial. Analvsts Journal, March·-April 1972, 
Table I, page 53. 
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In the words of Sharpe and Cooper, " ... there is sub-
stantial stability over time, even at the level of in-
d . . . . ..49 1v1dual securities. -
J_Jevy has also examined the short-run stationarity of 
betas by developing betas for 500 New York Stock Exchange 
shares over the period 30th December, 1960 to 18th 
50 December, 1970. The period was divided into ten non-
overlapping periods and each period~,52 week week beta 
was then correlated with the beta of the subsequent 52 
week beta, for each individual share. In order to facili-
tate comparison with Blume' s study~ 1 twhich will be discussed 
below) , both product-moment correlation coefficient and 
rank order correlation coefficients were calculated. The 
rank-order coefficient has the advantage of eliminating the 
effect of extreme outlying observations which can affect 
product-moment calculations. His findings show that 
indi vi.dual share betas very considerably and in Levy's 
words, beta is 11 unpredictable for individual securities. 1152 
5.9.2 The Stationarity of Portfolios of Shares 
The earliest study of portfolio beta was that of Blume. 53 
In an analysis of 251 shares on the New York Stock Exchange 
over the four consecutive eight-year periods between 1927 
and 1960. Five portfolios based on the beta values of the 
shares were constructed with the fifty highest beta shares 
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in portfolxo one, the next fifty highest into portfolio 
two - and so on. The results of selecting such-portfolios 
on the line basis of individual share betas at the end of 
each period are given in Table 4-8. 
Table 4-8 
Portfolio Beta Stability - Blume, 1968 
Portfolios Selected on the Basis of Betas at End of: 
Portfolio Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Average Beta at Average Beta at Average Beta at,the 
End of the Period End of the Period End of the Pericx:l 
1 2 I 2 3 3 4 
1 .1.47 1.46 1.65 1.42 1.51 1.42 
2 1.14 1.14 1.19 l.15 0.15 1.13 
3 0.90' 0.97 0.92 1.02 1.02 1.05 
4 0.69 0.77 0.68 0.76 0.76 0.87 
5 0.43 0.50 0.39 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Source: Blume, .Marshall E., "The Assessment of Portfolio Perfonnance -
An Application of Portfolio Theory," Unpublished Ph.D. . 
Dissertation, university of Chic.ago, Chicago, 1968., quoted 
by Roux, F.J.P., "A Note on Measuring Risk", Unpublished Paper 
Graduate School of Business Administratim, University of 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1977, page 11. 
In a second study, Blume analysed the stability of beta 
. f l' f . . 54 in port o ios o varying size. The analysis was con-
ducted using portfolios corisisting of 1, 2, 4, 7, 10, 20, 
' 
35, 50, 75 and 100 shares. His findings of the average 
correlation coefficients between the five periods for both 
products-moment and rank order analyses are given in Table 
4-9. 
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Ta.ble 4-9 
Product-Moment and Rank Order Correlation Coefficients for 
PortfOlios of v~]Ylngs)-zeSfO-~ F~-Acf]acent =sever~ Y~~r­
Periods ~ Blume, 1971 
1 
2 
4 
7 
10 
20 
35 
50 
0.618 
0.736 
0.828 
0.880 
0.914 
0.954 
0.966 
0.982 
0.672 
0.774 
0.824 
0.906 
I 0.938 
0.978 
0.986 
0.984 
----~---------------'-------------
Source: Blume, Marshall E., "On The Assessment of Risk", 
.. Journal of Finance_, Volume 26, March 1971, 'l'able 
2, page 7. 
Blume has commented on these results as follows: 
"The values of these correlation co-· 
efficients is striking. For the 
assessments based upon the data from 
July, 1926 through June, 1933, and 
evaluated using data from July, 1933 · 
through J·une, 1940, the product-moment 
c6rrelations varied from 0.63 for 
single securities to 0.98 for port-
folios of 50 securities. The high 
value of the latter coefficient in-
dicates that substantially all of the 
variation in the risk among portfolios 
of 50 securities can be explained by 
assessments based upon previous 
data ...• These results, which are 
typical of the other periods, suggest 
that at least as measured by the 
correlation coefficients, naively 
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extrapolated assessments of future 
risk for larger portfolios are re-
markably accurate, whereas extrapo-
lated assessments of future risk for 
individual securities and smaller 
portfolios are of some, but limite4 
value in forecasting the future."55 
Levy, in his study discussed earlier, also constructed 
portfolios based on ranked historical beta values and both 
product-moment and rank order correlation coefficients 
were calculated. Levy's mean correlation coefficients for 
/ 
both techniques are given in Table 4-10. 
Table 4-10 
Product-Moment and Rank Order Correlation Coefficients for 
---pQrffoT:los of varying Sizes over 9 Adjacent one Year 
Periods - Levy 
Number of Shares Average Product-~'lcment Average Rank Order 
per Portfolio Correlation Coefficient Correlat.ion Coefficient 
1 0.486 0.466 
5 0.769 0.747 
10 0.853 0.849 
25 0.939 0.935 
50 0.972 0.980 
So'l,lrce: Levy, Robert A., "On The Short-Term Stationarity of 
Beta Coefficients," Financial Analysts Journal, 
November-December 1971, Table 2, page 57. 
Thus, despite measurement problems associated with the 
calculation of beta for individual shares, betas are re-
. markably stable and ar~ acceptable as projections of future 
risks, when securities are grouped into portfolios. 
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4.10 Summary 
The empirical research does suggest that the CAPM does 
provide a reasonably good risk surrogate.· Return has been 
shown to be positively and linearly related to risk. The 
research findings suggest that the distinction between 
systematic risk, unsystematic risk and returns is not 
1clear since both risk components appear to be related to 
I 
return whereas the CAPM predicts ~hat only systematic risk 
should be so related. This effect may however, be the 
result of measurement error and statistical problems. Beta 
values have also been shown to exhibit reasonable station-
arity for individual shares and remarkable stability for 
portfolios. 
Although the CAPM is less reliable on virtually every 
criterion, for individual shares, it has been shown to be 
a more accurate representation for portfolios of securities. 
According to Sharpe: 
"A number of rather inaccurate estimates 
for securities may combine to form an 
exceptionally accurate estimate for a 
portfolio, thanks to the law of large 
numbers. The estimate for one security. 
may be too high, and another too low, 
with the result that the average is 
1 just right' . To borrow the statistic.--
ian' s jargon: if predictions about 
securities are subject to error but 
unbiased (and the errors are uncorrel-
ated) , predictions about fairly well 
diversified portfolios may be quite 
accurate. 11 57 
289 
Jensen, conunenting on research which has sought to test 
the CAPM when the apparently highly restricting and un·-
realistic underlying assumptions if the model have been 
relaxed, maintains: 
11
.0.As we have seen, most of the assump-· 
tions of the model have been shown to 
be cap~ble of relaxation without destroy-cg 
ing the essential nature of the results."::> 
Francis, in a review of the effects of relaxing the 
assumptions underlying CAPM theory, concludes as follows: 
"In each case the implications of the 
model were slightly obscured. If all 
were relaxed simultaneously, the 
result would be even less determinant. 
However, the fact that the analysis is 
not exactly determinate under realistic 
assumptions does not mean it has no 
value. The analysis still rationalizes 
much observed behaviour, explain such 
hitherto unexplained practices as di-
versification, and offers realistic 
suggestions about the directions 
prices and returns should follow when 
they deviate significantly from equil-
ibrium. The theory is a powerful engine 
for analysis."59 
There is strong evidence to suggest that CAPM theory is 
a valid measure of risk and that the approach that will be 
adopted in this study is methodologically sound. The "betan 
will be calculated for firms which will then be grouped J.nto 
portfolios according to their strategy of diversification. 
The following chapter will discuss the methodology in depth 
before proceeding to the analysis and evaluation of the 
findings. 
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5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
5.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters have outlined the basic theoretical 
/ groundwork that forms the basis upon which this research is 
based. Strategy has been shown to be the outgrowth of an 
amalgam of forces - some conscious and based on careful 
analysis which seek to ensure that explicitly generated and 
stated objectives are~met. Oth~r forces which shape s~rategy 
are those which arise from "iv"ithin the firm and are based on 
shifting coalitions. These latter forces are likely to be 
more powerful in diversified firms since the corporate head 
office, by design in many cases, does not understand the 
many different industries in which its divisions operate and 
thus allocation of scarce capital resources for expansion 
are likely to be based on divisional perspective rather than 
corporate perspective. The strong divisions, both in a 
political and economic sense, are likely to obtain the major 
share of the resources. The fact that these divisions obtain 
the resources enables them to become even stronger and 
visible in the firm and so the cycle is repeated. 
Firms are also seen to evolve through different 'stages 
of development" and adopt unique strategies. Certain firms 
·grow largely by internal development while others focus on 
. 
• external or acquisitive means to achieve their objectives. 
In addition, firms appear to adopt a particular philosophy 
of diversification. Research has shown that firms adopt one 
of four major approaches to their diversification. On one 
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extreme, the firms adopt a strategy of completely unrelated 
diversification and will enter almost any industry. Others 
remain reasonably close to their "traditional" industry or 
"core skills" and are described as "related" diversifiers. 
"Dominant" product firms appear to maintain very close ties 
with their industry and "core skills" since their diversifi-
cation attempts are relatively modest when compared to their 
major product-market area. "Single" product firms occupy 
the opposite and of the continuum from that of the "unrelated" 
group in that they have not diversified to any meaningful 
extent. 
The theory of diversification fr~m a financial point 
of view has also been reviewed in an attempt to assess the 
possible benefits accruing to a diversification strategy. 
Since many "unrelated'' firms are regarded by financial 
analysts as investment holding companies, it is appropriate 
to attempt to explain the persistent trend toward corporate 
diversification by relating it to the well developed theory 
of security diversification. The financial theorists have 
shown that it is possible to obtain substantial improvements 
in a risk/return sense by adopting a diversified or un-
related portfolio of shares. 
Tl}ii:;~_£_l:!_~pter wil!__~Pr<?yide a_~--9~~~~:i:-view of the research 
QQjt=~iiY~- _C3:ng_Jn~-~ZiC>ciol~gy _~b-.~c_h __ see~_!:_<;>_ ~-~a~~E-~--- these _i_ssues 
in a ~~eveloping_e~9_n9~Y· In addition, the research procedures 
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and the development of the research hypotheses are presented. 
5.2 Overview of Research Objectives 
5 .• 2.1. The Research Questions 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the research efforts 
that have focused on the amount of diversification measured 
on a product count basis in order to determine whether 
diversification makes a significant difference to performance, 
have been singularly unsuccessful. Yet studies conducted 
in a number of different and highly developed countries, 
namely the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy and 
the United States have shown that there is a steady trend 
toward increased diversification. The main research objective 
should be clear - "Why do firms continue to diversify when 
it would appear that there are no advantages in performance 
as measured by published financial data?" Flowing from 
this question a further set of questions arise: 
- If the product count method of measuring diversifi-
cation does not reveal any meaningful in the face 
of a continuing trend toward diversity of opera-
tions, is the method of measuring diversification 
a meaningful one? 
- What effect does a particular product-market 
strategy have on risk? 
- Are larger firms less "risky" than smaller firms? 
All these research questions are posed within the frame-
work of a less-developed economy. The mature economies 
such as the United States and the major European countries 
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. ' .. · 
,, 
provide a corporate environ.~ent substantially different from 
that experienced in the developing countries - yet very little 
research appears to have been performed in the context of a 
less mature economy despite the fact that most of the nations 
of the world are classified as developing or less developed. 
Such a study is believed to be of considerable importance since 
it will assist in the development of a framework within which 
firms will be better able to assess their development and growth 
alternatives and ensure efficient resource allocation to those 
firms that are effective at value creation. 
5.2.2. General Research Problems and Limitations 
This research has been carried out in South Africa and 
covers the seven year period 1970 - 1976. The following con-
ditions in this particular environment have contributed to 
complicate the research: 
5.2.2.1. Unpublished and unavailable data. 
5.2.2.2. Inflation. 
5.2.2.3. Recessionary economic conditions after the oil 
crisis of October-November, J973. 
Each of these difficulties is discussed briefly below: 
5.2.2.1. Unpublished and Unavailable Data 
The research appears to suffer-from this problem. How-
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ever, in the South African business research field this 
is a particularly serious limitation. The disclosure require-
ments of South African firms are completely inadequate. For 
example, many firms do not publish sales figures. Furthermore, 
the increase of leasing in the South African economy is well 
known and although lease payments are disclosed, the actual 
lease periods are not required to be disclosed. Thus in 
order to calculate the total assets employed in a firm by 
capitalizing l~ases is impossible since the analyst has no 
information as to the breakdown of the annual lease payment 
into, say, three year, five year or ten year leases. 
Wherever data was unavailable, such firms were still 
included in the population and the specific variable was 
entered as missing data. 
5.2.2.2. Inflationary Conditions 
South Africa has experienced high rates of inflation 
during the 1970 decade and has had a different effect on 
the various industries in the country. As a result of 
problems in adjusting for the. impact of inflation on differ-
ent industries, it was decided not to attempt such an adjust-
ment for the following reasons: 
5.2.2.2.1. No single economist or economic study consulted 
agreed on what effect an overall rate of inf la-
tion of, say, 8 per cent per annum in a particular 
I 
I 
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year would have on the twenty-one sectors of 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
5.2.2.2.2. This study revealed that some 67 per cent of 
the firms in the population were not single 
product firms and were vertically integrated 
and/or diversified to some extent. The problems 
of inflation-adjusting for multi-industry firms 
were considerable and introduced an immediate 
bias into the research. 
5.2.2.2.3. The earlier studies in the field of corporate 
performance in the developed economies did not 
adjust for inflation. Thus, in order to facili-
tate comparison with these studies, no adjustment 
for inflation was made. 
5.3. The Research Populatibn and Methodology 
5.3.1. The Research Population 
The earlier studies which have analysed corporate perfor-
mance and on which this study is based and which were discussed 
in the literature survey in earlier chapters, based their 
analyses on samples drawn from a larger, well-defined pop-
ulation. As a result these studies are open to sampling and 
statistical error. Both Wrigley and Rumelt for example ex-
tracted their sample of 100 companies from the "Fortune 500ir 
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lists of 1967, 1949, 1959 and 1969 respectively. 1 
In order to avoid both sampling and statistical prob-
lems it was decided to analyse ALL the industrial companies 
quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange over the period 
1970-1976. The firms were carefully analysed according to 
the procedures developed by Wrigley and Rumelt and then 
allocated to their strategic groups. The data used to 
identify firms was obtained from: 
5.3.1.1. The Johannesburg Stodk Exchange Public 
Relations Department 
5.3.1.2. The Investor•s Guide (Pty) Ltd., an 
investment advisory firm 
5.3.1.3. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange Handbooks, 
Volumes 1 and 2, 1970 to 1977 
5.3.1.4. Published company accounts 
The total number of 376 companies were considered for 
inclusi_on into the research population. Of these 376 firms, 
98 were eliminated because analysis of the published data 
and personal contact with executives showed that these firms 
had changed their strategy radically. If a firm had achieved 
a change in strategy during the period it would not fit into 
any single category and was thus eliminated. To be included 
in the research population the following criteria had to be 
met: 
··, 
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The firm should not have been subject to any major 
modification or change - for example., having completed 
a major diversifying and unrelated take ever during 
the.period 1970-1976. Such a radical and important 
move would have meant a fundamental change in 
strategy. 
- The only firms that were permi t.ted to pursue signif·-
icant unrelated growth were those classified as 
conglomerates. This was considered acceptable 
since this pattern of development is an integral 
part of the conglomerate strategy. 'l'his convention 
follows the earlier research studies. 
- The firm must have been quoted on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange over the period 1970-1976 inclusive. 
The research population was thus defined as: 
.All industrial firms quoted on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange over the period 1970-1976 inclusive 
which followed and did not divert from a particular 
diversification strategy during this period. 
The companies included in the research population are 
given in Appendix. II. Companies have been classified 
into their strategic categories using the procedures des-
cribed in section 5.3.2. later in this chapter. The industry 
breakd6wn of the population is described in Table 5-1. 
., 
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'l'able 5-. J.. 
The Research Pop l~.l~tio_n _ _!?y_J;_!?:..d u ~tr y_§._s_Qe f j:_neg._ 
Qy_. the Johannesbur_g___§tock S;~_;:_ba~e __ -.:_Absolute 
Frequency, He la tive Fre.:_92J.eElCL___?nd _ _fu11mla tive 
Industry Code 
I 
' Financial Industrial 1 
Beverages and Hotels 2 
Building & Allied 3 
Chemical 4 
Clothing & Knitwear 5 
Fishing 6 
Food 7 
Footwear and Leather 8 
Furniture & Appliances 9 
Iron, Steel, Engin-
eering & Electrical 10 
Motor & Transport 11 
Pulp, Paper & Pack-
aging 12 
Pharmaceutical and 
Medical 13 
Printing & Publishing 14 
Shipping 15 
Stores 16 
Sugar 17 
Textiles, Carpets, 
Blankets and Yarns 18 
Tobacco and Match 19 
Retailers & Whole-
salers 20 
General 21 
Total 
Frequency 
Absolute Relative Crnrn.ilative 
!requency Frequency }?r~uency 
42 15.1 15.1 
8 2.9 18.0 
26 . 9. 4 27.4 
6 2.2 29.6 
22 7.9 37.5 
7 2.5 40.0 
12 4.3 44.3 
3 1.1 45.4 
10 3.6 49.0 
48 17.3 66.3 
21 7.6 73.9 
12 4.3 78.2 
7 2.5 80.7 
8 2.9 83.6 
1 0.4 84.0 
13 4.7 88.7 
5 1.8 90.5 
7 2.5 93.0 
4 1. 4_ 94.4 
9 3.2 97.6 
7 2.5 100.0 
278 100.0 
c . 
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The research prog-ramme was designed to evaluate corporate 
performance and risk according to c·orporate strategy a.s 
evidenced b~ the orientation toward diversification. The 
hypotheses stated in the following section are based on the 
theory discussed earlier in the literature survey. 
I 
\ 
5~3.2. The Research Methodology 
As stated earlier, all the industrial firms quoted on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange over the period 1970-1976 
and which did not undergo any major shifts in the lend and 
type diversification were included in the research population. 
These firms were placed into strategy categories based on 
the methodologies developed by Wrigley and Rumelt. The 
following section describes this classification methodology. 
5.3.2.1. The Classification of Firms into Strategic Categories 
Following Wrigley's original system, Rumelt defined a 
"specialization ratio" as follows: 
The proportion of a firm's revenues that can be 
attributed to its largest single business in a 
given year.2 
Rumelt continues: 
Taking the term specialization ratio as denoting 
the proportion of a firm's annual revenues 
attributable to its largest discrete product-
market activity, Wrigley's original categories 
may be described as follows: 
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Single Product: Firms with a specialization 
ratio between 0.95 and 1.0. Such firms grow 
only through expansion in the scale of their 
operations. 
Dominant Product: Firms with a specialization 
ratio between 0.70 and 0.95. Such firms have 
diversified to a small degree but are still quite 
dependent upon and characterized by their major 
product-market activity. 
Related Product: Firms with a specialization ratio 
less than 0.7 which have diversified by adding 
new activities that are tangibly related to the 
collective skills and strengths possessed orig-
inally by the firm. 
Unrelated Pr_oduct: Firms that diversify (usually 
by acquisition) into areas that are not related 
to the original skills and strengths, other than 
financial, of the firm ... 3 
Following this approach each firm was analysed to 
establish its specialization ratio. The major business was 
viewed as a business which could be managed separately without 
affecting the firms' other activities. This required that 
a line of demarcation be drawn between the major product-
market area and the remaining business units. This proved 
to be a very difficult activity. Rumelt experienced similar 
dif·f icul ties: 
Each company had a unique history and had developed 
its own pattern of relationships between tech-
nologies, products and markets. What was a 
discrete business for one firm was of ten an . 
integral and non-separable business in another 
firm. 4 
Rumelt found·that the following types of strategic change 
scenarios were of assistance in establishing strategic inter-
dependency: 
1306 
eliminate the product-market-activity or increase 
its size. 
The attempt wa~ made to establish whether the 
decrease or increase in size of a business 
area would affect the major product-market area 
to a significant degree. For example, if 
T.W. Beckett and Company Ltd. were to drop 
their coffee division, would this have a serious 
effect on the tea division? The conclusion 
reached was that it would affect performance 
considerably as the products were sold by the 
same sales force and loss of shelf space and 
promotional power through the lack of joint 
in-store promotions. Thus t~a and coffee were 
seen as constituting a single product described 
as "beverages". The South African Breweries 
on the other hand, could eliminate or expand the 
Afcol Furniture group without any serious effect 
on the Beer Division. Thus these two product-
market areas are "unrelated." 
to employ a different production technology of 
process or to use a different raw material. 
A firm such as the McCarthy Group which retails 
motor vehicles would be changed or affected 
considerably if a decision was taken to move 
to say, wholesaling alone or to retail a 
different product. This would entail a change 
of technology in a retailing sense. Consequently, 
McCarthy's retailing division must be seen as a 
-"discrete" or single business visit. Where 
this dependence is not apparent, in a firm such 
as AE and CI Ltd., where many different tech-
nologies are employed, the firm is clearly less 
dependent on a process or skill and can be 
divided into several distinct business units. 
The procedure of classifying firms is obviously sub-
jective and involves the exercise of judgement by the research-
er in dealing with this issue. Rumelt argues as follows: 
These criteria should make it clear that while our 
method of classifying discrete businesses does 
require the exercise of judgment on the part of 
the evaluator, it is consistent with the "top down" 
approach to the study of diversification. While 
@ the 
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it necessarily introduces problems associated 
with the lack of totally objective standards, 
it is doubtful whether such standards are 
attainable in business research of t_his type . 
... In this research we have sought to strike a 
balance between dealing with aspects of a 
situation that are measurable and dealing with 
the aspects thought to be most relevant. When 
in doubt, we have tended to favour relevancy over 
exactness.5 
appropriat1category as follows: 
- Firms with SR between 0.95 and 1. 0 into Single Business. 
- Fi:rms with SR between 0.70 and 0.95 into Dominant 
Business. 
- F' irms with SR between 0.50 and 0.70 into Related 
Business and 
- Firms with SR less than 0.50 into Unrelated Business. 
In order to achieve further refinement of Wrigley's 
classification system, Rumelt introduced a further ratio, 
called the "Related Ratio" which he defined as "the proportion 
of a firm's revenues attributable to its largest group of 
related businesses. 116 Thus although a firm operated in a 
number of discrete business areas, these areas may be regarded 
as related in that they may concern the marketing or man-
ufacturing of a product to a common group of consumers or 
a common industry. Each firm that was found to have a Spec-
ialization Ratio of less than 0.70 was regarded as belonging 
to either the Related Business category or the Unrelated 
Business category. If the Related Ratio of a firm was 
g~eater than 0.70 then that firm was classified as a Related 
308 
Business firm. Similarly, if the Related Ratio was less 
than 0.70 then the firm was classi~ied as an Unrelated 
Business firm. 
Rumelt also identified a pattern amongst the more 
·diversified firms in the Dominant and Related Business 
I 
I 
c~tegories that suggested that certain firms diversify into 
I 
areas that are allied to the core or major business area of 
those finns. Rumelt observed as follows: 
A search through the Related group for other 
types of patterns revealed that a distinction 
could be drawn between firms that had stayed 
relatively "close to home" and those which 
had related new activities to old in such a 
way that they were eventually active in 
businesses which, considered by themselves, 
were virtually unrelated.7 
Those firms that diversified in such a way that all 
new product-market areas were "close to home" and were all 
linked to the major product-market area were termed either 
"Dominant-Constrained" or 11 Related Cons trainee." '11hose 
firms who had diversified in such a way that the "newest" 
product-market areas were linked to the major product-ma·rket 
area via an earlier diversification move were termed 
"Dominant-Linked" or ''Related Linked." These relationships 
are illustrated in Figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1 
Constrained and Linked Strategy 
Relationshi£§_ 
A: CONSTRAINED 
B: LINKED 
0--0----
Major \ 
Product 
Market 
Area 
Major 
Product-..,_ __ """ 
Market 
In Figure 5-1, the "constrained" strategy ensures that 
diversification moves denoted A, B, C and D are all connected 
or "constrained" to the major business area. A 'linked' 
strategy on the other hand, connects new business areas E 
and H to the major business by virtue of their relationship 
to business areas F and G. If business areas F and G did 
not exist, then business areas ~ and H would be regarded as 
"unrelated" to the major business area. 
The classification of firms into the Dominant "constrained" 
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and "linked" groups also reveals a group of firms that 
have diversified into "unrelated 11 areas and that do not fit 
neatly into the "constrained" and 11 linked" groups. These 
firms have a Specialization Ratio greater than 0.70 and 
-
that revenues from unrelated business areas exceed revenues 
from related business areas, but not including the dominant 
business area. These firms were classified as "Dominant 
Unrelated". 
The Dominant business category also consists of vertically 
integrated firms in which the production process is sequen-
tial and linked. Sappi Ltd., is a good example of a vertically 
integrated firm in that the company operates in the complete 
production cycle for paper products ranging from forest 
management and development, sawmilling to pulp and paper 
production. Eddels Holdings Ltd. is a further example since 
the firm has interests in leather tanning, shoe manufactur-
ing, whblesaling and retailing. These firms were classified 
into a "Dominant Vertical" category. 
The "Unrelated 11 group of firms also exhibited two disti11ct 
methods of operation or philosophy. Certain firms, although 
operating in different areas are administered in such a way 
as to suggest that they are completely different from a 
managerial point of view. 
In a study of similarly sized diversified firms Berg 
has found significant differences between firms he termed 
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."diversified majors" and those termed "conglomerates." 8 
Table 5-3 summarizes his findings. 
Table 5-3 
Corporate Office Differences Between 
J?iversified M~ors and-Conglomerates 
Executive 
Roles 
General 
Executive 
Finance (of 
which control) 
Legal/Secretary 
Personnel 
Research and 
Development 
Marketing 
Manufacturing 
Public Relations 
Diversified M~jors 
Average Number % of 
of Corporate Total 
Executives in in the 
the Role . Role 
---
4 .l. 4 
84 28.3 
(58) (19.5) 
20 6.7 
16 5.4 
139 46 .'8 
10 3.3 
3 1.0 
8 2.8 
Purchasing & Traf-
f ic 12 4.2 
Corporate Planning 55 1.6 
Totals 297 100.0 
~-Con_g__lomerates 
Average Number % of 
df Corporate Total 
Executives in the 
the Role Role 
5 
51 
( 2 3) 
17 
7 
6 
5 
92 
.s. 4 
55.5 
(25.0) 
18.4 
7.6 
6.5 
"1 5. 4 
100.0 
Source: Berg, Norman, "Corporate Role in Diversified Companies," 
Unpublished Working Paper, Graduate School of Business 
Aqministration, Harvard University, Boston, 1977--.~~ 
The executive functions at the corporate off ice are clearly 
different. The conglomerate firm appears to be concerned 
primarily with resource allocation between divisions and the 
lack of Research and Development, Marketing, Manufacturing and 
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Purchasing functions at head office level is a strong 
indicator that these functions are better placed at the 
divi~ional level under this particular man~gement strategy. 
Unfortunately, no in-depth study of highly diversified 
South African firms and their structural and hierarchical 
relationship with Head Offices exists and some difficulty 
in categorizing "unrelated" firms into the "unrelated 
passive" and "conglomerate" categories was experienced. 
In order to obtain moreinf ormation a number of experienced 
investment analysts in South African Investment Banks, 
stockbroking firms and colleagues were consulted. The con-
glomerates were identified largely by their aggressive, 
numerous and often large, successful take-over activities. 
All other "unrelated" firms were classified as "unrelated 
passive". 
5.3.3 •. Summary of the Strateqic Category System 
The four basic categories developed by Wrigley were thus 
refined by Rumelt to yield a total of nine strategic cate-
gories. These are: 
Single Business 
- Dominant Business - Vertical 
- Constrained 
- Linked 
-·unrelated 
- Related Business - Constrained 
- Linked 
- Unrelated Bus. - Unrelated passive 
- Conglomerate 
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'rhe following is a summary of d<:-;finitions and the 
9 
categorization methodology employed: 
A firm's diversification strategy_ is defined 
as its commitment to diversity per se together 
with the strengths, skills or purposes that span 
this diversity, as evidenced by the way in which 
business activities are related on~ to another. 
The primary measure of diversity is taken to 
be the speciali~ation ratio, defined as the 
proportion of a firm's revenues that is 
attributable to its largest discrete product-
market activity. A discrete·busihess (or product-
market activity) is one which is st:rategically 
independent of the firm's other businesses in 
the sense that basic changes in its nature and 
scope can be made without meeting con~traints 
imposed by other of the firm's businesses and 
without materially affecting the operation and 
strategic direction of other of the firm's 
businesses. 
Businesses are related to one another when 
a corrunon skill, resource, market, or purpose 
applies to each. A firm's related ratio is 
defined as the proportion o~ its revenues that 
are attributable to the largest group of 
businesses that are related in some way to 
one another. Each member of this group need 
only be related to one other business in the 
group (linked relatedness), though it may be 
related to all and all may be directly related 
to one another (constrained relatedness). 
The vertical ratio is defined as the propor-
tion of a firm's revenues attributable to all 
of the by-products, intermediate products and 
final products of a vertically integrated sequence 
of manufacturing operations. 
In any given year a firm's diversification strategy may 
be described as corresponding to one of the following 
categories: 
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I. Single busines~ (abbreviated "S" or "SING") -
firms that are basically committed to a single 
business. A.tllong non--vertical ly integrated 
firms (VR 0.7), Single business companies are 
those with specialization ratios of 0.95 or more. 
Among vertically integrated firms (VR 0.7), 
those thathave an end-product business that con-
tributes 95% or more of total revenues are 
classified as Single business firms. 
II. Dominant business (abbreviated "D" or "DOM") -
firms that have diversified to some extent but 
which still obtain the preponderance of their 
revenues from a single business. hrncng non-
vertically integrated firms (VR 0.7), those 
with specialization ratios greater than or equal 
to 0.7 but less than 0.95 are Dominant business 
firms. Among vertically integrated firms (VR 0. 7), 
those that do not qualify as Single business 
companies fall in the Dominant category. 
A. Dominant Vertical (abbreviated "DV 11 ) - ver-
tically integrated firms (having vertical 
ratios of 0.7 or more) which produce and 
sell a variety of end-products, no one of 
which contributes more than 95% of total 
revenues. 
B. Dominant Constrained (abbreviated "DC") -
non-vertical Dominant business firms that 
have diversified by building on some parti-
cular strength, skills, or resource associated 
with the original dominant activity. In such 
firms the preponderance of the diversified 
activities are all related one to another 
and to the dominant business. 
C. Dominant IJinked (abbreviated "DL" ) - non-
ver t ica l Dominant business firms that have 
diversified by building on several different 
strengths, skills, or resources or by building 
on new strengths, skills or resources as 
-they are acquired. In such firms the pre-
ponderance of the diversified activities are 
not directly related to the ~ominant business 
but each is somehow related to some other 
of the firm's activities. 
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D. Dominant Unrelated (abbreviated "DU") - non-
vertical Dorninar~business firms in which 
the preponderance of the diversified activities 
are unrelated to the dominant business. 
III. Related business (abbreviated "R" or "REL") -
non-vertically integrated firms which are diver-
sified, having specialization ratios less than 
0.7, and in which diversification has been 
primarily accomplished by relating new activites 
to old so that the related ratio is 0.7 or more. 
A. Related Constrained (abbreviated "RC") -
Related business firms that have diversified 
chiefly by relating new businesses to a 
specific central skill or resource and in 
which, therefore, each b~siness activity is 
related to almost all of the other business 
activities. 
B. Related Linked (abbreviated "RL") - Related 
business firms which have diversified by re-
lating new businesses to some strength or skill 
already possessed, but not always the same 
strength or skill. By diversifying in several 
directions and exploiting new skills as they 
are acquired, such firms have become active 
in widely disparate businesses. 
IV. Unrelated business (abbreviated ''U" or "UNRL") -
non-vertical firmi which have diversified chiefly 
without regard to relationships between new 
businesses and current activities. Such firms 
are defined by a related ratio of less than 0.7. 
A. Unrelated Passive (abbreviated "UP") - Un-
related business firms that do not qualify as 
Acquisitive Conglomerates (see definition below). 
B. Acquisj..tive Conglomerates (abbreviated "AC") -
Unrelated business firms which have aggressive 
programs for the acquisition of new unrelated 
·businesses. More specifically, such firms 
are defined as having, over the past five years, 
(1) had an average growth rate in earnings per 
share of at least 10% per year, (2) made at 
least five acquisitions, at least three of 
which took the firm into businesses unrelated 
to past activities, and (3) issued new equity 
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shares whose total value (using market prices 
at the time of issue) was at least as great 
as the total amount of conunon dividends 
paid during the same period. 
5.4. The Data Sources and Variables 
5.4.1. Data Sources 
Data on all the 278 firms which constitute the total 
research population were obtained from a variety of sources. 
The primary sources of basic financial data were: 
5.4.1.1. The Bureau of Financial Analysis, 
University of Pretoria 
5.4.1.2. Investor's Guide (Pty) Ltd. 
5.4.1.3. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
5.4.1.4. Published financial data 
5.4.2. Variables 
All data was placed on computer disc files and tape and 
included: 
5.4.2.1. The Company name 
5.4.2.2. A code number for each firm 
5.4.2.3. The strategic category into which the firm 
fell 
5.4.2.4. The strategic c~tegory based on Wrigley's 
four major categories - Single, Dominant, 
Related or Unrelated 
5.4.2.5. Industry code number for each company 
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5.4.2,6. Company ranking in terms of size based on 
Sales, Fiscal Assets and Total Invested 
Capital 
5.4.2.7. Financial data for each of the years 1970-
1976 
Some 66 difference variables were obtained for each 
firm for each year. These variables were then manipulated 
to produce the following variables: 
GTINC : The annual mean uniform growth rate of Total 
Invested Capital over the period 1970-1976 
inclusive 
GCFLOW: The annual mean uniform growth rate in Cash 
Flow. Cash flow is defined as Net Profit 
after tax plus Depreciation 
GSALES: The annual mean uniform growth rate in Net Sales 
GTDBT : The annual mean uniform growth rate in Total 
Debt. Total Debt is defined as Long Term Debt 
plus all Current Liabilities 
GDPS 
GEBIT 
GPAT 
GP ATP 
GBVEQ 
GEPS 
The annual mean uniform growth rate in Dividends 
Per Share adjusted for splits and capitalization 
issues 
The annual mean uniform growth rate in Earnings 
Before Interest and Taxes. 
The annual mean uniform growth rate in Net 
Profit after Tax before extraordinary items 
The annual m~an uniform growth rate in Net 
Prof it after Tax and after Preference Share 
Dividends 
The annual mean uniform growth rate in the 
Book Value of Ordinary Shareholders Equity 
The annual mean uniform growth rate in Earnings 
per Ordinary Share, adjusted for all splits and 
capitalization issues 
BETA 
GTFE 
ROIAT 
- - -·--------· --·- -----····-···--··'·--·-····----·--~J _______ l _____ ... ___ ··- --
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The Beta Value for each share that averaged 
a trading volume on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange in excess of 200,000 per annum 
for the years 1975 and 1976. Saloner and 
Strebel have shown "that at average trading 
volumes of less than approximately 200,000, 
systematic risk is volume dependent .... so 
that the ex-post systematic risk is deter-
mined by trading volume rather than the 
inherent riskiness of the share."10 These 
findings were based on a study of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Although 
there is a continuing debate as to the 
efficiency of the Johannesburg Stock market, 
the evidence poiats to volume dependency.11 
Thus only the highest volume shares is in 
the industrial sector were included. The 
beta values were obtained by regressing the 
weekly returns of each share versus the all 
market index. Dividends were not included in 
the returns data. Sharpe and Cooper have 
shown that the non-inclusion of dividend 
returns does not affect the overall return 
in any meaningful way.12 All returns were 
adjusted for share splits and capitalization 
issues. 
The annual mean uniform growth rate of Total 
Funds Employed 
Arithmetic average return on Invested Capital 
over the period. The return was calculated 
as follows: 
ROI = 
Net Prof it after tax plus after tax 
cost of 'interest 
Total Liabilities "less CUrrent 11.abilitles--. 
ROEAT . Arithmetic average return on Shareholders Equity 
over the period. The calculation was as ·follows: 
ROE = 
Net Profit after tax and after 
Preference Dividends 
Total Shareholders Equity 
ROA Return on Total Assets Employed in 1976. The 
calculation was as follows: 
ROA = 
Net Profit after tax plus after tax 
cost of interest 
Total Assets 
319 
ROI Return on Invested Capital for 1976. The 
calculation was as follows: 
CF LOW 
, DRAT 
CFTIC 
CFTDT 
SD ROI 
SD ROE 
SDEPS 
AD BET 
ROI = 
Net Profit after tax plus after-tax cost 
of interest 
Total Liabilities lessCurrent Liabilities 
Cash flow in 1976. This is calculated as Net 
Profit after tax plus depreciation. 
Debt Ratio in 1976. This is calculated as 
follows: 
Debt-Ratio= Total Long Term and Short-Term Debt 
Total Liabilities 
Cash flow to Total Invested Capital in 1976. 
This was calculated as follows: 
CFTIC= Net Profit after·tax plus Depreciation 
Total Liabil1 ties less C.urrent Liabilities 
Cash Flow to Total Debt in 1976. This was 
calculated as follows: 
CFTDT= Net Profit after tax·plus Depreciation 
Total Long Term Debt plus Current Liabflities 
The Standard Deviation of Return on Invested 
Capital 
The Standard Deviation of Return on Equity 
The Standard Deviation of Earnings per Share 
Beta adjusted for Leverage. Hamada has shown 
that:l3 ~alue of levered equity' 1 
B unlevered = B levered ~alue of uqlevered equit~ 
E 
Thus: Bu= BL (EL ) 
u 
where, EL = levered equity and 
Eu = unlevered equity 
In an efficicent market, the advantage of debt 
is derived from the tax shield - thus increased 
debt to replace equity will yield an advantage 
of 
I 
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D (1 - t) 
where, D = Debt and 
t = tax rate 
5.4.3. Classification of Variables 
The variables calculated and· defined in section 5.4.2. 
above were grouped into three major groups to facilitate 
analysi~. These were: 
5.4.3.1. Growth Variables 
5.4.3.2. Return Variables, and 
5.4.3.3. Risk Variables 
The variables were classified as follows: 
Growth Variables: GTINC - Growth of Total Invested Capital 
GCFLOW - Growth of Cash Flow 
GSALES -- Growth of Sales 
GTDBT - Growth of Total Debt 
GDPS Growth of Dividends per Share 
GEBIT - Growth of Earnings before 
interest and taxes 
GPAT - Growth of Prof it after Tax 
GPATP - Growth of Profit after Tax and 
after Preference Dividends 
GBVEQ - Growth of Book Value of Equity· 
GEPS - Growth of Earnings Per Share 
GTFE - Growth of Total Funds Employed 
Return Variables: ROIAT - Return on Invested Capital 
after Tax 
ROEAT - Return on Equity after Tax 
ROA - Return on Total Assets for 1976 
ROE - Return on Equity for 1976 
ROI - Return on Invested Capital for 
1976 
CF LOW - Cash Flow for 1976 
Risk Variables: DRAT - Debt Ratio for 1976 
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CFTIC 
CFTDT 
SD ROI 
SD ROE 
SDEPS 
Beta 
AD BET 
-Cash Flow to Total Invested 
Capital 
- Cash Flow to Total Debt 
- Standard Deviation of Return 
on Invested Capital for period 
1970-1976 
- Standard Deviation of Return 
on Equity for period 1970-1976 
Standard Deviation of Earnings 
Per Share for period 1970-
1976 
- Beta Value for 1976 
- Beta Adjusted for Leverage 
using "Hamada' s" formuJ,a 
5.4.4. The Major Research Hypotheses 
5.4.4.1. Hypotheses Relating to Growth 
Based on the research by Lynch and others, conglomerate 
firms have been shown to grow very rapidly. This is due to 
their aggressive, take-over orientated development pattern. 
It was thus hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis Gl: Conglomerate firms will grow most 
rapidly on all variables except 
Earnings per Share (GEPS) and 
Dividends per Share (GDPS). 
These two variables, namely GEPS and GDPS are equity 
related and since conglomerates tend to effect their acquisi-
tions through equity managements, these variables will 
exhibit slower growth rates. Since these firms will issue 
equity to acquire companies it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis G2: Conglomerate Firms will experience the 
most rapid growth in Book Value of 
Equity (GBVEQ). 
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These hypotheses may appear to be in conflict with the 
traditional view of the conglomerate firm developed during 
the boom years of the late 1960s. Yet when the particular 
economic conditions experienced in South Africa are taken 
into considerat~on, it is clear that the Stock Exchange 
has been depressed and conglomerates have found it very 
difficult to issue paper and play the fabled "money game" 
so popular in the decade of the 1960s. Thus although these 
firms have continued with their unrelated acquisition 
strategies, greater amounts of equity have been issued to 
pay for these acquisitions. The impact on earnings per share 
can thus be expected to be deleterious. 
In general, given the relatively small size of the South 
African market for almost all products, those firms that 
concentrate their efforts in a relatively few areas will 
not grow as rapidly as firms that are branching out into new 
and more diverse business areas. Thus it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis G3: The more diversified firms occupying 
those strategies dee~ed to be more 
diversified will exhibit growth rates 
greater than less diversified stra-
tegies. Thus the rank order in terms 
of growth variables G'l1 INC, GTFE, GCFLOW 
and GSALES will be Unrelated, Related, 
Dominant and Single. 
Following directly on Rumelt's findings which provide the 
most meaningful theoretical and empirical basis despite the 
fact that his research was carried out in a highly developed 
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and mature economy - it was hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis G4: 'I'he Dominant Constrained group will 
produce the best overall performance 
from a growth point of view, and 
produce at least above average per-
formance. 
Furthermore, growth is partly dependent on the firms' 
aSility to finance expansion. It thus hypothesized th~t 
the high growth strategies, namely the Unrelated and Related 
groups, will expand their dividends relatively slowly in 
comparison to the slower growing strategies - namely the 
Single and Dominant groups. Thus: 
Hypothesis GS: The Unrelated and Related categories 
will produce a slower rate of 
dividend growth (GDPS) . 
Given the fact that the South African economy has been 
relatively depressed over the period 1970-1976, those 
firms that were tied to the fortunes of a particular industry 
will perform at levels considerably below average. It is 
hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis G6: Single Business and Dominant-Vertical 
firms will have growth rates signif i-
cantly lower .than other strategic 
categories. 
According to the Product Life Cycle theory, products will 
grow rapidly and growth will slow as the market matures and 
finally reaches saturation, and eventually growth will become 
negative as the product declines. A firm which forecasts 
a mature market for its product will seek to escape from its 
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traditional industry with its declining growth and profit-
ability prospects. On the other hand, management may be 
deficient and made to cope with the competitive situation 
in the industry. Such firms will also seek to escape from 
their traditional industry and will seek "greenE:!r" pastures 
that are not related to the major product~market area. Such 
firms, especially if management is weak, will be unable to 
build on skills already possessed in the firm as they will 
have sought product-markets unrelated to their existing areas. 
On the other hand, if a firm had decided to develop diversifi-
cation strategies that build on the "core skills" existing 
in the firm by adopting a strategy of "constrained" or 
"linked" diversification, it can be exoected to be more 
successful than a firm moving into unrelated areas from the 
same base. A firm that adopts a "conscious strategy" in 
that strengths, weaknesses and opportunities are carefully 
apprais~d and then follows a strategy which ~ill capitalize 
on those strengths, overcome the ·weaknesses wherever possible 
and exploit opportunities is likely to have a greater chance 
of success than its "escaping" counterpart. It is thus 
hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis G7: Dominant Constrained and Dominant 
Linked firms will achieve superior 
performance in terms of growth than 
Dominant-Unrelated firms. 
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5.4.4.2. Hypotheses Relating to Returns and Profitability 
A major requirement for achieving superior profitability 
and hence returns is that management fully understands the 
markets, technology and products produced and marketed by 
the firm. Conglomerate and Unrelated-Passive firms by their 
I 
very nature do not possess the skills required to manage 
ektremely diverse operations. The Unrelated-Passive group 
conforms reasonably closely to those firms that Berg has 
\ 
termed "diversified majors" and are likely to operate the 
relatively large corporate head off ice staff that were found 
to characterize this group. The Unrelated-Passive category 
can thus be expected to understand and therefore manage 
diverse operations more effectively than the conglomerate 
group who appear to seek only financial synergies. It is 
thus hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis Rl: Unrelated-Passive firms will produce 
superior returns than conglomerate firms. 
Hypothesis R2: The "constrained" strategies will 
produce superior returns than "linked", 
"unrelated", vertical and single 
business strategies. 
The Conglomerate category can be expected to be managed 
more aggressively than other categories. Such aggressiveness 
will be evidenced by more "aggressive" use of debt to gear 
lower return on investment and asset figures to higher than 
average returns on equity. It is thus hypo~hesized that: 
Hypothesis R3: Conglomerate firms will have experienced 
lower returns on investment but will 
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be more highly geared than the 
less aggressive and more industry 
bound Single and Dominant categories. 
Overallr it is theorized, based on Rurnelt's findings, 
that the return on invested capital will be as hypothesized 
in hypotheses R4 and RS: 
Hypothesis R4: The rank order from the major 
strategic categories in terms of 
return on invested capital will be 
Related, Single, Dominant and 
Unrelated. 
Hypothesis RS: The rank order for the strategic cat-
egories in terms of invested capital will 
be - Don-,inant, Constrained, Related-
linked, Conglomerate, Unrelated, 
Dominant-linked and Dominant~vertical. 
S.4.4.3. Recent Studies of Conglomerate Performance and Risk 
In this study, risk has been defined as variability of 
return and has been divided into two components - systematic 
or market-related and unsystematic or non-market related 
risk. Conglomerate firms are regarded by investment analysts 
to be a form of "mutual fund" since they·are believed to be 
able to exert relatively little influence over their diverse 
portfolio of businesses since corporate head off ices are 
typically small and cannot be expected to understand the 
problems and opportunities of the divisions. This has resulted 
in a number of research efforts which have compared conglom-
erate performance with that of mutual funds. These will be 
reviewed below in order to lay the foundation for the research 
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hypotheses in this study. 
5.4.4.3.1. .14 The Smith and Schreiner Study 
This is the earliest study of conglomerate performance 
in relation to modern portfolio theory. Smith and Schreiner 
I 
also experienced difficulties in identifying conglomerate 
firms. In their sample of 19 conglomerate firms, 9 were 
also included in Rumelt's study. Of the 9 firms classified 
as conglomerate by Smith and Schreiner, Rumelt classified 
only 4 into the same category. The other 5 were classified 
. 
by Rumelt as Dominant-Constrained, Related-Constrained, 
Dominant-Unrelated and Unrelated-Passive. If Rurnelt's classi-
fication system is accepted as the more meaningful, then 
this represents a 56 percent error by Smith and Schreiner. 
Smith and Schreiner conclude that "with few exceptions, 
the mutual funds have attained more efficient diversification 
. 15 
than the conglomerates." They do, however, recognise 
that mutual funds have certain features that may serve to 
explain their superior performance in their simulation study 
which sought to test diversification efficiency by estimating 
how "close" they were able to come to an optimal portfolio. 
They note: 
(The mutual funds have attained more efficient 
diversification as expected) because of their 
comparative advantage in investment flexibility, 
divisible investments, and their ability to 
invest in dominant firms excluded from the 
security populations of conglomerates.1 6 
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Smith and Schreiner do nevertheless regard the con-
qomerate performance favorably when they state: 
••.• some of the conglomerates appe-ar to have 
done a commendable job of selecting unrelated 
industries so as to take advantage of low 
ccorrelations .••.. it appears that certain of 
the conglomerates have succeeded remarkably 
well in their diversification objective.17 
Although their study was not directly comparable to the 
objective of this'- study, the Smith. and Schreiner paper does 
. \ 
suggest that congl~merates !!ta·y be able to obtain "positions" 
relatively close to the eff i~ient, optimal portfolio. This 
~ • •. I 
..... 
means that the conglomerate' will be able to provide higher 
I . . 
~. 
returns at lower risK as suggested by portfolio theory. 
-. 
, r"' "'. 
--. 
... . 
·s .. 4.4.3.2. The westcm and Mansinghka Study18 
~his 1971 paper also experienced difficulties in the 
. '
.:definition ~n~d identification. of the conglomerate firms and 
made the "classic" error by using the 1968 SIC Industry 
··Categories as a screen to identify the firms. A final sample 
-0f 63 firms were selected. This 1968 sample was compared 
cllto Rurnelt's 1969 sample of conglomerate firms and a total 
--Of 27 firms were common to both samples. Only 11 firms were 
-classified by both Rumelt and Weston and Mansinghka. Once 
:again, if Rurnelt's classification system is taken as correct, 
·then Weston and Mansinghka have included 16 firms in their 
·sample of conglomerates that are not true conglomerates. 
~his is an error of over 59 per cent. 
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Weston and Mansinghka compared both growth rates and 
return performance of their sample (whose performance is 
severely biased downwards since, of the 16 incorrectly 
classified firms, 8, or 50 per cent, belonged to Rumelt's 
lowest performing category, the Unrelated-Passive group), 
to two randomly selected samples of industrial firms and 
industrial and non-manufacturing firms. 
They find that the "means of the growth rates TIVere 
significantly higher for the conglomerates as compared with 
sample 1 or sample 2 separately or jointly. 1119 The authors 
then dismiss these findings which were all significant at 
the 0.01 level over the period 1960-1968 (apart from the 
earnings per share growth rate which was significantly superior 
at the O.bS level) by stating, "No great importance is 
attached to these measurements of the differential growth 
20 
rates." 
Weston and Mansinghka then revert to a cross-sectional 
analysis of the returns for 1968. They also calculate returns 
data for 1958 but this is hardly relevant since it is generally 
accepted that apart from a few exceptions, the conglomerate 
movement only gained momentum during the 1960s.Rumelt has 
shown, for example, that only 1.2 per cent of the "Fortune 
500" could be classified as acquisitive conglomerates in 
1959. 21 Their findings are presented in Table 5-4. 
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Table 5-4 
Weston-Ma~singhka Returns Results: Conglomerates 
vs. Control S~mples, 1968 
Industrial Industrial and 
Control Manufacturing 
i 
Cong][ome~ Sa..!!!J2,~- Control 
--
I 
EBIP.T/TA 10.4 8.5 7.6 
I 
EBIT/TA 15.1 15.6 13.3 
Net Income/Net 13.3 12.4 12.0 
Worth 
Net Profit/Net 14.2 12.4 12.2 
Worth 
- EBIAT 
- TA 
= Earnings before Interest but after Taxes 
= Total 11-ssets 
EBIT = Ear~ings before Interest and Taxes 
s_ample· 
Source: Weston, J. Fred, and Mansinghka, Surenda K., "Test 
Non-
of Efficiency Performance of Conglomerate Firms," 
_Journal ·of Finance, Volume 26, September 1971, p. 926. 
The differences between the means are not significant 
yet for three of the four measures the conglomerate performance 
was greater than that of the control samples. Weston and 
Mansinghka find that: 
As compared with industrial firms, therefore, 
the conglomerate firms employed higher debt 
ratios, both in 1958 and in 1968. In addition, 
as compared with both samples, the debt ratios 
of the conglomerat12f irms grew more rapidly during the decade. 
A number of other comparisons of the Weston-Mansinghka 
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"conglomerates" with Forbes and Fortune 500 firms are made 
and although no statistically significant differences are 
obtained - all the longitudinal results show the ''conglomerates" 
outperforming the other samples. 
Weston and Mansinghka conclude that their findings are 
"evidence consistent with the successful achievement of 
defensive diversification by the conglomerate firms. 1123 
This conclusion appears to be the result of their findings 
which are based on a sample which has serious limitations 
when viewed from a managerial point of view. The authors 
imply that conglomerate managers are "defensively" oriented. 
When the evidence of the managerial philosophies of the men 
who have built the "true"conglomerate firms suggests exactly 
the opposite! 
The conclusion that must be drawn from the Weston and 
Mansinghka paper is that the authors lack of managerial 
orientation has allowed them to introduce bias into their 
sample and draw cone lusions ~·ihich run counter to the observed 
behavior of the group they describe. 
5.4.4.3.3. The Melicher and Rush Study24 
This study also suffers from the lack of the researchers' 
ability to view conglomerates from a managerial perspective. 
The method of classification used in this study are vague and 
the major criterion for inclusion into the conglomerate group 
332 
sample was that "Moody's Industrial Manuals" regard the firm 
as an industrial firm, that the firm be listed on the Standard 
and Poor's annual and quarterly data tapes. Once again, 
the findings indicate that conglomerate performance from a 
return point 0£ view is not significantly superior although 
the conglomerates produced superior (although still _not 
statistically significant) returris in most of- the· years studied. 
Melicher and Rush confirm that Weston and Mansinghka finding 
that conglomerates used debt aggressively to improve returns 
to equity. They summarize as follows: 
For the entire period, the average standard 
deviation for conglomerate firms was higher than 
for non·-conglomerate firms, but the difference 
1 was not statistically significant. Conglomerate 
\ returns over the same period were higher than 
non-conglomerate returns, but the difference 
was not statistically significant. Hence the 
comparison of conglomerate and non-conglomerate 
returns and total risk indicates that the two 
groups were comparable in total risk and pro-
vided reasonably comparable investment returns 
to their investors. An examination of sub-
period return and total risk measures generally 
supports the same conclusion.25 
They conclude: 
•.. this study suggests that while conglomerate 
firms achieved a level of performance comparable 
to the considered non-conglomerate firms, their 
performance was not at all outstanding. Hence, 
conglomerate diversification may be an effective 
··means "for obtaining defensive diversification," 
but it does not seem to be an effective vehicle 26 for obtaining superior or outstanding performance. 
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27 5.4.4.3.4 .. The Mason an¢! Goudzwaard Study 
This is the most recent research study in this field 
and the authors point to the "misleading" nature of the 
earlier studies. The Mason-Goudzwaard study seeks to match 
conglomerate performance against randomly selected portfolios 
where both groups have similar asset structures. Thus this 
study seeks to explore performance differentials"in terms 
of a~set structure. 1128 Their methodology follows Weston and 
Mansinghka's definition of conglomerate firms and some 95 
candidate firms were identified and asked, through question-
naires, to provide the percentage distribution of assets among 
SIC Classifications. Of these 95 candidates, only 22 were 
useable. Matching portfolios with similar asset structure 
and composition were then constructed. Mason and Goudzwaard 
hypothesized that the conglomerates would "significantly 
outperform or at least perform as well as the portfolio 
"simply because operating control should confer certain 
advantages to a diversified portfolio of assets. 1129 
Mason and Goudzwaard conclude that the portfolios out-
perform the conglomerates in terms of rate of return on assets 
and to shareholders, a result which is contrary to that 
hypothesized. An interesting finding is that between 1962 
and 1967, the performance of the conglomerate group deteriorated 
while the portfolios' performance remained level. It had 
been suggested that a longer time period would be more 
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appropriate to judge the performance of conglomerates since 
it may take some years to revitalize a firm. This may well 
be a valid point since the 1967-1968 period was a very 
active period in terms of take-over activity and thus a 
measure of perf.ormance in 1968 (as in the Mason and Gondzwaard 
study) may be misleading. In rc1any cases conglomerate firms 
would be playing the "portfolio game" a.nd channeling cash 
from 11 cash cow" to "question mark" divisions and these invest-
ments could well account for the deteriorating performance 
reported by Mason and Gondzwaard. 
5.4.4.3.5. Summary_ 
The above section has reviewed the relevant literature 
regarding the performance of conglomerate firms. Almost all 
the studies report considerable difficulty in defining the 
conglomerate firm and appear to have relied on conventional 
measures such as the SIC classification system. In essence, 
these studies have confirmed the findings of Gort - diversi-
fication does not appear to contribute to return or risk. 
The fact that these studies confirm Gert's research is not 
surprising since they are all based on product/industry-
count measures of diversification. 
Rumelt's study was the first to attempt to measure the 
impact of diversification from a managerial perspective. 
Building on earlier studies that had identified sig·nif icant 
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managerial patterns between firms which had adopted different 
approaches to growth, control and development, his findings 
show distinct differences in performance and risk between 
firms with different diversification strategies. 
5.4.4.4. Hypotheses Relating to Risk 
Given the findings of Smith and Schreiner who concluded 
that "conglomerates have succeeded remarkably well in their 
diversification objective" since they appear to be capable 
of entry into low correlation industries ·- it is hypothesized 
that: 
Hypothesis Vl: Conglomerates will achieve lower rates 
of returns variability as measured 
by variables SDEPS, SDROI and SDROE. 
Weston and Mansinghka, Melicher and Rush, and Mason and 
Gondzwaard all report that their conglomerates all employed 
higher than average debt levels in their capital structures. 
It is thus hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis V2: The conglomerate group will possess 
higher than average debt ratios than 
other strategic groups. 
It will be assumed that higher levels of diversification 
indicate .a more aggressive and hence more risk oriented 
management. Thus is it hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis V3: The rank order in terms of debt ratio 
will be Unrelated, Related, Dominant 
and Single categories. 
Bet~ has been shown to be a relevant measure of the 
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systematic risk of firms with trading volumes in excess of 
200, 000 shares per annum on the J·ohannesburg Stock Exchange. 
Given that a major reason for diversification is to reduce 
risk by investing in counter cyclical industries and firms 
and since the conglomerate group has been shown by Smith 
and Schreiner to have diversified reasonably efficiently, 
it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis V4: Conglomerate firms will have beta 
values not significantly different 
from all other firms in the population. 
In addition, since dependence on single industry means 
that firms operating in this industry face high cyclical 
risks, thus, 
Hypothesis VS: The rank order of the strategic 
categories in terms of beta values 
will be Single, Dominant, Unrelated 
and Related. 
The Hamada/Rubenstein formulae that eliminate the leverage 
component of beta values permits an evaluation of the business 
risk component since risk can be apportioned into financial 
and business risk components. Thus the business element of 
risk as measured by the "adjusted beta" should reflect the 
firms' diversification posture and provide an additional 
measure of the impact of industry concentration as evidenced 
by the "specialization ratio". Since the strategy of the 
firm will have maximum impact on the business risk element 
it is hypothesized that: 
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Hypothesis V6: The "business" re.~ated risk component 
as measured by the "adjusted beta" 
which eliminates the effect of financial 
lev·erage and hence financial risk, 
will produce a rank ordering of strategic 
categories as follows: Single, Dominant, 
Related and Unrelated. The Single, 
Dominant-Vertical and Dominant-Unrelated 
sub-categories will all exhibit high 
business risk. 
Treynor has suggested that a useful technique to rank 
portfolios is provided by the following formula 30 : 
T = Rit - ,Rf 
B. 
l 
where: T = Treynor Statistic 
Rit - Return on the Share i in 
Rf = Risk-free rate of return, 
B. ·- the l Beta value for Share 
period t 
and 
i 
This statistic relates the excess return earned by the 
firm (as measured by the return on the share minus what 
could be earned on a risk free investment) to the systematic 
risk ofthe firm. Since conglomerates are believed to be 
able to produce synergistic effects and improve controls and 
operations, this group should generate significantly higher 
"Treynor Statistic" values. Single, Dominant-Vertical, 
Dominant-Unrelated and Unrelated firms are less likely to 
obtain s~nergies since their strategies confine them to the 
vagaries of particular industries in the case of the Single 
and Dominant groups whilst in the case of the Unrelated 
category, the strategy is not designed to capitalize on 
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"core skills''. Consequently, the following hypothesis was 
proposed: 
Hypothesis V7: When measured using Treynor's 
Statistic, the rank ordering will 
5.5. Summary 
be as follows: Conglomerate, Related-
Constrained, Related-Linked, Dominant-
Constrained, Dominant-Linked, Dominant-
Vertical, Dominant-Unrelated, Single 
and Unrelated. 
This chapter has provided the overall methodology and 
hypothesis for this study. The major thrust of the research 
sterns from the belief that the overall strategy of the f irrn 
must be to provide shareholders and stakeholders with the 
best return or maximize their wealth by reducing risk whilst 
maintaining return at some acceptable level. Earlier efforts 
to explain the reason for the seemingly inexorable trend 
toward increased diversification have not been successful. 
These research efforts have shown diversity as measured by 
the number of industries in which a firm operates, to be a 
less than satisfactory strategy. Instead of focusing on 
the number of industries occupied or.products produced, this 
research has taken the view of top management and concentrated 
on the way that business areas are related in terms of the 
common "core skills". These skills are not.only manufacturing 
but include pricing, distribution, consumer segments, suppliers, 
and financial skills. This strategic categorization methodology 
339 
has provided meaningful results in the developed economy of 
the United States. This research ~ill test this methodology 
using smaller firms and in a less developed economy. In 
addition, this study will seek to relate returns to risk 
in a meaningful manner. Research on the impact of strategy 
I 
on rate of return performance is still in the embryonic stage -
I 
but research which explores risk and return in a strategic 
context is almost non-existent. 
The hypotheses developed in this chapter have their 
origins in the research performed in the United States and, 
in the main, anticipate the highest growth group to be the 
conglomerate/unrelated firms while the most profitable firms 
are expected to come from those firms that have remained 
reasonably close to their "core-skills" in their diversifica-
tion efforts. The Single and Dominant-Vertical groups are 
expected to show low growth, moderate to low returns and 
high ri.sk. Conglomerates and Unrelated f irrns are, in keeping 
with the results predicted by portfolio theory, expected to 
have relatively low risk profiles since they are believed 
to have spread their risk over indust~ies with low correlation. 
This particular research methodology has not ,been applied 
in any economy outside of Rumel~'s study in the United States. 
This study also extends previous work in the field bi applying 
Capital Asset Pricing Model Theory to diversification strategy. 
The research programme also examines the development of 
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corporate strategy in the context of a developing economy 
and by extending the research population ta include all 
firms quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is not 
susceptible to statistical errors. By exploring the impact 
of strategy on financial performance and risk, which are 
! 
the major determinants of share prices and ultimately share-
1 
' 
holder wealth, it is anticipated that the research will 
yield important results and conclusions which will serve, 
not only to explain, but to guide managerial decision-making. 
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6. THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to report and interpret 
the analyses of the company data according to the methodology 
described in Chapter 5. The methodological approaches pre-
sented in Chapter 5 involved the detailed analysis of the 
published financial data of nearly four.hundred companies. 
Each company's annual<.report and. related company data which 
was available in libraries was analysed for each of the seven 
years over which performance was measured. 
The mean annual growth rate for 23 variables were calcu-
lated for every company which had followed a particular 
"strategy" over the period 1970-1976 inclusive. This involved 
over 6,000 regression calculations alone. The mean and stan-
dard deviation were then calculated for each major strategic 
category and each strategic sub-category. Finally, 11 growth 
variables were selected as being most representative. In 
addition, a further 25 variables were calculated to assist in 
the interpretation of trends and unexpected findings. The 
major focus was on the performance differences between the 
major strategic categories and the strategic sub-categories and 
a number of interesting a~d significant issues, apart from those 
expected from the testing of the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 5, were explored. 
This chapter reviews the development of the major hypotheses 
and then proceeds to the testing of the hypotheses after 
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highlighting the strategic category breakdown comparison 
between all the quoted South African industrial firms and 
samples drawn from major deve.loped economies. 
6.2. Review of the "A Priori" Hypothesis 
The "a priori" hypothesis developed in Chapter 5 were 
divided into three major groups. These were: 
6.2.1 Hypotheses relating to Growth, 
6.2.2 Hypotheses relating to Returns, and 
6.2.3 Hypotheses relating to Risk. 
The major underlying theme upon which these hypotheses 
are based stem from the conviction that the management prac-
titioners are guiding their organizations instinctively and 
intuitively toward diversification. Academic research has 
been shown, at least for the large part, to be unable to explain 
the steady trend toward increased diversification in corporate 
activity. Some researchers have concluded that these moves are 
d f . . . 1 a e ensive reaction by management. However, this conclusion 
is a rather weak attempt to explain their findings since the 
management teams of conglomerate firms are typically highly 
aggressive and entre~reneurial by nature - hardly a breed of 
manager to behave defensively. Diversification is believed to 
provide benefits as well as causing problems of administration, 
integration and control. The major benefit according to theory 
is that total risk of variability is reduced as investment funds 
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are spread over different business areas and industries. 
The "naive" vie'w of diversification holds that investment 
should be spread over as many areas as possible and that 
very widely diversified holdings are less risky than a 
lower level of diversification. However, as Wagner and Lau 
and others have 'shown, there is little to be gained by 
. 2 
spreading investments over more than 20 investments. It 
will be recalled that Wagner and Lau find that a portfolio 
of 15 shares has a correlation with the overall market of 
r = 0.80 and an increase in the number of holdings of 33.3 
percent to 20 shares improves the correlation to r = 0.83 -
an improvement in the correlation coefficient of only 0.0375 
percent. The number of shares or investments in the port-
folio are less important than the degree of correlation between 
the securities. The key factor is negatively correlated re-
turns. Modern theory has also shown that very wide diversi-
fication could eliminate risk completely. Only non-systematic 
risk can be diversified away and the completely diversified 
firms would still experience the swings in the total market. 
A less widely diversified firm which has brought its "core 
skills" to bear in carefully selected market may be able to 
provide better returns at a comparable level of risk and there-
by create value and increase shareholder wealth. 
The conglomerates have sought to reduce earnings variability 
throu~h the external entry route into unrelated areas, and as 
346 
Smith and Schreiner have shown, have been able to structure 
reasonably efficient portfolios. 3 Thus this group are 
expected to produce the highest growth rates as moderate 
levels of risk. 
While the United States conglomerate experience has shown 
tnat many of these firms developed out of firms that found 
themselves in declining and/or unprofitable markets, another ! . 
group of firms appear to have responded differently to industry 
or product life cycle effects. Instead of aggressive entry in-
to unrelated areas, these firms have entered markets that may 
appear unrelated to the non-managerially orientated observer, 
but that are related to the declining product or industry. An 
example is the case of a textbook publisher entering the 
microfilm industry. This would be regarded as an "unrelated" 
move by many observers but the marketing viewpoint suggests 
that "textbooks" will become unattractive as an industry 
product-market area due to rising costs and other factors -
but microfilm may be the "textbook" of the future. Thus the 
firm has remained very "close" to the consumer need being sat-
isfied but is using a different product to do so. Thus the 
firm has developed a new product using new technology for the 
same consumer, and has entered a related market that may be 
causing the decline in the present industry. This response to 
industry and product risk is vastly different to that adopted 
by the conglomerate. Is is thus hypothesized that related firms, 
and particularly the "constrained" group, would produce superior 
returns. 
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Another group of firms responded to industry and product 
outlooks by concentrating on the "sequence of production" 
and integrated operations vertically. Othe~ firms responded· 
by undertaking a "half-hearted" diversification drive - these 
firms are either in the process of diversifying more meaning-
I 
fJlly or have experimented with a new "fad~ and how have 
"cold feet. 11 These firms, classified as the "Dominant-
Unrelated" group are expected to perform poorly on all measures. 
Their strategy appears to lack clear definition and purpose 
and such firms are likely to pay the price of lack of commitment. 
6.3. The Overall Eindings 
6.3.1 The Composition of the Population by Strategic Groups 
As discussed in Chapter 5, firms were classified into their 
strategic categories for the period 1970-1976 inclusive. These 
findings are of interest since a similar breakdown has been 
performed by Harvard University researchers in the United 
4 States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Italy. 
Unfortunately, these studies were concerned with a different 
time span and only the United States' study was concerned with 
inter-strategy financial performance. The majority of these 
. dissertations explored the "stages of development" theory within 
the framework provided by these different economies. The com-
parison of the South African breakdown by strategic category 
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provides useful insight into what may be described as the 
"stage of development" of South African corporate enter-
prise. The foreign findings are directly comparable with 
those of this study sine~ all used Wrigley's basic framework. 
The findings for France, West Germany, the United Kingdom 
i 
and Italy are given in Table 6-1. 
A. 
B. 
c. 
D. 
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Table 6--1 
The Evolution of Strategic Categories Over 
Time in France, W~st Germany F the United Kingdom 
and Italy: 1950-1970 
1950 1960 1970 
% of Firms % of Firms % of Firms 
in Category in Category in Category 
France 
Single 42.0% 28.0% 16.0% 
Dominant 21.0 27.0 32.0 
Related 33.0 40.0 42.0 
Unrelated 4.0 5.0 10.0 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
West Germany 
Single 34,0% 22,0% 22,0% 
Dominant 26,0 28,0 22,0 
Related 32,0 40,0 38,0 
Unrelated 7,0 9,2 18,0 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
United K~ngdom 
Single 33.7% 18.8% 6.0% 
Dominant 40.2 36.5 34.0 
Related 23.9 39.6 54.0 
Unrelated 2.2 5.1 6.0 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Italy 
Single 30,0% 23,0% 10,0% 
Dominant 24,0 20,0 33,0 
Related 43,0 53,0 52,0 
Unrelated 4,0 3,0 5 0 
TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Sources: Dyas, Gareth P., "The Strategy and Strµcture of French 
Industrial Enterprise"; Thannheizer, Heinz T., "The 
Strategy and Structure of German Industrial Enterprise,"; 
Channon, Derek F., "The Strategy and Structure of British 
Enterprise"; Pavan, Robert J., "The Strategy and Italian 
Enterprise", Doctoral Dissertations, Graduate SchQQl of 
Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 
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The comparison between the South African results and 
the United States' experience is even more revealing since 
Rumelt's methodology expands Wrigley's four major categories 
into nine sub-categories. 5 See Table 6-2 and Figure 6-5 below. 
Table 6-2 
Major and Sub-Category Strategic Groups 
in the United States:l949, 1959 & 1969 
Strategic Category 
Major Groups 
Single Business 
Dominant Business 
Related Business 
Unrelated Business 
Sub-Categories 
Single Business 
Dominant-Vertical 
Dominant-Constrained 
Dominant-Linked 
Dominant-Unrelated 
Related-Constrained 
Related-Linked 
Unrelated-Passive 
Conglomerate 
Percentage in 
United States 
1949 1959 1969 
34,5 16,2 6,2 
35,4 37,3 29,2 
26,7 40,0 45,2 
3,4 6,5 19,4 
34,5 16,2 6,2 
15,7 14,8 15,6 
18,0 16,0 7,1 
o, 9 3,8 5,6 
o, 9 2,6 0,9 
18,8 29,l 21,6 
7,9 10,9 23,6 
3,4 5,3 8,5 
o,o 1,2 10,9 
Each Category 
South Africa 
1976 
35,3. 
39,2 
J. 2, 9 
12,6 
35,3 
7,9 
18,9 
7,9 
5 ,o 
6,8 
5,8 
6,8 
5,8 
Source: Rumelt, Richard P., "Strategy, Structure and Economic 
Performance", Doctoral Dissertation, Graduate School of 
Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 
1972, Page 90. 
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6.3.2. The Financial Performance of the Total Population 
The data presented in Table 6-4 are the mean values 
and related statistics of the total population for each of 
the variables specified in Chapter 5. 
Table 6-4 
Financial Performance Statistics for Total Population 
Standard 
Variable 
Growth of Total 
Invested Capital 
Growth of Cash Flow 
Growth of Sales 
Growth of Total Sales 
Growth of Dividends 
per Share 
Growth of Earnings 
Beforl=~ Interest and 
Taxes 
Growth of Profit After 
Tax 
Growth of Profit After 
Tax and After Preference 
Dividends 
Growth of Book Value of 
Equity 
Growth of Earnings Per 
Share 
Growth of Total Funds 
Employed 
Return on Invested 
Capital After Tax 
Return on Equity After 
Tax 
Beta 
Beta Adjusted for 
Leverage Uunlevered) 
GTINC 
GCFLOW 
GSALES 
GTDBT 
GDPS 
GEBIT 
GPAT 
GP ATP 
GBVEQ 
GEPS 
GTFE_ 
ROIAT 
ROEAT 
BETA 
BET UL 
Mean 
.1435 
.1362 
.1150 
.1810 
.0778 
.1866 
.1641 
.1640 
.1376 
.1203 
.139 
.1410 
.2401 
.887 
.659 
Deviation 
.1375 
• 2744 
.1257 
.1600 
.1591 
.2143 
.2973 
.2972 
.1264 
.2081 
.110 
.1830 
.1730 
. 510 
.3798 
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'l'hese variables were calculated from the raw data accor-
ding to the procedures described in Chapter 5. Computer pro-
grams were written expressly for this research and included 
data manipulation and mean and standard deviation calculations. 
The advanced statistical procedures were performed by sub-
routine programs drawn from "The Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences" (SPSS) and the "Analysis of Quantitative 
Data" (AQD) programs at the Graduate School of Business Admin-
istration, Harvaid University. The financial performance of 
the total population is somewhat higher than anticipated if 
taken at face value. However, the fact that the data have 
not been adjusted for inflation should be borne in mind and 
thus the performance in real terms was relatively poor. 
The overall corporate compound growth rate has averaged around 
14 percent per annum. Total of Funds Employed averaged growth 
of 13.9 percent, Total Invested Capital averaged growth of 14.5 
percent_and Profit After Tax grew an average of 16.2 percent. 
These growth rates are all consistent with one another. The 
relatively high growth of Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
of 18.1 percent does not, howevei, flow through to the growth 
of Profit after Tax of 16.2 percent. This is probably due to 
rising interest rates and corporate taxes over this period. An 
interesting and disturbing feature revealed by the overview of 
total population performance is that the Growth of Total Debt is 
grown at 18.4 percent per annum while Growth of Book Value of 
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Equity has grown at only 14.0 percent. This observation 
prompted an investigation of the trend in Debt Ratios for 
the population and strategic categories. Table 6-5 presents 
these results. 
! 
. I Table 6-5 
Debt Ratios by Strategic Category Over Period 1970-1976 
Strategic Category 
Single 
Dominant-Vertical 
D:ominant-·Constrained 
Dominant-Linked 
Dominant-Unrelated 
Related-Constrained 
Related-Linked 
Unrelated-Passive 
Conglomerate 
TOTAL POPULATION 
1970 
41. 7 
4206 
44.8 
44.0 
38.5 
39.8 
42.8 
41.7 
41. 7 
42.3 
1971 
42.5 
43.8 
46.5 
43.3 
40.9 
43.9 
48.0 
47.4 
44.5 
44.5 
1972 
43.5 
43.6 
47.0 
41. 5 
38.8 
46.0 
47.1 
51.1 
44.3 
44.5 
Year 
1973 
42.9 
45.7 
47.7 
35.3 
. 40. 2 
44.5 
48.8 
50.8 
45.9 
44.2 
1974 
45.6 
44.3 
49.6 
33.0 
42.6 
49.2 
50.8 
53.1 
48.4 
46.9 
1975 
44.4 
45.5 
49.2 
39.7 
42.2 
50.7 
52.5 
53.6 
50.0 
47.6 
1976 
43.8 
46o0 
49.3 
44.6 
43.6 
47.0 
47.2 
55,0 
48.0 
46.8 
Note: Debt Ratio is defined as:· 
-Long Term Debt Plus Current Liabilities 
Total Liabilities 
·This trend is considered ominous. lUl categories show a 
continual worsening of the debt ratio. This trend may be partly 
explained by the effects of inflation and inadequate depreciation , 
allowances. This means that firms are forced to borrow to finance 
asset replacement. The categories with most serious deterioration 
in the Debt Ratio are the Related-Constrained and Unrelated-
Passive groups with the percentage of debt in the capital structure 
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rising 39.8 percent to 47.0 percent (an increase of 7.2 
percent) and 41.7 percent to 55.0 percent (an increase of 
13.3 percent) respectfully. 
The evidence of deteriorating debt ratios leads to the 
conclusion that firms are finding the equity sources of 
nJw equity and retained earnings inadequate. The Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange has been a particularly poor source of new 
equity in the form of eight issues over the 1970-1976 period 
and thus firms have been forced to rely mainly on retained 
earnings. Thus it seems reasonable to hypothesize that under 
relatively depressed economic conditions - especially after 
the "oil crisis" of late 1973, firms would reduce their di-
vident payments and the divident payout ratios would decline. 
A summary of dividend payout ratios for the strategic cate-
gories is given in Table 6-6. 
Table 6-6 
Dividend Payout Ratios By Strategic 
Strai:.egic 
Categories 
ear 
Category 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Single .596 .579 .544 .574 .676 .593 .629 
Dominant-Vertical .671 .432 .585 .622 .586 .616 .570 
Dominant-Constrained .599 .585 .582 .639 .675 .681 .632 
Dominant-Linked .597 .554 .589 .670 .720 .696 .760 
Dominant-Unrelated .618 .472 .393 .256 .461 .587 .543 
Related-Constrained .628 .662 .613 .617 .642 .696 .707 
Related-Linked .541 .584 .607 .649 .674 .695 .586 
Unrelated-Passive .508 .436 .484 .599 .663 .660 .679 
Conglomerate .586 .535 .567 .625 .645 .679 .680 
TOTAL POPULATION .599 .565 .554 .607 .663 .650 .647 
Note: 
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Dividend Payout Ratio = Dividend Per Ordinary Share Earnings Per Ordinary Share 
The results are not as expected. Instead of reducing 
the amount of funds paid to shareholders - firms have tended 
to increase the percentage paid out as dividendso Only two 
strategic categories show a decrease in the divident payout 
ratio over the period. The Dominant-Vertical and Dominant-
Unrelated groups reduced payouts from 67.1 percent to 57.0 
percent and 61.8 percent to 54.3 percent respectively. The 
most rapid increase in dividend payout over the period was 
made by the Unrelated-Passive group. This group's dividend 
payout rose from 50.8 percent to 67.9 percent of earnings 
~er share - an increase of 34 percent. 
6.4 Testing of the Hy:e._othesis 
The testing of the major hypotheses developed in Chapter 
5 will be presented in three sections to conform with the 
general nature of those hypotheses. It will be recalled that 
the hypotheses were grouped into three groups: 
Hypotheses relating to Growth, 
Hypotheses relating to Returns, and 
Hypotheses relating to Risk. 
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6.4.1. The Evaluation of Growth Performance 
6.4.1.1 Analysis of Means and Standard Deviations 
It was hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis Gl: Conglomerate firms will grow most 
rapidly on all variables except 
Earnings per Share (GEPS) and 
Dividends per Share (DGPS). 
The results of the analysis of the growth variables are 
given in Table 6-7. 
It is immediately apparent that the conglomerate group 
are above the total population mean for every variable. Even 
more significant is the fact that on three variables, namely 
Sales, Profits after tax and Total Funds Employed, the conglom~ 
erate performance is more than double the population average. 
On a further four variables, Growth of Total Invested Capital, 
Earnings before Interest and Taxes, Book Value and Equity and 
Earnings per Share, Conglomerate Growth exceeds the population 
mean by more than 50 percent. By any standard, this is an 
impressive performance. The variability of the group as measured 
by the standard deviation, is also relatively low in comparison 
to the total population. 
Hypothesis Gl holds that the conglomerate group would grow 
most rapidly on all variables except GDPS and GEPS. This hypo-
thesis is not supported by the results. The hypothesis predicts 
-·------------ ----- ----- ··-- ~- ---- ------ -----·-· ·---------- ------ --- ------------
Table 6-7 
'·· 
Financial Perfonnance by Strategic Category for Growth Variables, 1970-1976 
I STRATEGIC CATEGORY 
Graflth Variable Single Dan-Vert. ·Dan-Con. Dan-Link Dan-Unr. Rel-Con. Rel-Link Unrelated Cong • 
G'l'INC Mean .1155 .0559 .1732 • 1921 .0978 .1897 .1289 .1466 .2677 
Std.Dev. .1273 .2285 .0902 .1789 .1118 .1203 .1227 .1454 .1405 
Mean .1158 .0452 .2018 .1531 .0484 .1499 .1679 .1449 .1709 
GCFIDW Std.Dev. .3376 .3157 .2101 .1263 .2243 .1350 .2147 .3028 .2851 
Mean .0772 .1064 .1336 .0798 
--
.1177 .1429 .1524 .1400 .2438 
GSALES Std.Dev. .0988 .1472 .1449 .1169 .1122 .1056 .1493 .1223 .1885 
Mean .0432 -.0299 .1574 .0849 .0482 .1373 .0879 - .1011 .1055 w U1 GDPS Std.Dev. .1781 .2098 .1343 .1256 .1573 .1335 .1317 .1542 .1221 ......i 
. GEBIT Mean .1172 .1547 .2419 .2059 .1383 .2369 .2431 .2257 .3297 
Std.Dev. .2665 .1957 .1412 .1164 .1928 .1261 .2270 .2462 .2204 
GPA'l' Mean .1059 .0533 .2570 .1632 .1144 .2270 .1680 ~1650 .3387 
Std.Dev. .3567 .3192 .2201 .2294 .1885 .1252 .3374 .3017 .3332 
GPATP Mean .1057 .0366 .2400 .1988 .1251 .2291 .1727 .1830 .3284 
Std.Dev. .3642 .3557 .2005 .1395 .2043 .1284 .3374 .3108 .3178 
GBVEQ Mean .1217 .0568 .1747 .1528 .0854 .1532 .1446 .1305 .2353 
Std.Dev. .1343 .2209 .0900 .0752 ~1170 .0767 .1061 .1318 .1238 
GEPS Mean .0791 .0285 .2066 .1299 .0671 .1590 .1241 .1394 .1825 
Std.Dev. .2254 .2577 .1626 .1779 .1701 .1368 .2211 .2295 .1849 
G'I'FE Mean .0688 .0470 .1127 .0928 .1359 .1197 .1234 .0880 .2116 
Std.Dev. .0909 .0838 .0995 .0914 .1573 .0952 .1247 .1113 .1605 
358 
correctly on ten of the eleven growth variables. The conglom-
erate group was the most rapidly growing on.all variables as 
predicted except for GCFLOW. On this variable, instead of 
leading the strategic categories, the conglomerate group, whose 
_cash flow grew at 14.49 percent, fell behind the Dominant-
Constrained category whose cash flows grew at an average of 
. 20 •
1
18 percent. On the two variables on which the conglomerates 
were expected to lag, namely GEPS and GDPS, this group were 
the second most rapid growth category. The rankings on all the 
growth variables are given in Table 6-8 below. 
Table 6-8 
Rankings by Strategic Category on all Growth Variables 
Growth ! RANK 
Variable 1st .2nd 3rd - 4th 5th 6th 7th. 8th 9th 
GT INC CON D-L R-C D-C UP R-L s D-U D-V 
GCFLOW D-C CON R-L D-L R-·C UP s D-U D-V 
GSALES CON R-L R-C U-P D-C D-U DV D-L s 
GDPS D-C R-C CON UP R-L D-L D-U s D-V 
GE BIT CON R-L D-C R-C UP D-L D-V D-U s 
GPAT CON D-C R-C R-L UP D.;..L D-TJ s D-V 
GBVEQ CON D-C R-C D-L R-L UP s D-U D-V 
GEPS D-C CON R-C UP D-L R-L s D-U D-V 
GTFE CON D-U R-L R-C D-C D-L UP s D-V 
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The pattern presented in Table 6-8 suggests that two 
other strategic groups are producing very high rates of 
growth. These are the Dominant-Constrained and Related-
Constrained groups. , Conversely, the Single and Dominant-
Vertical groups are seen to be growing relatively slowly 
or almost every variable analyzed. 
In order to guage the growth performance of the major 
strategic categories the Single, Dominant, Related and 
Unrelated groups were analyzed. The results are presented 
in Table 6-9 below. 
Table 6-9 
Growth Performance by Major Strategic Category 
Growth Major Strategic Category 
Variable Single Dominant. Related Unrelated 
GT INC Mean .1155 .1437 .1627 .2020 
Std. Dev. .1273 .1562 .1235 .1537 
GCFLOW Mean .1158 .1407 .1579 .1568 
Std. Dev. .3376 .2318 .1724 ·. 2908 
GSALES Mean .0772 .1152 .1471 .1874 
Std. .Dev. .0988 .1362 .1250 .1623 
GDPS Mean .0432 .0909 .1154 .1031 
Std. Dev. .1781 .1681 .1331 .1384 
GE BIT Mean .1172 .2037 .2397 .2732 
Std .. Dev. .2665 .1598 .1753 .2372 
GPAT · Mean .1059 .1786 .2008 .2444 
Std. Dev. .3567 .2519 .2412 .3238 
GP ATP Mean .1057 .1759 .2040 .2495 
Std. Dev. .3642 .2415 .2420 .3179 
GBVEQ Mean .1217 .1350 .1494 .1784 
Std. Dev. .1343 .1355 .0896 .1370 
GEPS Mean .0791 .1373 .1435 .1591 
Std. Dev. .2254 .2003 .1773 .2084 
GTFE Mean .0688 .0984 .1213 .1445 
Std. Dev. .0909 .1067 .1076 .1477 
C· 
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Despite the fact that the average of major category of 
"unrelated" firms is lowered by the "unrelated-passive" 
sub-category, this category shows a superior growth rate for 
eight of the ten variables analyzed. The "single" business 
\ 
category by contrast, produces the slowest growth rate on 
every variable. · 
The advantages of the Unrelated strategy are further 
emphasized by the variability of these growth rates as measured 
by the standard deviation of the growth variables. When com-
pared with the "Single" business category, despite the rela-
tively high growth rates achieved, the "unrelated" group has 
lower Standard Deviation Values on six of the ten variables. 
Probably the most "telling" comparison is made by examining the 
GSALES, GEBIT and GPAT variables. The "unrelated" group ex-
panded sales at 243 percent of that of the single group, and pro-
duced a growth in EBIT and PAT of 233 percent and 231 percent 
of that of the Single Business firms respectively. Although 
experiencing higher sales variability with a standard deviation 
of 16.23 percent compared to 9.88 percent for the single group, 
the "unrelated" group experienced lower standard deviation 
values of 23.72 percent and 32.38 percent for GEBIT and GPAT 
wnile the "single" group produced values of 26.65 percent and 
35.67 percent respectively. Thus despite higher sales volatility 
the "unrelated" group was able to smooth EBIT and PAT fluctua-
tions considerably. 
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In response to the argument that the conglomerate and 
Unrelated-Passive are different strategies given Bergrs 
findings regarding the differing structure of their corporate 
head office staff, the growth performance can be compared by 
analyzing the data in Table 6-7 above. 6 
The strategi~s are radicall¥ different in growth perfor-
rnance. The Conglom2rate group is vastly superior to the 
"Unrelated-Passive 11 group with average GPAT _growth more than 
double that of the "Unrelated-Passive" group while standard 
deviation values are comparable at 30.17 percent and 33.32 
percent respectively. Hypothesis Gl and G2 are thus accepted 
since performance on all the growth variables are as predicted 
except for GCFLOW. 
Hypothesis G3 stated: 
The more diversified firms occupying those 
strategies deemed to be more diversified 
will exhibit growth rates greater than less 
diversified strategies. Thus the rank order 
in terms of growth variables GTINC, GTFE, 
GCFLOW and GSALES will be Unrelated, Related, 
Dominant and.Single. 
This hypothesis is confirmed and the predicted direction of 
the rapidly growing strategies is even more striking than that 
expected. The "more-diversified" strategies are faster growing 
than the more industry bound strategies on every variable. 
It has been anticipated that the "more-diversified" firms would 
grow rapidly as a result of their more aggressive, external 
growth orientated strategy. However, problems of control and 
integration were expected to affect the remaining variables ad-
versely. However., the evidence points not only to more rapid 
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but also more stable growth as evidenced by the standard 
deviation data. 
Since the Unrelated and Related groups were expected 
to be operating in areas where their "core-skills" were 
less likely to bring about increased effectiveness and 
efficiency it was hypothesized in Hypothesis G4 as follows: 
The Dominant-Constrained group will pro-
duce the best overall performance from a 
growth point of view and product at least 
above average performance. 
The ranking data presented in Table 6-8 shows that the 
Dominant-Constrained group showed the most rapid growth in 
variables GCFLOW, GDPS and GEPS. This group ranked second 
in variables GPAT and GBVEQ, third on variable GEBIT, and 
fourth on variable GTINC and fifth on GSALES and GTFE. 
However, the conglomerate group shows an even more constrained 
and high performance pattern. The Dominant-Const.rained group 
do produce the fastest growth on variables GDPS and GEPS as 
predicted by Hypothesis Gl. The hypothesis nevertheless is 
rejected and· the Dominant-Constrained group, whilst producing 
above average growth lagged far behind the Conglomerate group 
on a number of variables. 
Since the more diversified strategies, characterized by 
the Unrelated and Related strategies are likely to experience 
more numerous requests for capital resources due to their en-
try into growth markets, Hypothesis GS, anticipating a cash 
stringency situation in these strategies, stated: 
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The Unrelated and Related categories will 
produce a slower rate of dividend growth. 
Analysis of the dividend payout ratio data reveals that 
the hypothesis must be riejected. The average payout and 
GDPS data are given in Table 6-10 below. 
Table 6-10 
Average Dividend Payout Ratios and Growth in Dividends 
Per Share for all Sub-Categories: 1970-1976 
Strategic Dividend Payout 
_s_u_b_-_c_a_t_e--"'g_o_r~y~-~~~~~~Ratio Average 
Single 
Dominant-Vertical 
Dominant-Constrained 
Dominant-- Linked 
Dominant-Unrelated 
Related-Constrained 
Related-Linked 
Unrelated-Passive 
Conglomerate 
.5987 
.5831 
.6276 
•. 6551 
.4757 
.6521 
.6194 
.5756 
.6167 
GDPS 
.1059 
.0533 
.2570 
.1632 
.1144 
.2270 
.1680 
.1650 
.3387 
The results show that Hypothesis GS is not supported by 
the evidence. Apart from the 25.70 percent dividend growth 
rate of the Dominant-Constrained group, the diversified firms 
show relatively high average payout ratios and dividend 
growth rates. This tendency may be due to the more diversified 
firm's propensity to adopt the external/take over route to 
growth. Since firms prefer to use their shares to pay for an 
acquisition and may be attempting to use dividends to support 
their share prices. Based on the evidence, the hypothesis is 
rejected. 
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I 
The industry-bound strategies of Single Business and 
Dominant-Vertical are likely to have experienced low growth 
over the period. Hypothesis G6 stated: 
Single business and Dominant-Vertical 
firms will have growth rates significantly 
lower than other strategies. 
This hypothesis is accepted since the Single Business 
group does not rank higher th.an seventh on any variable and 
the Dominant-Vertical group is last on seven of the nine 
variables measured. These two groups, as can be expected, 
do not achieve the population's mean performance on any 
variable. 
Hypothesis G7 states: 
Dominant-Constrained and Dominant-Linked 
firms will achieve superior performance 
in terms of growth than Dominant-Unrelated 
firms. 
This hypothesis provides a useful framework to analyze a 
group of Dominant Business firms that have been unable or un-
willing -to diversify to an extent exceeding 30 percent of 
their operations. This group is substantial in number and 
constitutes 39.21 percent of the population. The Dominant-
Unrelated group does not quaaify as superior growth firms since 
they exceed the population mean on only .two variables - GSALES 
and GTFE. The other Dominant Business categories exceed the 
population means consistently. This hypothesis is thus accepted. 
- - --·-·-··-·----·-·-----~-...h...~-·-·-----.. ---- ·-· 
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6.4.1.2. Statistical Analysis 
This study analyzes the performance and risk of ALL 
the quoted industrial firms on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange that followed the same strategy as defined by 
the amount and manner of diversification. Thus all values 
are for the total population and any difference is significant. 
Other studies have extracted samples from a population and 
thus are subject to statistical error. This study analyzes 
the total population and consequently avoids these problems. 
In addition, more firms are included in this study. For ex-
ample, tbe Single Business group alone has almost as many 
7 
f;i.rms as Rumelt had in his total sample of firms. This study 
has 98 firms in the Single Business category while Rumelt 
·analyzed a sample of 100 firms drawn from the "Fortune 500." 
However, in order to broaden the applicability of this 
study it was decided to examine the differences in mearrs of the 
firms in the population to establish whether the performance 
differences were statistically significant. The results are 
presented in Tables 6~11, 6-12, and 6-13 for the major stra-
tegic groups, the Unrelated group divided into Unrelated-
Passive and conglomerates and the sub-categorie_~- respectively. 
The major groups, the sub-categories and separated Unrelated 
suht:icategories are distinguished by the codes CAT4, CAT9, and 
CATS, respectively. 
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TABLE 6-11 
"F"~Ratio Results for Major Groups (CAT 4) 
Statistical 
Growth Variables "F" Statistic Signif i_cance 
GT INC 3.469 0.0169 
GCLFOW 0.328 0.8051 
GS ALES 7.508 0.0001 
GDPS 2.578 0.0540 
GE BIT 6.275 0.0004 
GPAT 2.316 0.0760 
GP ATP 2.453 0.0636 
GBVEQ 1. 743 0.1536 
GEPS 2.079 0.1032 
GTFE 5.128 0.0018 
The.statistical results given in Table 6-11 above show 
clearly that the differences between the major category means 
are statistically significant, that the differences are not 
attributable to chance and that strategic category does 
"matter" in respect to growth performance. The only exceptions 
from a statistical point of view are GCFLOW and GBVEQ which 
are significant at the 80.5 percent and 15.36 percent level. 
• i 
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TABLE 6-12 
"F"-Ratio Re~ults for Five Categories (CAT 4) 
Statistical 
Growth Variables "F" Statistic Significance 
GT INC 4.251 0. 0.0 2 4 
: 
GCFLOW 0.264 0.9006 
GSALES 7.218 0.0000 
GDPS 1. 928 0.1060 
GEBIT 5.235 0.0004 
GPAT 2.478 0.0444 
GP ATP 2.359 0.0538 
GBVEQ 2.759 0.0282 
GEPS 1. 649 0.1622 
GTFE 6.972 0.0000 
The results of further fragmenting the four major groups into 
five groups by separating the Conglomerate group from the 
Unrelated-Passive group are also very meaningful in statistical 
terms. Statistical significance between the CAT 5 means has 
improved for GTINC, GSALES, GPAT, GPATP, GBVEQ, and GTFE. Using 
this distinction the GBVEQ has become significant while the 
significance values for GCFLOW, GDPS and GEPS have deteriorated. 
The overall conclusion is that in growth terms, the distinction 
between the Unrelated-Passive and the Conglomerate group is a 
meaningful one. 
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The overall power of the methodology is further demon-
strated when the major groups are divided into the ni.ne 
categories defined in Chapter 5. The statistical results 
are given in Table 6-13 below. 
TABLE 6-13 
"F" Statistics for Nine Sub-·Categories (CAT 9) 
Statistical 
Growth Variables II F II Statistic Significance 
GT INC 4.399 0.0001 
GCFLOW 0.992 0.4424 
GSALES 3.971 0.0002 
GDPS 3.971 0.0002 
•GEBIT 3.129 0.0021 
GPAT 2.324 0 .. 0199 
GP ATP 2. 20·5 0.0274 
GBVEQ 3.449 0.0008 
GEPS 2.609 0.0092 
GTFE 4.549 0.0000 
These results are more favorable than expected. Apart 
from GCFLOW, all variables show statistical significance at 
the 0.05 level and seven are significant at the 0.01 or 
lower level. 
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6.4.1.3 Growth Analysis Summary 
The findings show conclusively that the strategic pos-
ture which South African industrial firms have adopted 
towards diversification, has an important influence on 
growth performance. The companies were divided into cat-
' 
egories of nine, four and five sub-groups and differences 
be~ween the category means are shown to be significant. In 
growth terms, the seven hypotheses developed in Chapter 5 
and which were based on the theory of corporate development 
and growth, were accepted in five cases, rejected in one 
and produced mixed results in another. 
6.4.2 The Evaluation of Return Performance 
The evaluation of return is an important aspect of any 
analysis of corporate performance since it constitutes one 
of the two components by which value and wealth are measured. 
It is however, subject to considerable difficulties in measure-
ment. The general formula is: 
Return = Profit/Income 
Investment 
The problems in measuring .return are concerned with both 
numerator and denominator. The calculation of profit is sub-
ject to many different definitions and valuations. Problems 
arise in the measurement and valuation of sales, cost.of goods 
sold, inventory valuation, the treatment of expenses such as 
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advertising, promotional expenditure, research and develop-
ment and depreciation. The saying that "profit is what you 
define it to be" is not ·without truth. The· problems do not 
stop at the definition of profit but extend to the valuation 
of the investment. The difficulties in the valuation of 
assets purchased ten, fifteen and twenty years ago are now 
fu:rther complicated by the high, fluctuating rates of inflation. 
These issues need not be explored in depth here but are raised 
to stress that the 11 return!' results presented here are of 
limited value - these limitations do not preclude the analysis 
of such data but require that the interpretation be more cau-
tious and the weight given this analysis in the overall eval-
uation be reduced accordingly. 
6. 4. 2 .1. Analysis of Returns and Testing of Hypotheses 
The re~urns performance of the highly diversified group 
of f irrns was explored in Hypothesis Rl which proposed that: 
Unrelated-Passive firms will produce 
superior returns to Conglomerate 
firms 
This hypothesis was founded on the theory that the Unrelated-
Passive group, which has been shown by Berg to have radically 
different head office structures will produce a different per-
formance record to the conglomerate group. The large staff 
oriented structure of the Unrelated-Passive group implies greater 
managerial skill and control and this particular structure can 
be expected to produce increased profitability and hence returns. 
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The results in Table 6-14 show that the difference in 
performance is not in the predicted direction. The Unrelated-
Passive group are shown to have earned lower returns on in-
vested capital than the conglomerate group and below the pop-
ulation average - the difference between the two categories is 
almost 2.5 percent per annum. This means that the conglomerate 
group's return on invested capital averaged 17.25 percent 
above that produced by the 11 Unrelated-Passive 11 group. 'l'he var-
iability of the returns are also not as expected. The conglom-
erates have grown more rapidly and have entered unrelated areas 
by take-over - the combination of aggressive entry and high 
growth could be expected to produce high ROIAT variability but 
the evidence shows that they have been able to smooth returns. 
The hypothesis is thus rejected. 
Hypothesis R2 explored the relative effectiveness of the 
"constrained" strategy. The hypothesis states that: 
The "constrained" strategies will produce 
superior returns than "Linked", 11 Unrelated 11 , 
"Vertical" and Single Business Strategies. 
The "constrained" strategy ensures that core skills are 
exploited most advantageously since all diversifying efforts are 
"constrained" to the central product/market area. In the 
"Linked" strategy by contrast, the core skills are related to 
the central product/market area by a much more tenuous linkage 
system. The findings are presented in Table 6-15 below. 
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The comparison between the Unrelated-Passive and Conglomerate 
group is a valid one since both have specialization ratios 
of less than 0.7. The two groups ~re thus considered to be 
equally diversified. The two strategies are distinctive 
from a structural point of view and this difference should .be 
measurable in some tangible way. The previous section has 
shown the conglomerate group to be the leading strategy from a 
growth viewpoint - the larger head off ice orientation of the 
Unrelated-Passive group with its expected control emphasis 
should produce a superior "return" performance. The results of 
the comparison of the ROIAT variable are given in Table 6-14. 
TABLE 6-14 
"Unrelated-Passive" and Conglomerate Performance 
on Return on Invested Capital: 1970-1976 
Mean Return Standard 
Strategic Category 1970-1976 Deviation 
Unrelated-Passive .1374 .141 
Conglomerate .1611 .043 
Differential .. 0237 .0980 
Total Population .1410 .1830 
\ 
'·· 
\ 
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TABLE 6-15 
··Return. on Invested Capital: Constrained Strategy 
Vs. All Other: 1970-1976 
Standard 
Mean Return Deviation 
Strategy Major Category- RO TAT ROEA'f ROIAT ROEAT 
.Constrained Dominant .1659 .2618 .0530 .1100 
r 
.Related .. 1681 ~2639 .0470 .1240 
·.Linked Dominant .• 1424 .• 2173 .0450 .0850 
. " 
Related .1243 c2334 .0480 .14SO. 
·Vertical . Dominant.' .0700 '.2035 .2570 .1370 
··Unrelated ... 1486 .3437 .1060 .2770 
Single Business \. .. 1431 .2076 .270 .088 
~he hypothesis is accepted. The "constrained" strategies 
provide remarkably good average performance on both ROIAT and 
. ROEAT. These categories lag behind only one category in ROEAT -
·namely the Unrelated group. The Do.minant-Vertical ca.tegory 
is identified as a rarticularly.unattractive strategy with an 
ROIAT performance of 7.0 percent over the period. 
~he aggressive and risk taking nature of conglomerate 
firms is believed to be evident by high· 1evels of d.ebt usage 
to enable them to grow faster than average and to gear profit 
returns to relatively high ROEAT levels. It was thus hypothesized 
that: 
. ' 
( 
... 
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I 
Conglomerate firms will have experienced 
lower returns on investment but will be 
more highly geared than the less aggressive 
and industry bound Single and Dominant 
Categqries. 
t... 
The means of the 4 relevant strategic categories are 
given in Table 6-16. 
TABLE 6-16 
Comparison Between Conglomerate Single and 
Dominant Categories on Return on Invested Canital ______ __,, ___ _ 
A.nd Debt Ratio 
Strategic Category ROIAT Debt Ratio Average 
Conglomerate .1611 .4611 
Single Business .1431 .4349 
Dominant Business .1329 .4353 
The findings reveal that the conglomerate category did 
not.experience lower returns as hypothesized and their ROIAT 
mean was, on average, 12. 58 percent and 21.12 percent above 
that of the Single and Dominant category firms respectively. 
These above average returns were, however, geared to high 
Returns on Equity by the use of moderately higher levels of 
debt. The hypothesis is accepted in part. 
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In his analysis of the relative performance of ~he 
major strategic categories in the d~veloped economic 
environment of the United States, Humelt found that the 
ranking of categories in terms of ROIAT was: Related, 
Single, Dominant and Unrelated8 . It was hypothesized that: 
I The rank order for the major strategic 
categories in terms of return on invested 
capital will be - Related, Single, Dominant 
and Unrelated. 
The results comparing the United States and South AfTican 
experience are given in Table 6-17 below: 
TABLE 6-17 
Major Strategic Category Return on Invested Ca~~l 
Rankin~s: United States Vs. South Africa 
Return on Invested Capital 
United States South Africa 
Major Strategic Category Return Rank Return Rank 
Single Business .1081 2 .1431 3 
Dominant Business .0964 3 .1329 4 
Related Business .114.9 1 .1531 1 
.. 
Unrelated Business .·0949 4 .1486 2 
Thus, the rankings are found to be different. The leading 
major category is still found to be the Related Business 
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category but in the developing economy, the unrelated firms 
are seen to provide a better r~turn on invested capital. 
Similarly, the single business firms are seen to fall in 
ranking in the smaller, less developed economy. A note of 
caution in the interpretation of these results is required 
once again. The time frames over which these two studies 
are different and the economic conditions vastly different 
and should be interpreted accordingly. 
The United States experience suggests that in terms of 
ROIAT no generalizations regarding the strategy most likely 
to produce superior returns can be made. This is due to the 
United States ranking running from a reasonably diversified 
strategy (Related) to a non-diversified strategy (Single 
Business). The South African results are more consistent 
with the diversified strategies (Related and Unrelated) 
superior to the less diversified strategies (Single and 
Dominant). The hypothesis is repeated since the less devel-
oped economy appears to favour higher levels of diversifi-
cation when measured on ROIAT. 
In order .to examine the performance of the sub-categories 
the following hypothesis was proposed: 
The rank order for the strategic categories 
in terms of return on invested capital will 
be - Dominant-Constrained, Related-Constrained, 
Single, Related-Linked, Dominant-Linked, 
Dominant-Vertical, Dominant-Unrelated, Con-
glomerate and Unrelated-Passive. 
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This hypothesis is based on Rumelt's findings in the 
United States. The results for bot~ the United States 
and South Africa are given in Table 6-18: 
TABLE 6-18 
Sub-Category Return on Inve~ted Capital Rankings: 
United States Vs. South Africa 
Return on Invested Capital 
United States South Africa 
Strategic Sub-Category Return Ranking Return Ranking_ 
Single Business .1081 3 .1431 5 
Dominant-Vertical .0824 8 .0700 9 
Dominant-Constrained .0217 1 .1659 2 
Dominant-Linked ] .0869 3 .1424 6 7 Dominant-Unrelated .0994 8 
Related-Constrained .1197 2 .1681 1 
Related"'." Linked .1043 4 .1243 4 
Unrelated-Passive . 0940 6 .1374 7 
Con9lomerate .0956 5 .1611 3 
/ 
When ROIAT performance is fragmented into the,strategic 
sub-categories, the South African findings show a reasonably 
similar pattern of performance when compared to the United 
States results as revealed in Table 6-17 above. Rumelt's 
results show the highly diversified Unrelated-Passive and 
Conglomerate groups at the lowest end of the ranking scale and 
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the Dominant and Related Constrained categories leading 
the field. These results .also suggest that increased di-
versity improves ROIAT since the South African findings 
show that three of the top four rankings are occupied 
by "more diversified" groups. A striking aspect of Table 
6-18 is the high ranking of third obtained by the conglom-
erate group when compared to the< ·united States ranking of 
fifth. This provides strong support for the conclusion 
,that the less-developed economy provides high returns to a 
more diversified st~ategy. The results require that the 
hypothesis be rejected. 
6.4.2.2 Returns Analysis Summary 
This section has analyzed the Return to Invested Capital 
and Return .on Equity by Strategic Category. The hypotheses 
have been based largely on Rumelt's pioneering .study in a 
developed economic setting and the results in the developing. 
economy have beeri contrary to those expected in most cases. 
The most striking finding has been the fact that based on 
ROIAT results, increased diversification provides signifi-
cantly superior results when compared to other strategies in 
the developing economy. This study has focused largely on 
ROIAT as the measure of performance as the ratio is not in-
fluenced and has been adjusted for the effect of leverage. 
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The Return on Equity ratio, although important, is depen-
dent primarily on the Return on Investment performance of 
the firm. In addition, the following section which applies 
Capital Asset Pricing model theory to evaluate the strategic 
categories, is a more comprehensive and valid measure of 
performance thari the simple Return on Equity ratio. 
In summary, the return performance of the categories 
has been shown to be significantly different. However, the 
return ratios have serious limitations since they measure 
only return - a relatively meaningless concept unless risk 
is considered simultaneously. 
6.4.3. The Evaluation of Risk 
The study of economic issues is often complicated by 
the lack of common yardstick to measure the effects, if any, 
of different policies and strategies. As has been demon-
strated ~n previous sections of this Chapter, the impact of 
a particular strategy is difficult to assess - while a 
strategy may provide excellent growth in profits, the return 
on investment may be less than that available by investing 
in firms adopting a different strategy. A large variety of 
factors may affect the growth and returns of a particular 
firm. 
This study seeks to apply theories and constructs de-
veloped in other academic areas to the study and evaluation 
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of business strategy. The financial economists have de-
veloped a method to measure corporate performance and 
which is able to simultaneously evaluate both risk and re-
turn. This method, described in Chapter 4, is known as 
Capital Asset Pricing Model Theory. (CAPM) 
A following section presents the results of the tests 
and analyses of corporate strategy in the context of risk/ 
return as developed in CAPM theory. The theory has been 
tested empirically and has wide support as the most efficient 
technique in the measurement of investment return and risk. 
This study is the first attempt to apply CAPM theory to the 
managerially orientated diversification system proposed by 
Wrigley and refined by Rumelt. 
6.4.3.1. Testing the General Hypotheses Relating to Risk 
The first two hypotheses tested are more general in 
nature and do not utilize CAPM.'theory. Theory and evidence 
presented by Smith and Schreiner predicts that the conglom-
erate group will be reasonably efficiently diversified as 
the many different divisions are likely to operate in diverse 
and negatively correlated industries. They can thus be ex-
pected to_generate returns which have low variability. It 
was hypothesized that: 
Conglomerates will achieve lower rates of 
return variability than other categories 
as measured by the variable SDROI. 
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This hypothesis is accepted since the conglomerate group 
exhibits low levels of SDROI. The standard deviation values 
for ~he various categories are presented in Tables 6-14, 
and 6-15 above and reveal that the conglomerate group exper-
ienced a standard deviation of ROIAT of 4.3 percent. This 
is the lowest v~lue as predicted by the hypothesis and is 
considerably less than the population average of 18.3 percent. 
The conglomerate group was also expected to employ 
higher levels of debt. The following hypothesis was developed. 
The conglomerate group will possess 
higher than average debt ratios. 
Tables 6-5 and 6-16 above show that the debt ratios of 
I 
conglomerates were slightly higher than average - but not 
unduly so given the apparent stability of returns and profits 
as discussed earlier. However, the ratio of eq~ity to in-
vested capital is revealing and enables a direct comparison 
between the United States and South Africa to be made. The 
findings are given in Table 6-18. 
TABLE 6-18 
Ranking of Strategic Sub~categories in Terms of Equity/Invested 
Capital Ratio: United States and South Africa· 
South Africa 
Percentage 
improvement 
Ratio in Ratio in (deterioration) 
Strategic Sub-Category 1970 1976 Over Period 
Single Business 81. 6 83.1 1. 84 
Dominant-Vertical 80.7 76.3 (5.45) 
Dominant-Constrained 82.4 78.3 (4.85) 
Dominant-Linked 76.0 78.9 3.82 
Dominant-Unrelated 88.0 84.1 (4.43) 
Related-Constrained 85.5 72.1 (15.67) 
Related-Linked 81. 8 73.4 (4.16) 
Unrelated-Passive 84.2 69.6 (17.34) 
Conglomerate , 82.3 76.3 (7.29) 
Note: Equity/Capital = Total Shareholders Interest 
Total Invested Capital 
Average 
Value 
1970-1976 
81.00 
77.93 
79.77 
81.14 
84.73 
77.87 
75.74 
75.06 
78.61 
United States 
E/C 
Rank Ratio Rank 
3 78.1 5 
6 72.4 8 
4 80.7 2 
: 1 75. 816/7 
7 80.0 3 
0 79.8 4 u 
9 83.0 1 
5 59.1 9 
w 
co 
N 
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The first factor of interest in Table 6-18 is that· 
in 1970, when the United States and South African results 
are comparable, the ratios are not radically different 
although the South African population is slightly more 
highly geared than the United States sample. The South 
African results :also show th.at apart from two categories, 
namely the "Single" and 11 Dominant-Linked" categories, all 
categories showed a deterioration in the ratio over the 
period. A further factor of interest in that the South 
African categories provide a pattern in that the highest 
ratios (and hence most favourable) tend to be those stra-
tegies that are less diversified whilst the diversified 
categories are clustered in the less favourable range. No 
such pattern is evident in the United States' data. This 
adds weight to the argument that more diversified firms 
are able to support higher levels of debt - partially due 
to their ability to weather cyclical business and· conditions. 
The pypothesis, based on earlier studies and confirmed 
by Rumelt' s study, that conglomerates will have higher, levels· 
-:-.. __ 
of debt is not accepted. The total population average in 
South Africa over the period 1970-1976 is 79.26 percent 
and that of the conglomerate group is 78. 61. The conglom-
erates are thus acceptably close to the population average. 
The Debt-Ratio values of the South African population is pre~ 
sented in Table 6-5. The conglomerate average over the 
period is 46.11 percent while the population average is 45.26 
percent - once again a not unacceptable difference. 
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6.4.3.2. Testing Risk Hypotheses Using the CAPM 
As stated in Chapter 5, due to the concern that low 
volume shares quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
may be volume bound, only shares with an average volwne 
in excess of 200,000 shares traded per annum for 1975 
i 
and 1976 were included in the population of "beta" firms. 
This group, consisting of 87 firms is the total population 
of shares/firms for which the beta values are considered 
"reliable" and thus differences between means are 
significant. 
The first hypothesis developed was as follows; 
Conglomerate firms will have beta 
values not significantly different 
from all other firms in the 
population. 
This hypothesis is based on the theory that a well di-
versified conglomerate will have a risk and return profile 
'similar to that of the market. The means of the conglomerate 
group and all other firms is given in Table 6-20. 
TP~BLE 6-20 
MEAN VALUES OF BETA FOR CONGLOMERATE-GROUP 
AND ALL OTHER BETA FIRMS 
Strategic Mean "t" 
Categories N of Beta Statistic df. Significance 
Conglomerate 15 0.9342 
0.40 85 0.693 
Ali Other 72 0.8767 
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It will be noted that despite the fact that the dif-
ference between the beta means of 0.9342 and 0.8767 are 
significant on their own, the "t" statistic is also cal-
culated. The "t" statistic of 0.40 at 85 degrees of free-
dam is not significant and thus the hypothesis is accepted. 
If the statistical analysis is ignored, the differente is 
significant, as has already been stated, but the difference 
is not. material and the "portfolio" of conglomerate firms, 
within which betas which had a range from 1.974 to 0.402 
are included, has a mean beta which is 6.56 percent above 
the mean of all other beta firms. The hypothesis is thus 
accepted. 
It was hypothesized that firms that operated in a single 
industry or were heavily dependent on a particular industry 
would possess high systematic risk. Thus: 
The rank of the strategic categories in 
terms of· beta values will be Single, 
Dominant, Related and Unrelated. 
The mean values of beta for each of the major categories 
are given in Table 6-21. The conglomerate group is distin-
guished from the "Unrelated Grau~" in this table. 
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T]l.BLE 6-21 
BETA VJl.LUES FOR MAJOR STRATEGIC CA'rEGORIES 
Major Strategic Number of Mean 
Category Observations Beta Value Rank 
Single Business· 19 0.857 2 
Dominant Business 30 0.977 4 
Related: 'Business 15 0.377 1 
Unrelated-Passive 6 0.986 5 
Conglomerate 15 0.934 3 
The hypothesis is not accepted since the beta values do 
not decline with increasing diversification as hypothesized. 
No discernable pattern is evident from the beta values. In 
order to establish whether the 5 category breakdown is stat-
istically meaningful since the findings presented in Table 
6-14 suggest that the conglomerates have produced higher re-
turns or invested capital at lower variability - which should 
contribute to lower risk at higher return, an analysis of 
variance was performed. The "F" statistic obtained is F=3,10 
and with 4 and 80 degrees of tl.reedom is significant at the 
0.02 level. This is further, strong evidence of the validity 
of Wrigley's major categories to distinguish between firms on 
a risk/return basis. 
In order to test the validity of the sub-categories sug-
gested by Rumelt on a risk/return basis, the beta values for 
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all nine sub-categories were calculated and the means were 
compared. The findings are present~d in Table 6-22. 
TP.BLE 6-22 
MEAN VALUES FOR BETA FOR THE NINE SUB-CATEGORIES 
S"brategic Number of Mean 
Sub-Category Observations Beta Value Rank 
Single Business 19 0.857 4 
Dominant-Vertical 6 0.972 6 
Dominant-Constrained 9 1. 089 8 
Dominant-Linked 10 1. 092 9 
Dominant-Unrelated 5 0.548 2 
Related-Constrained 9 0.793 3 
Related-Linked 6 -0.247 1 
Unrelated-Passive 6 0.986 7 
Conglomerate 15 0.934 5 
These results were also tested for statistical signif-
icance. The "F" statistic isp=4.ll and with 8 and 76 
degrees of freedom is significant at the 0.0001 level. This 
means that the differences between the sub-category means 
are statistically significant. Rumel t uses the "Standard 
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Deviation of Earnings per Share" as his measure of risk. 9 
This variable is inadequate as a measure of risk. ,;Rumelt 
commenting on the fact that his measure (SDEPS) does not 
distinguish adequately writes, " ..... (the evidence suggests) 
that a composite measure of risk and return might prove 
more sensitive to category effects. 1110 
Rumeltdid not attempt to adjust for leverage in 
. . k d 11 . d b . 12 h d measuring ris . Hama a an Ru enste1n ave propose a 
methodology which enables an adjustment to be made to the 
"levered" beta which enables the "unlevered" beta to be cal-
culated. After effecting this adjustment is it possible to 
use the "unlevered" beta as a surrogate for "business risk" 
since: 
Total Risk = Financial Risk + Business Risk. 
The diversification strategy of a firm will affect only 
I 
the business risk component - thus if the means of 11 unlevered" -. 
beta are non-statistically different from one another this 
would imply financial risk is the major component and determin-
ant of systematic risk. If, on the other hand, the means are 
found to be significantly different after adjustment for lev-
erage, this would mean that business related factors play an 
important role in the determination of systematic risk. It 
would also provide support for the conviction that strategy 
impacts on systematic risk since the major categories and/or 
sub-categories are able to distinguish between the "unlevered" 
beta values. 
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It was thus hypothesized that: 
The "business 11 related risk component 
measured by the "adjusted" beta which 
eliminates the effect of financial· 
leverage and hence financial risk, 
will produce a rank ordering of 
strategic categories ~s follows: Single, 
Dominant, Related and Unrelated. The 
Single, "Dominant-Vertical" and "Dominant-
Unrelated" sub-categories will all exhibit 
high business risk. 
The beta values which were adjusted for leverage (BETAUL), 
were calculated for the major and sub-categories. The Un-
related group was again separated into Unrelated-Passive and 
Conglomerate sub-groups. The results are presented in 
Table 6-23 and 6-24. 
TABLE 6-23 
UNLEVERED BETA VALUES FOR MAJOR STRATEGIC CATEGORIES 
Major Strategic Number of Unlevered Beta 
Categories Observations -- BETA UL Rank 
Single 19 0.646 2 
Dominant 30 0.794 5 
Related 15 0.445 1 
Unrelated-Passive 6 0.733 3 
Conglomerate 15 0.679 4 
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These results show that significant differences still ·-~ 
exist between strategic categories. To test for sta-
tistical significance the "F" statistic was calculated 
and was found to be: F=2.37 and significant at the 0.06 
level. Thus, although significance has fallen from 0.02 
and 0.06 - the evidence points to the fact that business 
risk is an important component of systematic risk and that the 
major strategic categortes provide a useful framework 
to distinguish between different levels of such risk. 
'l1ABLE 6- 2 4 
UNLEVERED BETA FOR STRA.TEGIC SUB-CATEGORIES 
Strategic Number of Un levered Beta 
Sub-Category Observations = BETA UL Rank 
Single Business 19 0.646 3 
Dominant-Vertical 6 0.701 6 
Dominant-Constrained 0 0.890 9 
Dominant-Linked 10 0.829 8 
Dominant-Unrelated 5 0.663 4 
Related-Constrained 9 0.565 2 
Related-Linked 6 0.265 1 
Unrelated-Passive 6 0.733 7 
Conglomerate 15 0.679 5 
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The differences between the means of the sub-categories 
are also statistically significant as F=l.71 and is sig-
nificant at the 0.109 level. 
The sub-category analysis identifies two clusterings 
of strategy based on "unlevered" beta. The lowest 
"business risk" strategies appear to be the "Related-
Constrainedn and "Related-Linked" groups. These groups 
are lowest in "unlevered" beta terms - while the groups 
wii.th the highest "unlevered" beta are the "Dominant-
Constrained" and "Dominant-Linked" firms. The conglom-
erat~ group, in Y..eepinrg with their reasonably efficiently 
diversified "portfolios'·' and moderate leverage position 
analysed earlier, remain in the mid-range with a ranking 
of 5 in Table 6-24 and 4 in Table 6-23 above. 
The hypothesis requires that the ranking on major 
strategic category be according to ~iversification. The 
hypothesis is rejected since the single category does 
not obtain the highest "unlevered" beta and thus is hot 
perceived to possess the highest "business risk". Simil-
arly, the Single, Dominant-Vertical and Dominant-Unrelated 
groups do not exhibit significantly high "unlevered" beta 
values - .indeed, the "Dominant-Constrained'' and "Dominant-
Linked" are perceived to have even higher risk. The hy-
pothesis is thus rejected on both counts. 
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Treynor's statistic is a measure which enables the 
analyst to rank portfolio performa1~ce in· terms of both 
risk and return. In discussing this stati~tic, Treynor 
refers to the ranking of funds. This statistic is, 
however, equally applicable to portfolios of firms as 
~rouped in this study. Treynor states: 
"We have seen that, consistent with any 
specified level of the market rate of 
return, there is associated with each fund 
a range of combinations of expected port-
folio return and risk. The slope of the 
portfolio-possibility line measures the 
rate at which the individual investor 
increases the expected rate of return of 
his portfolio as his burden of portfolio 
risk increases. A comparison of slopes 
among funds provides a means of rating 
funds which transcends variations in indi-
vidual investors' attitudes toward risk. 
Although the slopes vary just a.s the mar-
ket rate of return varies, it can be 
proved that the ranking of the funds rep-
resented remains unchanged. The relative 
rankings can be read directly from the 
characteristic lines of funds to be compared. 
Differences in ranking based on the charac-
teristic lines can be quite significant 
for individual investors, even though they 
take varying attitudes toward risk. Also, 
the differences are independent of market 
fluctuations. Because the ranking measure 
has these properties, it provides a ~seful 
basis for reviewing the performance of fund 
management." ( 13) 
In or~er to gauge the overall risk/return profile of the 
categories it was hypothesized as follows: 
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When measured using Treynor's Statistic, 
the rank ordering will be as follows: 
Conglomerate, Related-Constrained, 
Related-Linked, Dominant-Constrained, 
Dominant-Linked, Dominant-Vertical, 
Dominant-Unrelated, Single and Unrelated-
Passive. 
The findings based on the Treynor Statistic by the major 
strategic.categ6ries and sub-categories are given in Tables 
6-25 and 6-26 respectively. 
TABLE 6-25 
'I'REYNOR STATIS·rrc FOR MALTOR STRATEGIC CA.TEGORIES 
Major Strategic Number of 
Category Observations •rreynor Statistic Rank 
Single Business 19 -0.628 4 
Dominant Business 30 -0.919 5 
Related Business 15 0.511 1 
Unrelated-Passive 6 -0.507 3 
Conglomerate 15 -0.411 2 
These mean values provide a "F" statistic of F-1.75 and 
the differences between means are significant at the .147 
level. Although meaningful since the means in Table 6-25 
-are for the total population - the statistical measure is not 
encouraging. The ranking is however, regarded as important 
since the mean value for the "Unrelated" group is ranked 
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second and the conglomerate sub-category is shown to 
provide a return, commensurate with the risk; that is, 
above the average of -0.4831 for the total population 
and superior to that suggested by all previous studies. 
The findings for the sub-categories are presented in 
Table 6-26 below and are presented in ranked order. 
T.ABLE 6-26 
TREYNOR STATISTIC FOR STRATEGIC SUB-CATEGORIES 
Strategic Number of Treynor 
Sub-Categories Observations Statistic Rank 
Related-Linked 6 1.613 1 
Dominant-Unrelated 5 0.043 2· 
Dominant-Linked 10 -0.064 3 
Related-Constrained 9 -0.224 4 
Conglomerate 15 -0.411 5 
Unrelated-Passive 6 -0.507 6 
Single Business 19 -0.628 7 
Dominant-Vertical 6 -1.139 8 
.. Dominant-Constrained 9 -2 .. 256 9 
The total population mean is - 0.4831 and thus the 
Treynor statistic for the first five sub-categories in Table 
6~26 has produced above average re"t;urns. The "F" value 
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calculated to measure the statistical significance between 
the sub-category means in Table 6-26 is F=2.93 and is sig-
nificant at the 0.007 level. 
Rumelt also attempted to,rank the sub-categories and 
used a statistic which he termed the "Risk Premium Ratio" 
(RPR) which is calculated as follows: 
RPR = GEPS - Risk Free Rate of Return after tax 
SDEPS 
The rankings based on this statistic for the sample 
extracted from the United States economy are compared with 
the South African results which were calculated using the 
most rigourous Treynor statistic are compared in Table 6-27 
below. 
TABLE 6-27 
RISK PREMIUM RANKINGS BY MAJOR AND 
SUB-CATEGORIES: UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 
Strategic Category 
A. Major 
Single Business 
Dominant Business 
Related Business 
Unrelated Business 
United States 
Ranking 
4 
3 
1 
2 
South African 
Ranking 
3 
4 
1 
2 
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TABLE 6-27 
(continued) 
United States South African 
Ranking_ __ Strategic Category 
B. Sub-Categories 
Single Business 
Dominant-Vertical 
Dominant-Constrained 
Dominant-Linked 
Dominant-Unrelated 
Related-Constrained 
Related-Linked 
·unrelated-Passive 
. Conglomerate 
R k' an.::u1g 
5 
7 
2 
8 
1 
4 
6 
3 
7 
8 
9 
3 
2 
4 
1 
6 
5 
Rumelt's ,findings are relatively mixed - that is, no dis-
tinct clusters are apparent. However, closer analysis reveals 
that the "Constrained" strategies rank first and second. Thus,· 
the "constrained" type strategy appears to pr.ovide relatively 
good return premiums based on the risk of the strategy in 
the mature, developed economy. 
The South African results are strikingly different from 
those of the United States. The "linked" strategies are 
ranked first and third and bracket the second and fourth 
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placed Dominant-Unrelated and Related-Constrained group. 
The results in the less developed economy suggest that 
the more diversified "linked 11 and "unrelated" strater:ries 
are superior performers. The impression of the higher 
premium being granted to the more diversified strateg·ies 
is strengthened.by the fact that the Conglomerate and 
Unrelated-Passive sub-categories are ranked fifth and sixth. 
The first six rankings are all occupied by the more di-
versified strategies while the worst risk premium cluster 
consists of the less-diversified, indu~try based categories. 
6.4.3.3 Summa~ of Risk Analysis 
The analysis of risk reveals significant differences 
between diversification strategies in terms of risk. In 
general, the higher debt usage levels, which imply high fi-
nancial risk, and identified as a feature of conglomerate 
capital structure in the developed, United States economy, 
are not associated with South African conglomerate firms. 
The average values for the Equity/Capital and Debt Ratios are 
only marginally above the population average. 
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7. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
This research on the impact. of strategy, defined as 
the extent and manner of diversification, has analysed the 
financial performance of 278 firms over a seven year period. 
The study has been based on methodology developed by earlier 
researchers whose work has shown that the methodology is able 
to distinguish between different strategies and predict per-
formance according to theories in marketing and organisational 
behaviour. . . . ,. . .. . 
It has ai'so been possible to compare the population of 
South African industrial firms with the more developed 
economies of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy and West Germany. The developing South African economy 
is facing important strategic issues. It is necessary to more 
fully understand the unique environment within which South 
African firms find themselves and to more accurately predict 
the trends that are likely to develop as the economy matures. 
7.2. Synopsis of Findings 
The findings indicate that South African firms appear 
to be following a trend toward increased diversity.of oper-
ations. This tendency toward increased diversity appears to 
be consistent with the pattern experienced in the developed 
economies. The rapidity of the move toward diversification 
may, however, not be as rapid as that experienced in the 
developed economies since these economies grew rapidly during 
the fifties and sixties, whereas the South African economy is 
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moving toward diversification during a period of slow growth 
in the global economy. 
Analysis of corporate performance indicates that the 
categories of diversification are able to distinguish between 
different levels of financial performance and that the fin-
ancial performance of strategies followed by firms in a devel-
oping environment is radically different from that in the dev-
eloped economy. 
The findings also show that strategy, as defined by the 
strategic categories, has an important impact on the risk of 
a firm as defined by beta. The fact that systematic risk, for 
which beta is a measure, is significantly affected by strategy, 
is an important finding. This result, which is not predicted 
by CAPM theory, prompted further investigation of the influence 
of strategy on business risk. By eliminating the affect of 
financial risk on the total systematic rj_sk (measured by beta) , 
it was possible to assess the impact of strategy on business 
risk. Once again, the effect is significant. 
7.3. Summary of Findings 
7.3.1. Composition of Population by Strategic Category 
The developing economy shows important differences in 
composition from the developed economies. In 1976, South 
African firms can be grouped into two groups:a more "advanced" 
and a less "advanced"group. Some 75 percent of the firms were 
not diversified to any meaningful extent. This group, made up 
·of the Single Business and Dominant Business categories, is 
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considerably larger than the more developed group which is 
made up of the Related and Unrelated categories. This latter 
group comprises some 25 percent of the population. Analysis 
of Table 6-2 above reveals that the strategic composition of 
South African firms in 1976 is not paralleled at any stage in 
any of the developed economies studied. The composition of 
the United Kingdom study in 1950 is 74 percent in the-Single/-
Dominant categories and 26 percent in the Related /Unrelated 
···categories. ·Despite this apparent similarity, the firms in· 
the economies are not at similar stages of development since 
closer analysis reveals that the South African group has a 
relatively large group of Unrelated firms in the population. 
The percentage of Unrelated firms in the United Kingdom and 
South African economies for the years 1950 and 1976 are 2,2 
·percent and 12,6 percent respectively. These findings show 
that South Africa possessed a relatively large group of.high~y 
diversified firms when compared to the United Kingdom at a 
similar stage of development. 
The South African results show that a large number of 
firms have not diversified. The single business category comprises 
over one-third of all quoted South African firms. This per-
centage of firms suggests that South African firms, when 
viewed from a "Stage of Development"point of view, are some 
twenty years behind the firms in the developed economy. The 
composition by strategic category values for the different 
) 
economies are reprod.uced in Table 7-1 to facilitate comparison. 
,--
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Table 7-1 
Composition of Firms by Strate~Category for South 
Africa in 1976 and the United States, France, the 
United Kingdom, Italy & West Germa-nv for 1950 
Percentage of Firms in Each Cateqory 
1976 1950 
i South Africa United States France U.K. Italy. W. Germc.n2 
i 
Single 36 35 42 34 30 34 
Dominant 39 35 21 40 24 26 
Related 13 27 33 24 43_ 32 
Unrelated 12 3 4 2 4 7 
The two groups in the South African population are im-
mediately visible. The Single categories are relatively similar, 
but this similarity ends when the remaining categories are con-
sidered. Firms in the developed economies had diversified more 
rapidly into the Related area and thus the percentage of firms 
in the Dominant group are less than the percentage for the 
South African population. Also, the Related group in the South 
African environment is small, while that for the developed 
economies is very much larger. The Unrelated group, on the 
other hand, reveals that a number of South African firms had 
diversified to a considerable degree. This group is, however, 
relatively small and grew out of the Stock Market boom of the 
late 1960's. The overall conclusion, is, however, that the 
majority of South African firms are still in Stage I and 
Stage II of Scott's model and the experience of the developed 
economies suggests that South African firms will continue to 
diversify over the next two decades. 
Analysis of the sub-categories in Table 6-2 above also 
reveals important differences between the South African and 
United States composition. The United States composition in 
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1950 is made up of a large group of Dominant-Vertical 
firms (15,7 percent) and of large percentages of 
Dominant-Constrained and Related-Constrained firms. South 
African firms, if the proposition that these firms in 
1976 were at a stage of development equivalent to that of 
United States firms in 1950 is accepted, also contain a· 
relatively large percentage of Dominant-Constrained firms 
(18,7 percent), but firms are very much more evenly spread 
over the remaining sub-categories. 
The United States experience shows no conglomerate 
firms and the Dominant-Linked and Dominant-Unrelated 
groups contain less than one percent of the firms studied. 
The comparable South African figures are 5,8 percent for 
conglomerates and 7,9 percent and 5,0 percent for the 
Dominant-Linked and Dominant-Unrelated groups. The South 
African and United States compositions are illustrated in 
Figure 7-1. 
I 
I 
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Figure 7-1 
Composition, by Strategic Cateaories:United States 
(1949) and South Africa (1976) 
United St.ates 
40 -
Percentage 30 
of 
Firms 20 L _[ ]_~ in Category 10 
·- .::l 
SB DV DC DL DU RC RL UP 
South Africa 
40 
Percentage 30 
of 
Firms 20 
in Category 
Where: SB = 
DC = 
DU = 
RL = 
c --
10 
SB DV DC DL DU 
Single Business; DV = Dominant-Vertical; 
Dominant-Constrained; DL = Dominant-Linked; 
Dominant-Unrelated; RC = Related-Constrained; 
Related-Linked; UP = Unrelated-Passive; and 
Conglomerate. 
c 
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7.3.2. Performance Findings 
The quantitative findings regarding performance 
are divided into three sections and are reviewed 
individually below .. 
7.3.2.1. Growth Performance Fi1y~.in~ 
.The conglomerates lead the field from a growth 
point of view. This group of firms ·11rns the fastest growing 
in six, and second fastest in two and third fastest in 
one of .the nine key growth variables analysed. Thus, 
this group was not below third fastest growing in any· 
variable. However, the conglomerate strategy, being based 
largely on aggressive, take-over behavio~r is expected to 
produce very high levels of growth and the real test of 
this group's performance lies in its return performance 
and overall risk profiles which will be discussed below in 
the relevant sections. 
The "second best"growth performances were the 
"constrained"strategies. These two strategies are based on 
what has been described as "controlled diversification". 
These findings confirm results in the United States where 
the "Constrained"strategies ranked second and third in 
GSALES,GPAT and GEPS. When measured on the same variables, 
these strategies were ranked third and fourth on GSALES, 
second and third on GPAT and first and third on GEPS. 
The United States results show that the Related-
I 
I 
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Linked strategy is a relatively poor performer from a 
growth poj_nt of view. The Related-Linked group was 
ranked fourth, seventh and sixth on the variables GSALES, 
PAT and GEPS respectively, while the South African group 
is ranked second, fourth and sixth respectively. This 
suggests that the "Linked"strategy is considerably more 
successful in South Africa than in the United States from 
a growth point of view. 
The overall growth analysis findings show that the 
less diversified strategies, namely Single Business, 
Dominant-V~ical, Dominant:....Linked and Dominant-Unrelated, / . 
are poor performers. These firms are industry-bound and 
appear to be unable to generate higher levels of growth 
in their existing business areas and those that have 
attempted to diversify into fields that are not familiar, 
such as the approach adopted by the Dominant-Linked and 
Dominant-Unrelated strategies, have been unsuccessful. 
The Dominant-Constrained group is the only exception and 
the high performance of this strategy bears powerful 
testimony to the importance of the rule of "remaining 
close to the core skills"of a firm. The poor performance 
of the Dominant-Linked and Dominant-Unrelated strategies 
probably reflects diversification efforts that have 
attempted to remain reasonably close to the core skills 
of the firms, but have been unsuccessful due to an 
inability to correctly identify the existing core skills 
and success factors in a business or industry and have 
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thus resulted in a "negative synergy" effect. 
The high performance firms have all adopted 
strategies which involve diversification to a ·relatively 
high degree. The only high performance strategy which 
does not involve diversification is the Dominant-· 
Constrained strategy which was discussed above. Clearly 
the South African business environment provides high 
growth potential to diversified firms. The United States 
evidence is mixed and the composition of firms by 
strategic category has indicated that, at a comparable 
stage of development, the South African firms tend to be 
more diversified than firms operating in the more 
developed economies. 
7.3.2.2. Rate of Return Performance 
The Dominant-Constrained and Related-Constrained 
strategies are shown to produce the best Return on 
Invested Capital performance in the developing economy with 
returns of 16,81 percent and 16,59 percent respectively. 
This pattern is confirmed by the United States, b~t the 
rankings are reversed with values of 14,91 percent and 
14,11 percent for the categories respectively. An 
important difference from the United States findings is 
that the conglomerate group rank third in ROIAT·whereas 
this group ranked fifth in the United States. This 
difference in results is important since, in the United 
l 
·1 
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States, the conglomerate group achieved an ROIAT 
value of 9,56 percent while the total sample in the study 
achieved 10,52 percent. Thus.the conglomerate group 
were somewhat below average in the United States.· In 
South Africa, on the other hand, the conglomerates 
achieved an above average ROIAT value of.16,11 percent 
while the average for the population was 14,10 percent. 
The ROIAT data provide strong evidence regarding the 
unattractive Dominant-Vertical strategy which produces an 
average of only 7 1 0 percent. Similarly, the Unrelated-
Passive group who were expected to produce significantly 
above average returns performance, due to the assumption 
that they would be more likely to utilize professional 
managers, were shown to perform at a below average ROIAT. 
The collapsing of the nine sub-categories into 
four major categories highlights the fact that, in South 
Africa, there appears to be a clustering of high and low 
performance strategies on a continuum of diversification. 
The more diversified group made up of the Related and 
Unrelated grOups rank first and second on ROIAT with the 
less diversified group in third and fourth places. This 
clustering is clearly visible from the date presented in 
Table 6-17. The United States evidence, however, shows 
no clustering. Significantly, the Single Business group 
are ranked second while the Unrelated group are ranked 
fourth. Once again, diversity is favoured in the develop-
ing economic environment. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
- ' 
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7.3.2.3. The Findings Relatin~ to Risk 
7.3.2. Analysis of Standard Deviation 
Risk was defined as variability of earnings and 
when SDROI is used as a measure, the conglomerate group, 
were found . to exhibit very low levels of variation. 
The average value of SDROI for the population was 18,30 
percent, whilst that of the conglomerate group was only 
4,3 percent~ All other sub-categories, except Single 
Business, exhibited higher SDROI values. The conglomerate 
. . 
group have been able to produce high growth, coupled 
with high returns at low levels of returns variability. 
The risk of a firm can be divided into business 
·and financial risk components. A portion of this financial 
risk is.measured by the degree of financial leverage in 
the firm's capital structure. The conglomerate group of 
firms have been found to employ high levels of debt in 
the United States, but the evidence reveals that this 
does not hold true for South Africa. Conglomerates were 
found to have increased their leverage and that their 
Equity/Invested Capital ratio has deteriorated by 7,29 
percent over the period. This deterioration, although 
significant, was not serious since this ratio for both 
the Related-Constrained and Unrelated-Passive groups had 
deteriorated even more rapidly. The findings also show 
that the more diversified firms tend to be more highly 
leveraged. No such clustering was found to exist in the 
United States. In addition, the findings_ show th~£ ~outh 
I 
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. 
African conglomerate firms are not as aggressive in 
their use of debt as their American counterparts. 
7. 3. 2. 3. 1. Analysis of Systematic Risk 
The risk pr6file of a firm is dependent on many 
different variables and the study has made use of CAPM 
theory to measure the overall risk profiles of firms. 
This theory was then applied to assess the business risk 
component of systematic risk as the betas were adjusted 
to eliminate the effect of leverage_on beta. The appli-
cation of the CAPM to the population data produced 
important· results. 
Firstly1 the conglomerate group were shown to have 
beta values that were not significantly different from 
the betas·of the total population. Secondly, the con-
glomerate firms, with their outstanding growth, returns, 
low returns variability and moderate gearing, are seen to 
rank fifth, when measured by beta. This indicates fairly 
high systematic risk. The Unrelated group, when taken as 
a whole, have a beta value of 0,949 and rank third in 
systematic risk behind the Related and Single Business 
categories. This beta value is above the population 
average 0,887. The findings reveal that beta does not 
decline with increasing diversification. Indeed, the 
theory of diversification suggests that increased diversi-
f ication will cause beta to regress toward the mean for 
the population. The results indicate that the conglomerate 
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group and the Unrelated group taken as a whole, have 
above average beta values. Clearly, high levels of 
diversification are perceived as being high risk to the 
extent that beta values are above average. ~rhis suggests 
that investors are adding additional "units"of risk to 
these groups due to what may be termed "management risk". 
Concern that the management of Unrelated and Conglomerate 
firms do not fully understand the diverse operations of 
divisions and subsidiaries and that manageJTient m&y be 
unable to deal with a management crisis should one arise 
are examples of situations which give rise to increased 
"management risk~' 
The overall beta pattern shows that the Unrelated-
Passive group are regarded as possessing the highest level 
of systematic risk. These firms are believed to be 
managed by professional managers and the results are sur-
prising. These firms are expected to be well managed. 
Although this group produced average growth over the 
period, their return performance was disappointing, being 
low and suffering from relatively high variability as 
measured by SDROI. 
A further interesting finding was that the Dominant-
.. 
Constrained group had high beta values. This strategy 
produced outstanding growth and returns performance over 
the period. Thus the conclusion must be that high depen-
dence on an industry, technology or product is regarded 
. - .... - --
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as high risk. 'l'he Dominant group as a whole, with a 
beta value of 0,977, has the highest systematiC risk. 
The fact that this group are diversified, albeit to a 
limited extent, appears to produce high systematic risk 
since the Single Business group have a lower beta value 
of 0,857. The market thus appears to favour no diversi-
fication or a reasonable degree of diversification since 
the Related.group has the lowest beta with a value of 
0,377. The pattern suggested by the findings is as 
illustrated in Figure 7-2. 
1,0 
o, 9 
0,8 
Systematic 0,7 
Risk 0,6 
0,5 
0,4 
0,3 
Figure 7-2 _ 
Degree of Diversification & Systematic Risk 
0.857 
Zero 
(Single) 
_9.9TJ_ 
.. 
Low 
(Dominant) 
0.377 
Moderate 
(Related) 
0. 94.9 
High 
(Unrelated) 
Degree of Diversification 
Unfortunately, these findings cannot be compared with 
the experience in the developed economies since no 
previous research has been done in this area. 
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The results are all highly signj_ficant and show 
that the methodology is able to explain systematic risk -
an important finding since no' previous research has been 
able to explain and assess the impact of diversification 
on systematic risk. 
7.3.2.3.2. Analysis of Beta Adjusted for Financial Risk 
The results of this analysis show that, when the 
effects of financial leverage are eliminated from beta ·-
the category differences are significant. Thus, the 
effect of strategy on the business risk component can be 
measured. The related group are the lowest systematic 
risk category and are followed by the Single Business 
category. This pattern is the same as the pattern for 
the unadjusted betas. The ranking changes dramatically 
thereafter since the more diversified group improve their 
ranking from third and fifth for unadjusted beta to third 
and fourth for unlevered beta for the Unrelated-Passive 
and Conglomerate groups respectively. 
The related group with moderate levels of diversi-
fication prove to possess the lowest levels of business 
. risk, whilst the Dominant stra.teg ies possess high business 
risk. The low beta for the Single Business group is un-
anticipated. Although the Single Business, Dominant-
Unrelated and Conglomerate groups have unlevered beta 
values that are fairly clustered (the values are 0,646, 
414 
0,663 and 0,679 respectively), the findings again con-
firm that the Dominant type strategy is perceived, 
despite excellent financial performance in the case of 
the Dominant-Constrained group, to possess high business 
risk. The Dominant-Constrained group actually have the 
highest unlevered beta (See Table 6-24). One· possible 
explanation is that the market believes these firms to 
be "unskilled" in the management of diversity and will have 
to prove the value of such a strategy and their ability 
and commitment to this strategy. Those firms that have 
been able to manage diversification and have continued to 
pursue this strategy are probably the occupants of the 
Related category which has been shown to have the lowest 
business risk. The Unrelated group are found to occupy 
the mid-range with respect to business risk and this is 
not unexpected given their relatively well-diversified 
portfolios. 
The conclusion is that business risk is not solely 
dependent on internal operating leverage and dependence 
on a particular industry or product. The extent, manner 
and stage of diversification are very important determin-
ants of business risk. 
7.3.2.3.3. Analysis of Beta using ''Treynor's Statistic" 
"Treynor's Statistic"provides a quantitative 
measure of portfolio performance and enables a ranking 
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of portfolios to be made based on both risk and return. 
As such, it is a useful tool to rank the various strat-
egic categories which are, of course, portfolios of firms 
which have adopted similar strategies to achieve their 
objectives. When the risk/return rankings provided by 
the "Treynor Statistic"are evaluated, the Related category 
is shown to be the superior strategy. The market prefers 
moderate diversification and is shown to penalize the 
industry and product-bound firms in the-Single and Dominant 
groups since these latter strategies are ranked last in 
Table 6-25. A further observation of interest can be 
made by examining the ranking of the Unrelated-Passive 
and Conglomerate groups which make up the Unrelated 
category. These strategic categories had been ranked as 
"middle of the road"performers on both Beta and Unlevered 
Beta (see Tables 6-21 and 6-23). When ranked by the 
more meaningful"Treynor Statistic",this group is ranked 
second and confirms the impression that diversification 
is rewarded in the developing economy since the more 
diversified strategies, namely Related and Unrelated, 
are ranked first and second using this measure. 
Unfortunately, no comparable data has been calcu-
lated for any of the developed economies and, thus, a 
comparative analysis between the South African and 
developed economy rankings was impossible. Rumelt employed 
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a crude measure to rank risk and return performance and 
the comparison between the United States and South 
Africa was presented in Table 6-27. The first four 
strategies are clustered in the area suggesting moderate 
diversification, and the first six, which include the 
two Unrelated categories, are all "more diversified" 
strategies. The results are different from those found 
in the United States where no such clustering is evident. 
•, 
417 
7.4. implications of the Research 
Since the end of World War II, the world economic 
system has undergone considerable change~ South Africa, with 
its less developed economy, has lagged behind the development 
of the more mature economies, but has, neverthel~ss, been able 
to produce outstanding growth in its economy. The country has· 
changed from a largely agricultural to a relatively sophisti-
cated industrial nation. The country has overcome problems . 
of infrastructure change and has been able to compete in world 
markets. The economic climate has become more competitive as 
. I 
multinational firms entered the rapidly growing South African 
market. 
This study has shown that South African firms have 
tended to follow the behaviour of firms in the more developed 
economies and have diversified their operations. The structure 
of South African industry has changed and firms appear to have 
responded in very similar fashion to their counterparts in the 
developed economies. The research suggests that South African 
firms lag behind firms in the developed economies by approxi-
mately ten to twenty years. If this pattern of development 
continues to follow that of the mature economies, then South 
African firms will continue to move toward increased diversi-
fication. The Single Business group, which comprises some 34 
percent of South African firms and the Dominant Group, which 
comprises some 39 percent of the firms, can be expected to move 
toward the Related and Unrelated groups at a fairly raiiia pace. 
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'I'he United States composition in 1970 is heavily vleighted 
toward the more diversified strategies as they comprise of 
64,6 percent of the firms studied. The comparable figure for 
South Africa is only 25,4 percent. This move toward increased 
diversity will require considerable change in the organisational 
structures, reward and control systems and demands on manage-
ment. 
South African firms will tend to become more division-
alised in their organisational structures and very much more 
emphasis will be placed on prof it and return measures of per-
formance. The less efficient firms, which adopt low perform-
ance strategies, will be forced to change their managerial 
strategies and styles radically if they are to survive. 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange has proved to be a .very 
poor source of new capital for firms and the move towards 
increased diversification and divisionalisation means that 
the capital generation and allocation process will be incorp-
orated into the firm and not be left to the capital markets. 
Management in a diversified firm decide where to invest and 
what the sources of those funds will be. The capital markets, 
when needed to supply funds, will tend to supply those funds 
to the corporation as a whole and will not be concerned with 
the division or divisions that.will receive these funds. This 
trend has important implications for both bankers and managers 
and will require new skills. 
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The speed at which the move ~award diversified aper-
ations will take place is difficult to gauge, but may be 
slower than that experienced in the developed economies. 
The move toward diversification in these economies took 
I 
place during rapid, global economic growth. 'rhis growth is 
! 
likely to be slower in the future. 
South African firms tend to be more evenly spread 
across the strategic categories than firms in the United 
States and may mean that South African firms have been more 
innovative in. their approach to strategy se.lection. Rather 
than following the strategy of other firms which led to an 
"uneven population"across the strategies, as in the United 
States, the South African results imply that firms have been 
more willing to follow their own intuition and instincts. 
There were a large number of conglomerate firms in South Africa 
in 1976 while there were none in the United States at a com-
parable stage of development. This implies that South 
African firms were more willing to experiment with new strat-
egies and may explain why the conglomerate group are found to 
be a relatively high performance group in South Africa and why 
research in the United States has been unable to identify 
superior performance from United States based conglomerates. 
In addition, the "more diversified"strategies have 
produced very good performance and this implies that the 
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diversified firm, with its emphasis· on ROI and profits and 
aggressive and innovative managerial style, is able to take 
advantage of the economic conditions provided by the develop-
ing economy. This is an important finding since this phenom-
1 
i 
enon does not occur in the mature economy. The diversified 
i 
firms produce only average performance in a mature economy. 
The finding that the "constrained" strategies are 
superior performers when measured on growth and return , 
and yet are seen as fairly high risk firms, raises the 
question of whether firms in these strategies are investing 
for future growth. The markets in which they operate at 
presen.t may be growing rapidly and providing good returns -
yet this group is perceived to have high systematic risk. 
This implies a speculative image among investors. The rapid 
,. 
growth markets in which they are operating may mature and 
these firms may be unable to maintain their records. Thus 
f irrns that are growing rapidly and generating funds should 
begin investing in new, and perhaps unrelated, areas. The 
high systematic risk which th.ese firms exhibit implies that 
the market is not satisfied with high growth and good returns 
alone, and that these measures may be too short term orientated 
to permit the accurate assessment of performance. 
The research findings relating to risk are of con-
siderable importance since management should be concerned with 
both return and risk. The findings'reveal that the market 
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perceives certain strategies as being high risk since strategy 
has a quantifiable impact on systematic risk and on business 
risk. Consequently, the management of a firm which adopts a 
p~rticular strategy should be aware of the impact that the 
strategy will have on the risk profile and therefore, on the 
I 
value of this firm. The objective of management is to create 
wealth, and the value of a firm is heavily dependent on the 
risk element which flows from the strategic posture of the 
firm. 
This research also has certain implications for the 
education of management in South ~frica. If the trend toward 
diversification of operations occurs as expected, this will 
·mean that firms will require more skilled general managers. 
Diversified firms have typically used the divisionalised struct-· 
ure to manage their operations, and these divisions are managed 
by executi~es whose roles are no longer specialist or function-
ally orientated but are roles that require the skills of a 
generalist. Few would argue that the real value in any firm 
lies in its management and their ability to adapt to a changing 
environment and to integrate different functional departments 
within the firm. The research has shown that firms are res-
ponding to their environment by diversifying and these diverse 
divisions will require general managers to integrate the 
management functions within the firm. 
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South Africa will need large numbers. of well-trained 
executives with general management skills over the next ten 
to twenty years. These general manager~ will be required to 
~ully understand their part.:Lcular product-market environment 
and direct operations. Top management will be freed from 
! 
operating management and will be able to concentrate on 'over-
all strategy formulation and to channel funds generated by 
the so-called "cash cows"to the new product and fledgeling 
divisions that will provide the growth and returns in the 
future. 
The Graduate Schools of Business in South Africa will 
thus be called upon to provide the training for the general 
managers required in the future. Business firms should 
support the business schools ~ not only by providing students 
but also by an active involvement in the teaching of managerial 
skills and by providing the schools with case study materials 
and similar assistance. 
7.5. Future Research Possib~lities 
This study is the first to explore the effect of 
diversification strategy on performance and return in the 
developed economy and which has investigated the impact of 
strategy on systematic and business risk. The possible 
future areas for research which would provide the management 
of firms operating in the developing economies with a frame-
work for strategic analysis and decision making that is more 
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meaningful than that produced in the developed economy are:-
7. 5.1. To evaluate the performance and risk of firms that 
adopt di.fferent organisational structures in the 
developing economy. At what stage of diversification 
is it optimal to shift to the divisionalised structure? 
Does the manner of diversification (whether the -. 
strategy is vertical, constrained, linked or unrelated) 
make a performance and risk difference? Why? 
7. 5. 2. To assess the managerial control and reward systerns 
that are adopted by firms adopting different strategies 
and to determine whether these systems affect perform-
ance. 
7.5.3. To determine the causes of the differences in perform-
ance within a strategic category. Why are certain 
firms more successful than other firms that have 
adopted the same strategy? What is the impact of 
industry? Can these differences be explained by the 
reward measurement and control systems and by the 
corporate cultures and climates in the firms? Are 
the more diversified firms more innovative? 
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7.5.4. Why do the Unrelated-Passive group perform so poorly? 
These firms have been found to exhibit high risk and 
poor growth and return performance yet are believed 
to be managed by more professional management. Are 
there any discernable differences between the 
"Diversified Majors" in the United States and those in 
South Africa? 
7.5.5. Further research into the underlying determinants 
systematic risk is needed. Management must be able to 
gauge the impact of strategic v~riables on the risk 
profile of the firm since this is a major determinant 
of the cost of capital. Thus, a more in depth research 
programme on the impact of strategy on the cost of 
capital would be of considerable value and interest. 
Conclusion 
A major problem today is the wide gap between the 
developed and developing countries. The developing countries, 
in order to survive~ are indu~trialising rapidly but are find-
ing that they are unable to compete effectively for a variety 
of reasons. A major premise of this research has been that 
f irrns in the developing countries have adopted management 
strategies that have proved to be successful in the developed 
economy, but that were not suited to their particular stage 
of development and which were inappropriate in their unique 
economic environment. 
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A level of sophistication between the developed and 
developing nations in terms of markets, products, technologies, 
capital markets, distribution systems and managerial skills 
differs considerably. Yet the management of firms continues 
to behave and operate in a manner which of ten suggests a lack 
of appreciation of these important differences. This study 
has shown that: 
South African firms are between ten and twenty yea.rs 
behind United States firms in their development. 
The South African firms can be expected to continue 
to diversify placing considerable strain on, and 
requiririg changes in, their organisational structure~, 
measurement, reward and control systems. That there 
will be a shortage of skilled and experienced general 
managers in the future, unless management recognises 
-the need for change and development and begins planning 
for and making the changes necessary to ensure corpor-
ate (and national) survival. 
That the type and manner of diversification strategy 
has an important effect on growth, and return perform-
ance. 
That "winning" strategies in the developed United 
States environment are not as successful in the local 
environment. 
That high levels of diversif~cation produce above 
average performance in the developing economy, con-
trary to the findings overseas. 
That strategy has a significant impact on systematic 
risk. Other studies which have not employed the. 
more managerially orientated methodology employed here 
have been unable to provide a satisfactory explanation 
of the effect of diversification on return and risk. 
Strategy, as defined in this study, has been found to 
affect the business risk component of total firm risk 
and reveals that the more diversified firm has a lower 
level of "unlevered systematic risk" than the less 
diversified firm. 
That strategy has an important influence on overall 
risk and return as measured by "Treynor's Statistic" and 
that the "more diversified" groups of firms are superior 
when measured using this technique. 
These results are all different from those found in earlier 
studies. This is to be expected since the environments in 
economies at different stages of development are different for 
reasons discussed earlier. This study forms the base from 
which a number of different research projects should flow in 
order to provide management of firms in the developing economy 
with a better understanding of the determinants of growth 
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return and risk so that these managers will be better able 
to direct their firms in the directions which will ensure 
the most efficient utilisation of scarce resources. 
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APPENDIX I REASONS WHY FIHMS DIVERSIFY 
~~~--~~~~~~~~ 
SURVIVAL 
To offset a declining or vanishing market. 
ro compensate for technological obsolescence. 
To offset obsolete facilities. 
To offset declining profit margins. 
To offset an unfavourable geographic location brought about 
by changing economic factors. 
STABILITY 
To eliminate or off set seasonal slumps. 
To offset cyclical fluctuations. 
To maintain employment of the labour force. 
To provide balance between high margin and low margin products. 
To provide balance between old and new products. 
To maintain share of market. 
'ro meet the new products of competitors. 
To tie customers to the firms. 
To distribute risk by serving several markets. 
To maintain an assured source of supply •. 
To assure an outlet for sale of the product . 
. To_ develop a strong competititve supply position by offering 
several close substitute products. 
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, 
To distribute risk by serving several markets. 
To maintain an assured source of supply. 
To assure an outlet for sale of the product. 
To develop a strong competitive supply position by offering 
several close substitute products. 
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Productive Utilization of Resources 
To utilize waste or by-product. 
To maintain balance in vertical integration. 
To utilize excess productive capacity. 
To make use of product innovations from internal technical 
resources. 
To capitalise destructive know-how. 
To make full use of management resources. 
To utilize excess marketing capacity. 
To exploit the value of an established market position, 
trade name or prestige. 
To keep pace with an ever increasing sale of technology. 
To capitalize on company research with existing techniques 
as well ~s its advances in technology. 
To capitalize on a firm's market contacts. 
ADAPTATION TO CHANGING CUSTOMER NEEDS 
To meet the demands or convenience of diversified dealers. 
To meet the specific requests of important individuals 
and/or groups of customers. 
To meet Government requests for national security. 
To improve the performance of existing products (equipment), 
through adding accessories or complementary products. 
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GROWTH 
To counter market situation of present products. 
To reinvest earnings. 
To take advant~ge of unusually attractive mergers or 
·acquisition opportunities. 
To stimulate the sale of basic products. 
To encourage growth for its own sake or to satisfy the 
ambitions of management or owners. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
To realize maximum advantage from the tax structure. 
To salvage or make the best of previously acquired 
products or companies. 
To maintain a reputation for industrial leadership. 
To comply with the desires (or whims) of owners or executives. 
To strengthen the f irra by obtaining new management and 
abilities. 
Source Standt, 'J~homas A., "Program for Product D:lversification 11 
Harvard Business Reviev~, November-December, 1954. 
Pages. 122·-123. 
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APPENDIX II 
LIS'l' OF FIH.MS IN POPULATION 
!SINGLE BUSINESS 
:•--·--·-u-
1/ Aberdare Cables Ltd. 
~ African & Overseas Enterprises Ltd . 
../African Cables Ltd. 
The African Clothing Factory Ltd. 
African Gate Holdings Ltd. 
Alex Ipworth Ltd. · 
Alpha Free State Holdings Ltd. 
Amalgamated J-:..aundries Ltd. 
JArgus Printing & Publishing 
./Associated Engineering S. A. 
vAurochs Investment Co. S.A. 
Bertrams Wines Ltd. 
Co. Ltd • 
Ltd. 
Ltd. 
Back Clothing Corporation Ltd. 
'v Beares Ltd. . 
Bellandia Homes Investments Ltd. 
vBerkshire International S.A. Ltd. 
M. Bertish and Co. Ltd. 
Bitcon Holdings and Trust Co. Ltd. 
Blaiki~-Johnstone Ltd. 
v Bradlows Stores Ltd. 
Buffalo Timber and Hardware Ltd. 
/Burlington Industries Ltd. 
VT. W. Beckett and Company Ltd. 
Capital Cartoria Motor Holding Ltd. 
vcaxton Ltd. 
Chemical Holdings Ltd. 
Oldham and Son Africa Ltd. 
vclaude Neon Lights S.A. Ltd. 
/coates Brothers S.A. Ltd. 
Consolidated Jersey Holdings Ltd. 
Consolidated Textile Mills Ltd. 
Coronation Brick Free State I.'td. 
~Crookes Brothers Ltd. 
v Delswa Ltd. 
Dugson Holdings Ltd. '. 
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./ Duros Ltd. 
Eastern Province Newspapers Ltd. 
Elrnar Holdings Ltd. 
Ernpisal South Africa. Ltd. 
Eriksen Consolidated Holdings Ltd. 
Fairw~ather Fashion Holdings Ltd. 
vFoscnini Ltd. 
vFrasers Ltd. 
vGarlick Ltd. 
Golden Brown Brick and 'rile Co. Ltd. 
Gooderson Hotels Ltd. 
Goodhope Concrete Pipes Ltd. 
Grand Bazaars Ltd. 
Gubb and Inggs Ltd. 
Harrowes Ltd. 
· Hepworths Ltd. 
v Highveld Steel & Vanadimn Corp. Ltd. 
· Illovo Sugar Eitates Ltd. 
vimperial Cold Storage Supply 
v Industrial Selections Ltd. 
James Brown and Harner Ltd. 
\/John Orr Holdings Ltd. 
W. F. Johnstone and Co. Ltd. 
Katz and Lourie Ltd. 
J_,ucys Holdings Ltd. 
MacDonald Forman and Co. Ltd. 
V"'Masonite Africa Ltd. 
·~Metro Cash and Carry Holdings 
Natal Consolidated Ind. Invest. 
Natal Steam Laundries Ltd. 
v O. K. Bazaars 19 2 9 Ltd. 
· · Picardi Hotelle Bpk. 
Premier Metal Co. of S.A. Ltd. 
Premier Portland Cement Rhod. 
Press Supplies Holdings Ltd. 
VProgress Industries Ltd. 
v Putco r_,td. 
~Rex Trueform Cl6thing Co. Ltd. 
Rhodesian Cables Ltd. 
Robbs Holdings Ltd. 
Ropes and Mattings Ltd. 
Safnit Mills Ltd. 
Satmar Ltd. 
Scottish Cables S.A. Ltd. 
,J Sea Products SWA I.td. 
/Silverton Tannery Ltd. 
Simba-Quix Ltd. 
~Sinclair Holdings Ltd. 
S.A. Associated Newspapers Ltd. 
South African Clothing Ind. Ltd. 
S.A. Woollen Mills Ltd. 
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Swaziland Sugar Milling Co. Ltd. 
~ Trade and Industry Acceptance 
v •rowles Edgar Jacobs Ltd. 
v Toyota South Africa Ltd. 
v Utico Holdings Ltd . 
. vunion Cold Storage of S.A. Ltd. 
v Union Steel Corp. of S.A. Ltd. 
v Vaderland Belegging;:; Bpk. 
VVeka Ltd. 
vVereeniging Refractories Ltd. 
Woolworths Holdings Ltd. 
DOMINANT-VER'I' ICAL 
B & S Furniture Company Ltd. 
Bruynzeel Plywoods Ltd. 
v Cullinan Holdings Ltd. 
Dunswart Iron and Steel Works Ltd. 
Eddels Holdings Ltd . 
./General Optical Co. Ltd. 
International Combustion Ltd. 
L.H.L. Engineering Holdings Ltd. 
Lawson Motors Group Ltd. 
vMooi H.iver Textiles Ltd. 
Phil Markel Meubileerders Bpk. 
Pilot Radio & Television Indust. Ltd. 
Rhodesian Pulp Paper Ind. Ltd. 
v'sappi Ltd. 
Steel and Barnett Ltd. 
Stein Brothers Holdings Ltd. 
Stewards and Lloyds of S.A. Ltd. 
S.W.A. Fishing Industries Ltd. 
VM & S. Spitz Footwear Holdings Ltd. 
v Textile Mills 1974 Holding Ltd~ 
'l'ruworths Ltd. 
V Uniewyn Bpk. 
DOMINANT·-CONSTRAINED 
'. 
African Products Manufacturing Ltd. 
Bakers South Africa Ltd. 
Brick Clay Holdings Ltd. 
Bus Bodies S.A. Ltd. 
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Canadian Overseas Packaging Ltd .. 
Columbus Holdings Ltd. 
Comair Holdings Ltd. 
Consolidated Glass Works Ltd. 
Dorman Long Vanderbijl Corp. Ltd. 
Duro Industries Ltd. 
vEdgars Stores Ltd. 
Eureka Rubber Company of S .Ji,.. Ltd. 
v Everi te Ltd. 
Field Industries Africa Ltd. 
~Globe Engineering Works Ltd. 
vGoldf ields Industrial Co:c:p. Ltd. 
Greatermans Stores Ltd. 
vGresharn Industries Ltd. 
~Grinaker Holdings Ltd . 
.('Gypsum Industries Ltd. 
Hendlers Metal Industries Ltd. 
VHortors Ltd. 
v Jabula Foods Ltd. 
Katzenllenbogen Ltd. 
Kohler Brothers Ltd. 
Lamberts Bay Holding-s Ltd. 
H. Lewis and Co. Ltd. 
v Lion Match Co. Ltd. 
Maccabee Industrial Finance Ltd. 
Massey-Ferguson S.A. ~imited. 
· Mathieson and Ashley Ltd. 
v Maccarthy Group I .. td. 
v Metal Box Company of S. A. I,td. 
vMetal Closures Group S.A. Ltd. 
Mitchell Catts Ltd. 
v National Bolts Ltd. 
v National Trading Co. Ltd. 
Oudemeester Group Ltd. 
~ Plate Glass & Shutterprufe Ind. Ltd. 
Premier Paper Mills Ltd. 
Prima Industrial. Holdings Ltd. 
Rand Carbide Ltd. 
Reunert & Lenz Ltd. 
v South l~frican Druggists Ltd. 
v Steel Metals Ltd. 
v'std. Brass Iron Steel Foundries Ltd. 
" J Tegniese & Ind. Be leggings Bpk. 
p JTiger Oats & National Milling Ltd. 
Trio Rand S.A. Bpk. 
United Oceana Holdings Ltd. 
Williruns Hunt South Africa Ltd. 
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DOMINli..N'l'·- T.: I NI\ED 
~ Berzack Brother~ Holdings Ltd. 
v Cernentation Company A.frica Ltd. 
De Beer Industrial Corp. Ltd. 
Dunlop South Africa Ltd. 
Evelyn Haddon & Co. Ltd. 
Finance Company Ind. Holdings Ltd. 
Hart Ltd. 
Howden Group South Africa Ltd. 
Natal Canvas Rubber Manufact. Ltd. 
Northern F-ree State Motors Ltd. 
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd. 
v Pretoria Portland Cement Co. Ltd. 
VRembrandt Beherende Beleg. Bpk. 
v Hcmbrandt Group Ltd. 
Rhodesian Brick and Potteries Ltd. 
Rhodesia Cement Ltd. 
Russell Holdings Ltd. 
South African Marine Corp. Ltd. 
v Trencor Ltd. 
S. M. van Achterbergh Ltd. 
vWelf . .tt Oddy Holdings Ltd. 
Wispeco Holdings Ltd. 
DOMINAWr- UNRELATED 
Capital Gold and ~xploration Ltd. 
Charmfit Holdings Ltd. 
Coal By-Products & Investments Ltd. 
Hippo Holdings Co. Ltd. 
Hugh Parker Limited. 
Kaap Kunene Beleggings Bpk. 
Marine Products Ltd. 
Marshall Industrials Ltd . 
./ Metair Investments Ltd. 
Manis and Fattis Industries Ltd. 
vSakers Finance & Invest. Corp. Ltd. 
Samuel Osborne S.A. Ltd. 
v South Atlantic Corpora ti on Ltd~­
/ Suncrush Ltd. 
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RELATED·-CONSTRAINED 
/ A .. E:. & C. I. Ltd. 
· ~ Afrikaanse Pers. 196= Beperk. 
# J Anglo Alpha Cement Ltd. 
/ASEA Electric South Africa Ltd. 
~ Associated Furniture Companies Ltd. 
>( Autolec Ltd •. 
./ Bouma t Ltd. 
Brick and Potteries Company Ltd. 
•Crown Mills Holdings Ltd. 
/Edward L. Bateman Ltd. 
Gallo Africa Ltd. 
/General Tire and Rubber Co. Ltd. 
Golden Arrow Investments Ltd. 
Hubert Davies and Co. Ltd. 
Industrial Investment Co. Ltd .. 
Malcomess-Bakke Ltd. 
v Murray and Roberts Holdings ttd. 
Natal Chemical Syndicate Ltd. 
Ryan Nigel Corporation J_,td. 
~ Tollgate Holdings Ltd. 
RELA'I'ED-· LINI<ED 
~-:YUe Circle Cement Ltd. 
° C.N.A. Investments Ltd. 
Clarke Chapman Africa Ltd. 
Derma.cult Ltd. 
c. J. Puchs Ltd. 
VL.T.A. IJtd. 
~Metje and Ziegler Ltd. 
National Airways & Finance Corp. Ltd. 
Propan Ltd. 
Shipwrights and Engineers Hold. Ltd. 
' S.A. Bias Binding Manufacturers Ltd. 
Primrose Industrial Holdings (U.K) Ltd. 
J Sentrachem Ltd. · 
Stuttaford and Co .. Ltd. 
Tongaat Group Ltd. 
Wellworths Stores & Bazaars Ltd. 
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UNRELATED-PASSIVE 
J Advance Holdin9s Ltd. 
Amalgamated Medical Services Ltd. 0 
v Bonnskor Limited 
v- Bromain Holdings Ltd. 
Curries Motors 1946 Ltd. 0 
Desiree International Ltd. 
vDiroyal Investments Ltd. 
v Industrial and Con@ercial Hold. Ltd. 
~Ovenstone Investments Ltd . 
. vPremier Industries :Ltd. 
11 Rentmeesterbeleggings Bpk. 
Sand Consolidated Invest~ Ltd. 
Searles Holdings Ltd. 0 
G. H. Starck Ltd. 
vSuiderland Development Corp. Ltd. 
S.A. General Industries Ltd. 
Teal Holdings Ltd. 
Turf Holdings Ltd. 
Woolfsons Holdings Ltd. 
CONGLOMERATE 
. • 
J Abercom Investments Ltd. 
J Adcock Ingram (Che.mists) Ltd. 
-../Anglo American Ind. Corporation Ltd. 
vAnglo-Transvaal Industries Ltd. 
~Barlow Rand Ltd. 
V'Calan Ltd. 
Elgin Fireclay Holdings Ltd . 
../ Federale Volksbeleggings Bpk. 
vHuletts Corporation Ltd. 
1 Lonrho Ltd. 
\/'Picardi Beleggings Bpk. 
v Protea Holdings Ltd. 
vRennies Consolidated Holdings Ltd. 
vSouth African Breweries Ltd. 
Scots African Finance Co. Ltd. 
v W & A Investment Corporation Ltd . 
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